Entwurf einer Psychologie 1 — Sigmund Freud

Editor’s Note

The following manuscript was written in the autumn of 1895. The first and second parts (p. 305 ff.) were initiated on a train journey after a meeting with Fliess (letter from September 23, 1895; part of the manuscript was written in pencil) and completed (see the date at the end of the manuscript) on September 25. The third part (p. 360 ff.) was begun (see the date at the beginning of the manuscript) on October 5, 1895. On October 8, the entire manuscript, containing all three parts, was sent to Fliess.

A fourth part, intended to address the psychology of repression—regarded by Freud as “the core of the riddle”—was evidently never completed. During his work on this problem, Freud’s doubts about the fruitfulness of the approach attempted in the draft grew stronger. These doubts arose shortly after the completion of the work, which had begun with feverish enthusiasm. By November 29, 1895 (letter No. 36), Freud was already skeptical: “I no longer understand the state of mind in which I hatched this psychology.”

In his letter dated January 1, 1896 (No. 35), he attempted a revision of his assumptions regarding the relationship between the three types of neurons, particularly clarifying the role of the “perception neurons.” More than a year after drafting the “Project,” Freud’s ideas had developed to the point where he outlined a model of the psychic apparatus in nearly the same terms as it is presented in the seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams (letter No. 52, dated December 6, 1896). Since that time, Freud’s interest in attempting to describe the psychic apparatus in terms of brain physiology had waned. Years later, Freud alluded to the failure of his efforts in this direction with the following words:

“It is an unshakable result of research that mental activity is tied to the function of the brain as it is to no other organ. A step further—how far, we do not know—is the discovery of the inequality of brain parts and their specific relationships to certain bodily organs and mental activities. But all attempts to deduce from this a localization of mental processes—attempts, for instance, to think of ideas as stored in nerve cells and excitations traveling along nerve fibers—have completely failed.” (The Unconscious, 1915, Collected Works, Vol. X, p. 273)

Modern brain physiology largely shares this view. For further reference, see the notable work by E. D. Adrian, The Mental and Physical Origins of Behaviour, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 1946, Vol. XXVII, pp. 1–6.

However, couched in the language of brain physiology, the Project contains a wealth of concrete psychological hypotheses, general theoretical assumptions, and scattered hints. Many of these ideas entered Freud’s writings after the necessary restructuring prompted by his abandonment of the physiological approach; some have become integral components of psychoanalytic hypotheses. Other parts of the Project, such as the treatment of the psychology of thought in the third part (p. 360 ff.), have not received comparable attention in Freud’s writings, even though some of the ideas developed there could easily be integrated into the system of psychoanalytic hypotheses.

The direct continuation of the Project in Freud’s writings can be found in The Interpretation of Dreams. However, the reformulation of the nature of the psychic apparatus, as attempted in the seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams, falls short, at least in one respect, of the assumptions made in the Project—namely, the role of the perceptual function could not be fully clarified there. (See also Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams, 1917, Collected Works, Vol. X, p. 412.) The resolution of this issue only emerged through Freud’s assumptions regarding the psychic structure, as they developed after The Ego and the Id (1923). This approach, however, had been anticipated in the Project through the thoroughly reasoned assumption of a continuously energized ego organization, which reappeared in Freud’s thinking after a thirty-year interval.

At the time of writing the Project, Freud’s interest was mainly focused on the neurophysiological aspects. With the failure of the hypotheses in this area, other considerations were temporarily set aside. This likely applies particularly to the assumptions about the ego, which in the Project are linked to a specifically distinguished group of neurons.

Immediately after completing the manuscript, Freud’s interest turned to other questions. With his return to clinical work in the autumn, the theory of neuroses moved to the forefront, and the crucial discovery from the autumn of 1895 concerns the distinction between the genetic conditions of obsessional neurosis and hysteria (letters No. 34 ff.).

To assist the reader in understanding the relationships between the highly condensed ideas presented, we have included a table of contents and, through annotations, occasionally point to sections of the work where a newly introduced topic is later continued.

Part I: General Plan

Introduction
First Fundamental Principle: The Quantitative Conception
Second Fundamental Principle: The Neuron Theory
The Contact Barriers
The Biological Perspective
The Problem of Quantity
Pain
The Problem of Quality
Consciousness
The Functioning of the Apparatus
The ( )-Conductions
The Experience of Satisfaction
The Experience of Pain
Affects and States of Desire
Introduction of the “Ego”
Primary and Secondary Processes
Recognition and Reproductive Thinking
Memory and Judgment
Thinking and Reality
Primary Processes: Sleep and Dream
Dream Analysis
Dream Consciousness

Part II: Psychopathology. Psychopathology of Hysteria

The Hysterical Compulsion
The Development of the Hysterical Compulsion
Pathological Defense
The Hysterical prōton pseudos
Conditions of the prōton pseudos in Hysteria
Disturbance of Thinking through Affect

Part III: Attempt to Represent Normal ψ-Processes

Normal Psychic Processes

1. GENERAL OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this draft is to provide a natural science-based psychology, i.e., to present psychic processes as quantitatively defined states of observable material parts, thereby making them comprehensible and free of contradictions. The draft contains two main ideas:

To interpret what differentiates activity from rest as a quantity (Q) subject to the general laws of motion.
To consider neurons as the material particles involved.

N and (Qη): Similar attempts are now common.

FIRST FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE
The Quantitative Interpretation

This principle is directly derived from pathological-clinical observations, particularly in cases involving excessive mental representations, such as hysteria and obsessive-compulsive neurosis, where—as will be shown—the quantitative characteristics are more pronounced than in normal conditions. Processes such as stimulation, substitution, conversion, and discharge, which were described in these contexts, directly suggested the interpretation of neuronal excitation as flowing quantities. An attempt to generalize these findings did not appear unjustifiable.

From this perspective, a fundamental principle of neuronal activity concerning quantity (Q) could be established. This principle promised significant insights, as it seemed to encompass the entirety of neuronal function. It is the principle of neuronal inertia, which states that neurons strive to rid themselves of quantities. The structure, development, and performance of neurons must be understood in this context.

The principle of inertia initially explains the dual structure of neurons into motor and sensory types, as a mechanism to counteract the intake of quantities by releasing them. The reflex movement, as a fixed form of this discharge, now becomes understandable. The inertia principle provides the motive for reflex movements.

Tracing this back further, the neuronal system is first seen as inheriting the general excitability of protoplasm, linked with an excitable external surface, interrupted over larger regions by inexcitable areas. A primary neuronal system uses the quantity (Qη) acquired this way to discharge it through connections to muscular mechanisms, thus maintaining itself free of excitation. This discharge represents the primary function of neuronal systems.

This creates the possibility of a secondary function, wherein certain discharge pathways are preferred and maintained, particularly those associated with the cessation of stimuli, i.e., stimulus avoidance. Generally, a proportion exists between the amount of excitation and the effort required for stimulus avoidance, such that the principle of inertia remains undisturbed.

However, the principle of inertia is disrupted from the outset by another factor: With the increasing complexity of the organism’s interior, the neuronal system also receives stimuli from the body itself—endogenous stimuli, which must likewise be discharged. These stimuli originate from body cells and form the basis of major needs: hunger, respiration, and sexuality. The organism cannot escape these internal stimuli as it can with external ones; it cannot use their quantities (Q) for stimulus avoidance. These stimuli only cease under specific conditions that must be fulfilled in the external world, e.g., the need for food.

To perform these actions, which deserve to be called specific actions, the organism requires an effort that is independent of endogenous quantities (Qη) and is generally greater since the individual is placed under conditions that can be described as the necessities of life. Consequently, the neuronal system is forced to abandon its original tendency toward inertia, i.e., a level of Q = 0. It must accept a reserve of quantity to meet the demands of specific actions.

However, in how it does this, the system shows a continuation of the same tendency, now modified to strive to keep the quantity (Qη) as low as possible and resist its increase, i.e., to maintain it constant. All functions of the neuronal system can be categorized under either the primary function or the secondary function, which is imposed by the necessities of life.

SECOND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE
The Neuronal Theory

The idea of combining this quantitative theory (Qη) with the knowledge of neurons provided by modern histology forms the second pillar of this theory. The main content of this new understanding is that the neuronal system consists of distinct neurons of uniform construction, which touch each other through intervening substances. These neurons terminate at foreign tissue elements where certain directions of activity are preformed: they receive signals via cell extensions and discharge them via axon cylinders. Additionally, neurons branch out extensively with variations in caliber.

Combining this representation of neurons with the interpretation of the quantity theory (Qη) results in the concept of an occupied neuron (N), which is filled with a certain quantity (Qη) at times, while at other times, it may be empty. The principle of inertia is expressed in the assumption of a flow directed from cell conduits or extensions to the axon cylinder. The individual neuron thus becomes a microcosm of the entire neuronal system, with its dual structure, where the axon cylinder serves as the discharge organ.

The secondary function, which requires the accumulation of quantity (Qη), becomes possible through the assumption of resistances opposing discharge. The structure of neurons suggests placing these resistances entirely in the contacts, which thus take on the role of barriers. The assumption of contact barriers proves fruitful in many respects.

The Contact Barriers

The justification for this assumption arises from considering that conduction here occurs over undifferentiated protoplasm, rather than over differentiated protoplasm within the neuron, which is likely better suited for conduction. This suggests the idea of linking conduction ability to differentiation, such that one might expect the conduction process itself to create differentiation in the protoplasm, thereby establishing better conduction ability for future transmissions.

Furthermore, the contact barrier theory permits the following applications:
A primary characteristic of nervous tissue is memory, that is, in general, the ability to be permanently altered by a single occurrence. This represents a striking contrast to the behavior of a material that permits wave motion to pass through and subsequently returns to its previous state. Any noteworthy psychological theory must provide an explanation for “memory.”

Every such explanation faces the difficulty that it must assume, on the one hand, that neurons are permanently altered by excitation, while on the other hand, it cannot be denied that new excitations generally encounter the same receptive conditions as previous ones. Thus, neurons must be both influenced and unchanged, unbiased.

We cannot currently conceive of a mechanism capable of such a complex function. Therefore, the solution lies in attributing the lasting influence of excitation to one class of neurons and the immutability, that is, the freshness for new excitations, to another. This gave rise to the practical distinction between “perception cells” and “memory cells,” which, however, has not been integrated into any other framework and cannot itself be substantiated.

If the contact barrier theory adopts this solution, it can express it as follows: There are two classes of neurons. First, those that allow quantities (Qη) to pass as if they had no contact barriers, remaining in the same state after each excitation as they were before. Second, those whose contact barriers manifest themselves, allowing quantities (Qη) to pass only with difficulty or partially. The latter can exist in a different state after each excitation than before, thereby offering a possibility to represent memory.

Thus, there are permeable neurons (offering no resistance and retaining nothing) that serve perception, and impermeable neurons (associated with resistance and retaining quantities (Qη)) that act as carriers of memory and probably of psychic processes in general. I will henceforth call the former system of neurons Φ and the latter ψ.

It is now useful to clarify the assumptions about ψ-neurons that are necessary to account for the most general characteristics of memory. The argument is as follows: ψ-neurons are permanently altered by the excitation process. When integrated with the contact barrier theory: their contact barriers enter a permanently altered state.

Since psychological experience shows that overlearning is possible based on memory, this alteration must consist of the contact barriers becoming more conductive, less impermeable, and thus more similar to those of the Φ-system. This state of the contact barriers will be referred to as the degree of facilitation. One can then say: memory is represented by the facilitations present between ψ-neurons.

If we assume that all ψ-contact barriers were equally facilitated or offered the same resistance—which amounts to the same thing—the characteristics of memory would clearly not emerge. Memory is evidently one of the determining, guiding forces in relation to excitation processes, and if all facilitations were uniform, there would be no preference for one path over another. It is therefore more accurate to say: memory is represented by the differences in facilitation between ψ-neurons.

What determines the facilitation in ψ-neurons?
Psychological experience indicates that memory, i.e., the enduring impact of an experience, depends on a factor referred to as the strength of the impression and on the frequency of repetition of the same impression. Translated into the theory: facilitation depends on the quantity (Qη) passing through the neuron during the excitation process and on the number of repetitions of the process.

Thus, quantity (Qη) emerges as the active factor, facilitation as the result of quantity (Qη), and, at the same time, facilitation as what can replace quantity.

One instinctively recalls here the original tendency of neuronal systems, maintained through all modifications, to avoid the burden of quantity (Qη) or to reduce it as much as possible. Forced by the necessities of life, the neuronal system has had to establish a reserve of quantity (Qη). To achieve this, it required an increase in the number of its neurons, and these had to be impermeable. Now, it spares itself the fulfillment with quantity (Qη)—at least partially—by establishing facilitations. Thus, facilitations serve the primary function.

One further application of the memory requirement to the contact barrier theory:
Generally, each ψ-neuron must be attributed multiple connections to other neurons, that is, multiple contact barriers. This forms the basis for the possibility of selection, determined by facilitation.

It is now evident that the state of facilitation of one contact barrier must be independent of that of all other contact barriers of the same ψ-neuron; otherwise, there would again be no preference, and thus no motive. From this, one can draw a negative conclusion about the nature of the facilitated state.

If one imagines a neuron filled with quantity (Q)—that is, occupied—this quantity (Q) can only be assumed to be evenly distributed across all regions of the neuron, including all its contact barriers. In contrast, it is easy to conceive that, with a flowing quantity (Qη), only one specific path through the neuron is taken, such that only one contact barrier is affected by the flowing quantity (Qη) and retains facilitation afterward.

Therefore, facilitation cannot be based on a retained occupation; otherwise, differences in facilitation between the contact barriers of the same neuron would not arise.

What facilitation otherwise consists of remains undetermined. One might initially think of the absorption of quantity (Qη) by the contact barriers. Perhaps further clarity will be achieved later. The quantity (Qη) that has left behind facilitation is likely discharged precisely because of the facilitation, which makes the barrier more permeable.

Moreover, it is not necessary that the facilitation remaining after a flow of quantity (Qη) is as great as it had to be during the flow. It is possible that only a portion of it remains as permanent facilitation. In this sense, it is also unclear whether it makes a difference if a quantity 3Qη flows all at once or if a quantity Qη flows three times.

All this is subject to later adjustments of the theory to psychological facts.

The Biological Perspective

With the assumption of two neuronal systems, Φ and ψ, where Φ consists of permeable elements and ψ of impermeable ones, a unique feature of the neuronal system—its ability to retain and yet remain receptive—seems to be explained. All psychic acquisition would then consist of the structuring of the ψ-system through the partial and topically specific removal of resistance in the contact barriers that distinguish Φ from ψ. With the progression of this process, the neuronal system’s freshness for receiving stimuli would indeed encounter a limit.

However, anyone scientifically engaged in constructing hypotheses will begin to take their propositions seriously only when these can be integrated into broader knowledge from multiple perspectives and when the arbitrary nature of their constructio ad hoc can be mitigated. Our contact barrier hypothesis will likely face criticism for postulating two fundamentally distinct classes of neurons with fundamentally different functional conditions, for which no independent justification initially exists. Morphologically, that is, histologically, no support for this distinction is known.

Where else could a justification for this classification be found? If possible, it must come from the biological evolution of the neuronal system, which, like everything else, is something that has gradually developed. One would want to know whether the two classes of neurons could have had biologically distinct significance and, if so, by what mechanism they might have evolved into their vastly different characteristics of permeability and impermeability. Naturally, the most satisfactory outcome would be if the mechanism sought could be derived from the primitive biological role itself; this would address both questions with a single answer.

Now, we recall that from the very beginning, the neuronal system had two functions: to receive stimuli from the external world and to discharge excitations generated endogenously. The latter obligation, imposed by the necessities of life, necessitated further biological evolution. One might then hypothesize that our systems Φ and ψ correspond to these two primary obligations: Φ being the group of neurons exposed to external stimuli, while ψ contains the neurons that receive endogenous excitations. In this case, we would not have invented the systems Φ and ψ but rather discovered them. What remains is to identify them with known structures.

In fact, anatomy reveals a system of neurons (the spinal gray matter) that is exclusively connected to the external world, and a superimposed system (the brain gray matter), which has no direct peripheral connections but where the development of the neuronal system and psychic functions are rooted. The primary brain aligns well with our characterization of the ψ-system if we may assume that the brain has direct and independent pathways to the body’s interior, separate from Φ. The origin and original biological significance of the primary brain are not known to anatomists; according to our theory, it would simply be a sympathetic ganglion, plainly stated. Here lies the first opportunity to test the theory against actual material.

For the time being, we identify the ψ-system with the brain gray matter. It is now easy to understand, based on the introductory biological remarks, that ψ is subject to further development through the proliferation of neurons and the accumulation of quantities, and to see how practical it is for ψ to consist of impermeable neurons. Otherwise, it could not meet the demands of specific action. But by what means did ψ acquire the property of impermeability?

Φ also has contact barriers; if these play no significant role, why do the contact barriers of ψ? The assumption of an original difference in the valuation of the contact barriers of Φ and ψ again carries the unfortunate appearance of arbitrariness. However, following Darwinian reasoning, one could now appeal to the indispensability and thus the survival of impermeable neurons.

A More Plausible Alternative

A different approach seems both more productive and less demanding. Recall that even the contact barriers of ψ-neurons are ultimately subject to facilitation, and that it is the quantity (Qη) that facilitates them. The greater the quantity in the excitation process, the greater the facilitation—that is, the closer they become to the characteristics of Φ-neurons. Let us, therefore, locate the differences not in the neurons themselves but in the quantities with which they deal. It can then be assumed that the quantities acting on Φ-neurons are so large that the resistance of the contact barriers becomes negligible, whereas the quantities reaching ψ-neurons are of the same order as the resistance of these barriers.

Thus, a Φ-neuron would become impermeable and a ψ-neuron permeable if we could exchange their topologies and connections. However, they retain their respective characters because the Φ-neuron connects only with the periphery, while the ψ-neuron connects only with the body’s interior. The essential difference is replaced by a difference in environmental circumstances.

Testing This Hypothesis

Now we must examine whether it can be claimed that the quantities of stimuli originating from the external periphery are of a higher order than those from the body’s internal periphery. There is indeed much to support this.

First, it is unquestionable that the external world is the source of all significant energy quantities, as it consists of powerful, intensely moving masses that propagate their motion. The Φ-system, oriented toward this external world, would be tasked with discharging the quantities (Qη) penetrating the neurons as quickly as possible but would nevertheless be exposed to the influence of large quantities (Q).

The ψ-system, as far as we know, is disconnected from the external world. It receives quantities (Q) only from two sources: Φ-neurons themselves and cellular elements within the body’s interior. It now becomes a matter of demonstrating that these quantities of stimuli are likely to be of a lower order of magnitude. Initially, it may seem troubling that we must attribute two such different sources of stimuli—Φ and internal body cells—to the ψ-neurons. However, recent histological findings on neuronal systems adequately address this concern. These studies reveal that neuron terminations and neuron connections share the same structural type; neurons terminate upon each other in the same manner as they do on body elements. It is likely that the functional processes in both cases are similar. It can also be expected that endogenous stimuli are of an intercellular magnitude similar to that observed in these nerve endings.

Here, then, is a second avenue for testing the theory.

The Problem of Quantity

I have no knowledge of the absolute magnitude of intercellular stimuli but will permit myself the assumption that they are of smaller magnitude and on the same scale as the resistances of the contact barriers, which makes this assumption intuitively plausible. With this assumption, the essential similarity of Φ and ψ neurons is preserved, and their differences in terms of permeability are biologically and mechanically explained.

While there is a lack of direct evidence, the perspectives and interpretations tied to the above assumption are particularly intriguing. First, after forming a correct impression of the magnitudes of quantities (Q) in the external world, one may ask whether the original tendency of the neuronal system to maintain quantity (Q) at zero is satisfied merely by rapid discharge or whether this tendency might already be active during stimulus reception. Indeed, we observe that Φ-neurons do not terminate freely at the periphery but rather beneath cellular formations that receive external stimuli on their behalf. These so-called nerve-end apparatuses, in the broadest sense, might serve the purpose of dampening external quantities (Q) rather than allowing them to act on Φ unchanged. They would then function as quantity shields, permitting only fractions of external quantities (Q) to pass through.

This interpretation aligns with the fact that the other type of nerve termination, the free one—without end organs—prevails significantly at the inner periphery of the body. There, quantity shields appear unnecessary, likely because the quantities (Qη) to be received do not require suppression to intercellular levels but are already of that order.

Given that the quantities (Q) absorbed by the terminations of Φ-neurons can be calculated, this may provide a means of estimating the magnitudes of quantities active between ψ-neurons, which correspond to the resistance of the contact barriers.

A Structural Tendency in the Neuronal System

This leads to the hypothesis of a broader trend governing the construction of the neuronal system: a progressively greater exclusion of quantity (Qη) from neurons. Thus, the structure of the neuronal system likely serves the purpose of exclusion, while its function facilitates the discharge of quantity (Qη) from neurons.

Pain

All biological mechanisms have operational limits, beyond which they fail. Such failures manifest in phenomena bordering on the pathological, serving as normal prototypes for pathological conditions. We have observed that the neuronal system is organized to block large external quantities (Q) from reaching both Φ and, to an even greater extent, ψ. The nerve-end shields and the indirect connection of ψ to the external world serve this purpose.

Is there a phenomenon that corresponds to the failure of these mechanisms? I believe it is pain.

Everything we know about pain supports this view. The neuronal system exhibits a decisive tendency toward pain avoidance, which reflects the primary inclination to resist increases in quantitative tension (Qη). From this, we infer that pain consists of the intrusion of large quantities (Q) into ψ. Thus, the two tendencies—resistance to tension and pain avoidance—are fundamentally the same.

Pain activates both the Φ and ψ systems. It encounters no barriers to conduction and is the most commanding of all processes. The ψ-neurons appear to be permeable to it, suggesting that pain arises from the action of quantities (Q) of a higher order.

Pain Stimuli

The triggers for pain are twofold:

Quantitative increases: Any sensory excitation tends toward pain as the stimulus intensifies, even in the highest sensory organs. This can be understood directly as a failure of the system.
Low external quantities: Pain also occurs in the presence of small external quantities, regularly associated with the disruption of continuity, i.e., when external quantities (Q) act directly on the ends of Φ-neurons without passing through nerve-end apparatuses.

This characterizes pain as the intrusion of excessively large quantities (Q) into Φ and ψ, that is, quantities of an even higher order than the normal Φ-stimuli.

The fact that pain uses all available discharge pathways is easy to understand. According to our theory, pain leaves permanent facilitations in ψ, as the passage of quantity (Q) facilitates conduction, possibly reducing the resistance of the contact barriers entirely and establishing a pathway similar to that in Φ.

The Problem of Quality

Until now, we have not addressed a major demand placed on any psychological theory beyond its contributions from the natural sciences. Such a theory must explain the phenomena we know in the most enigmatic way—through our consciousness. Since this consciousness knows nothing of the previously discussed assumptions—quantities and neurons—it must also account for its own ignorance.

Immediately, we become aware of a premise that has guided us thus far. We have treated psychic processes as something that could lack direct awareness through consciousness and exist independently of it. We are prepared to find that some of our assumptions are not confirmed by consciousness. If we are not misled by this, it follows from the premise that consciousness provides neither a complete nor a reliable account of neuronal processes. These processes are to be regarded initially as unconscious and inferred like other natural phenomena.

Nonetheless, the contents of consciousness must be integrated into our quantitative ψ-processes. Consciousness provides us with what we call qualities—sensations that differ in a wide variety of ways and whose differences relate to the external world. These differences form sequences, similarities, and so forth, but they do not inherently contain quantities.

One can ask: How do qualities arise, and where do they arise? These are questions that require careful investigation and can only be addressed tentatively here.

Where Do Qualities Arise?

Not in the external world, as our scientific understanding— to which psychology must also conform—holds that outside there are only moving masses and nothing more. Could they arise in the Φ-system? While it aligns with the fact that qualities are tied to perception, this contradicts all arguments that rightly place the seat of consciousness in higher levels of the neuronal system. Therefore, they must arise in the ψ-system. However, there is a significant objection to this: in perception, the Φ and ψ systems are active together, yet there exists a psychological process that takes place exclusively within ψ, namely reproduction or memory. Memory, generally speaking, is devoid of qualities. Recall does not normally reproduce the specific qualities of perceptual experiences.

This encourages the hypothesis that there might be a third system of neurons, perhaps called perceptual neurons, which are excited during perception but not during reproduction. The states of excitation in these neurons would give rise to various qualities, i.e., conscious sensations.

The Role of Consciousness and Perception Neurons

If we consider that our consciousness only delivers qualities, while the natural sciences recognize only quantities, a defining characteristic of the perceptual neurons becomes apparent. While science aims to reduce all qualities of our sensations to external quantities, it is expected that the structure of the neuronal system would consist of mechanisms to transform external quantities into qualities, thereby affirming the original tendency to block quantities. The nerve-end apparatuses acted as shields, permitting only fractions of external quantities to act on Φ, while Φ itself handled the rough discharge of quantities. The ψ-system was already protected from higher-order quantities, dealing only with intercellular magnitudes. Extending this, we may hypothesize that the third system operates with even smaller quantities.

One suspects that the character of quality (conscious sensation) only emerges where quantities are minimized. They cannot, however, be completely eliminated, as perceptual neurons must also be conceived as filled with quantity (Qη) and striving for discharge.

An Apparent Difficulty

This leads to a significant challenge: permeability is dependent on the influence of quantity (Qη), and ψ-neurons are already impermeable. With even smaller quantities (Qη), the perceptual neurons would need to be even less penetrable. However, such a property cannot be attributed to the carriers of consciousness. The variability of content, the fleeting nature of consciousness, and the ease with which simultaneously perceived qualities are associated, all point to full permeability of the perceptual neurons, with complete restitution to their original state. Perceptual neurons behave like sensory organs and would be ill-suited for memory functions.

Thus, perceptual neurons must exhibit permeability and full facilitation, which cannot stem from quantities. From where, then, does it originate?

A Revised Hypothesis on Quantity Flow

I see only one solution: revising the fundamental assumption about the flow of quantities (Qη). Until now, I have considered it solely as the transfer of quantity (Qη) from one neuron to another. However, it must also possess a temporal nature, as the mechanics of physical motion in the external world also retain this temporal characteristic. Let us call this characteristic the period.

I propose that all resistance at contact barriers applies only to the transmission of quantity (Q), but the period of neuronal motion propagates unimpeded everywhere, as if by induction.

Period and Consciousness

This hypothesis requires significant physical clarification, as the general laws of motion must apply here without contradiction. The assumption extends further: perceptual neurons are incapable of absorbing quantities (Qη) but instead adopt the period of excitation. This state of affection by the period, with the least quantity fulfillment (Qη), forms the basis of consciousness.

Even ψ-neurons have their own periods, but these are qualityless, or better said, monotonous. Deviations from this inherent psychic period appear in consciousness as qualities.

Origins of Period Differences

The origins of period differences point unmistakably to the sensory organs, whose qualities are represented by various periods of neuronal motion. Sensory organs act not only as quantity shields, like all nerve apparatuses, but also as filters, allowing stimuli of certain periods to pass. They likely transfer these differences to Φ, imparting to neuronal motion analogous variations in periods (specific energies). These modifications propagate from Φ through ψ to W, where they generate conscious sensations of qualities when nearly devoid of quantities.

However, this propagation of qualities is not durable. It leaves no traces and is not reproducible.

Consciousness

Only through such complex and abstract assumptions have I been able to integrate the phenomena of consciousness into the framework of quantitative psychology.

An explanation of why excitation processes in perceptual neurons (N) bring about consciousness is, of course, unattainable. The goal is merely to align the known properties of consciousness with parallel processes in perceptual neurons (N). On this point, the correlation is relatively satisfactory.

The Relation of This Theory to Others

A brief word on the relationship of this theory of consciousness to others. According to an advanced mechanistic theory, consciousness is a mere adjunct to physiological-psychological processes, and its absence would not alter psychic functioning. Another view holds that consciousness is the subjective aspect of all psychic events and thus inseparable from physiological processes of the mind.

The theory presented here stands between these two positions. Consciousness, in this view, is the subjective aspect of a subset of physical processes in the neuronal system, namely perceptual processes (ω-processes). The absence of consciousness does not leave psychic processes unchanged; rather, it entails the loss of contributions from the W (ω) system.

Representing consciousness through perceptual neurons (ωN) carries several implications. These neurons must have an outlet, however small, and a means of fulfilling themselves with a minimal required amount of quantity (Qη). The outlet, like all others, points toward motor activity, where every quality or specific period is evidently lost. The fulfillment of perceptual neurons with quantity (Qη) likely originates in ψ, as we do not assign this third system any direct connection to Φ.

The original biological role of perceptual neurons remains unknown.

We have thus far described the content of consciousness incompletely

It exhibits, besides the series of sensory qualities, another, very different series: that of pleasure and displeasure sensations, which now require interpretation. Since we are aware of a definite tendency in psychic life to avoid displeasure, we are inclined to identify this with the primary tendency of inertia. If so, displeasure would correspond to an increase in the quantitative level (Qη) or quantitative pressure, and perception would represent the sensation of this increase in ψ. Conversely, pleasure would represent the sensation of discharge.

Since the W-system is thought to be fulfilled by ψ, we can assume that with a higher ψ-level, occupancy in W increases, while it decreases with a falling level. Pleasure and displeasure would thus be sensations of the system W‘s own occupancy, its own level, with W and ψ functioning as communicating vessels. In this way, the quantitative processes in (ψ) would reach consciousness, again as qualities.

As pleasure and displeasure sensations emerge, the ability to perceive sensory qualities diminishes, as these lie in a neutral zone between pleasure and displeasure. Translated, this means that the perceptual neurons (ωN) function optimally at a certain level of occupancy: with stronger occupancy, displeasure arises; with weaker, pleasure—until perceptive capacity vanishes with the lack of occupancy. Based on such data, a corresponding movement pattern could be constructed.

Functioning of the Apparatus

We can now form the following picture of the operation of the apparatus composed of Φ, ψ, and ω systems:

External excitatory magnitudes strike the ends of the Φ-system, where they first encounter the nerve-end apparatuses and are reduced to fractions, likely of a higher order than intercellular stimuli (perhaps of the same order?). Here lies the first threshold: below a certain quantity, no effective fraction is produced, meaning the effectiveness of stimuli is confined to moderate quantities. Additionally, the nature of nerve-end covers acts as a filter, so that not every kind of stimulus can act on every nerve-end.

The stimuli that do reach the Φ-neurons possess both quantitative and qualitative characteristics, forming a continuum of the same quality in the external world, increasing in quantity from the threshold to the pain limit.

While external processes form a continuum in terms of quantity and period (quality), the corresponding stimuli are first reduced in quantity, second bounded within a range, and discontinuous in quality, such that certain periods are not effective as stimuli at all.

Transmission and Representation

The qualitative character of stimuli propagates unimpeded from Φ through ψ to ω, where it generates sensation. This is represented by a specific period of neuronal movement—not the same as the period of the stimulus but related to it by an unknown reduction formula. This period does not persist and fades toward the motor side; since it passes through, it leaves no memory trace.

The quantity of the Φ-stimulus activates the discharge tendency of the nervous system by converting into proportional motor excitation. The motility apparatus is directly connected to Φ, where these converted quantities produce effects quantitatively far superior by acting on muscles, glands, etc., thus working through energy release, while between neurons, only transmission occurs.

Interaction Between Systems

The ψ-neurons terminate in Φ-neurons, where part of the quantity (Qη) is transmitted—only a fraction corresponding to an intercellular stimulus magnitude. The question arises whether the quantity transferred to ψ grows proportionally with the flowing quantity in Φ, so that a stronger stimulus has a greater psychic effect.

Here, there appears to be a specific mechanism preventing excessive quantity (Qη) from reaching ψ. The sensory Φ-pathway is peculiarly structured, branching continuously with thicker and thinner pathways that terminate in numerous end points. This likely serves the purpose that stronger stimuli take different paths than weaker ones. For instance:

A stimulus (Qη₁) might follow only Path I, transferring a fraction to end point α in ψ.
A stimulus (Qη₂) would not double the fraction transferred at α but might also take Path II, which is narrower and opens a second endpoint in ψ.
A stimulus (Qη₃) would open the narrowest path, also reaching the ω-system.

This relieves individual ψ-pathways, and larger quantities in Φ manifest as occupying multiple neurons in ψ instead of a single one. The individual occupancies in ψ-neurons may be roughly equal. Thus, a quantity (Qη) in Φ translates into occupancy in ψ, with Qη₃ expressed as occupancy in ψ₁ + ψ₂ + ψ₃. In this way, Φ-quantity is reflected as complexity in ψ.

This mechanism prevents excessive ψ-quantities—at least up to certain limits. This closely resembles Fechner’s law, which could be localized in this manner.

Thus, ψ is occupied by Φ in quantities (Q) that are normally small.

The quantity of Φ excitation is expressed in ψ through complication and quality through topology, as anatomically the sensory organs communicate with specific ψ-neurons through Φ. However, ψ also receives occupation from the body’s interior, making it reasonable to divide the ψ-neurons into two groups: the mantle neurons, occupied by Φ, and the core neurons, occupied by endogenous pathways.

The ψ Pathways

The core of ψ connects to pathways where endogenous excitatory quantities ascend. While we do not exclude the possibility of connections between these pathways and Φ, the original assumption that there is a direct route from the body’s interior to ψ-neurons must hold. On this side, ψ is defenseless against the incoming quantities (Q), which drives the entire psychic mechanism.

What we know about endogenous stimuli can be expressed by the assumption that they are intercellular in nature, generated continuously but becoming psychic stimuli only periodically. The idea of accumulation is unavoidable, and the intermittent psychic effect suggests that the stimuli encounter resistances on their way to ψ, which are only overcome when the quantity grows sufficiently large. These pathways thus involve multiple segments, with several contact barriers leading to the ψ core.

Once a certain quantity (Q) is reached, the stimuli act continuously, with every further increase in quantity perceived as an increase in ψ excitation. At this point, the pathway becomes fully permeable. Experience further teaches us that after the discharge of a ψ stimulus, the pathway’s resistance is restored.

Summation in ψ Pathways

Such a process is called summation. The ψ pathways fulfill themselves through summation until they become permeable. The smallness of individual stimuli evidently enables summation. Summation has also been observed in Φ pathways, such as pain pathways, but it is only valid there for small quantities. The lesser role of summation in Φ pathways supports the notion that larger quantities are at play there. Extremely small quantities seem to be blocked by the threshold effect of the nerve-end apparatuses, while on the ψ side, where these apparatuses are absent, only small quantities act.

It is remarkable that ψ pathway neurons can oscillate between permeability and impermeability, recovering almost entirely their resistance despite the passage of quantities (Qη). This contradicts the assumed property of ψ-neurons: that flowing quantities (Qη) permanently facilitate them. How can this contradiction be resolved? By assuming that the restoration of resistance after the flow ceases is a general property of contact barriers.

Reconciling Resistance Restoration and Facilitation

This assumption can easily be reconciled with the facilitation of ψ-neurons. One must simply assume that the facilitation remaining after the flow of quantity does not entirely eliminate resistance but reduces it to a necessary minimum. During the flow of quantity (Q), resistance is eliminated, but afterward, it is restored—depending on the quantity that passed—to different levels. Consequently, smaller quantities can pass next time, and so on.

Even in the case of full facilitation, a certain baseline resistance remains uniform for all contact barriers, requiring a threshold quantity (Q) to be overcome for subsequent flows. This resistance could be considered a constant.

The effect of endogenous quantities (Qη) through summation thus merely reflects that this quantity comprises very small excitatory increments below the baseline constant, while the endogenous pathway itself is fully facilitated.

The Core Neurons and Quantitative Drive

It follows that ψ contact barriers generally have higher thresholds than transmission barriers, allowing the core neurons to accumulate further quantities (Qη). This accumulation is limited only by the capacity of the pathway. ψ here is exposed to quantities (Q), creating within the system the drive that sustains all psychic activity. We know this drive as the will, a derivative of the instincts.

The Experience of Satisfaction

The fulfillment of core neurons in ψ leads to a discharge tendency, a drive that releases itself via motor pathways. Experience suggests that this discharge first takes the path toward internal changes (e.g., emotional expression, crying, vascular innervation). However, such discharges, as previously explained, cannot bring relief since the intake of endogenous stimuli continues, restoring ψ tension.

Relief from the stimulus is possible only through an intervention that eliminates the release of quantities (Qη) within the body for a time. Such an intervention requires a change in the external world (e.g., food intake, proximity to a sexual object), which can only be achieved through specific action along predetermined pathways.

Initially, the human organism is incapable of performing such specific actions. They are carried out with external help, where an experienced individual is alerted to the infant’s condition through the discharge pathway of internal changes. This pathway thus gains the crucial secondary function of communication, and the initial helplessness of humans becomes the source of all moral motives.

Development of Satisfaction

When the assisting individual performs the specific action required in the external world for the helpless one, the latter, through reflex mechanisms, is then able to execute the internal adjustments necessary to eliminate the endogenous stimuli.

This constitutes a satisfaction experience, which has profound implications for the functional development of the individual. In the ψ-system, three things occur:

Sustained discharge is achieved, ending the drive that had produced displeasure in W.
In the mantle, a neuron (or several neurons) becomes occupied, corresponding to the perception of an object.
In other regions of the mantle, discharge signals from the reflexive movement linked to the specific action are registered.

Facilitations form between these occupancies and the core neurons.

Reflex Discharge Messages

Reflex discharge messages arise because every movement, through its side effects, triggers new sensory excitations (from the skin and muscles) that form a movement image in ψ. Facilitation forms in a manner that allows a deeper understanding of the development of ψ.

So far, we have recognized the influence of ψ-neurons by Φ and by endogenous pathways. However, individual ψ-neurons were separated by contact barriers with strong resistances. A fundamental law of association by simultaneity comes into play during pure ψ activity, such as reproductive memory. This law forms the basis of all connections between ψ-neurons.

We observe that consciousness, or quantitative occupancy, transitions from one ψ-neuron (α) to another (β) if α and β were once simultaneously occupied by Φ (or another source). Simultaneous occupancy of α and β facilitates the contact barrier between them. In the language of our theory, this means that a quantity flows more easily from one neuron to an occupied neuron than to an unoccupied one.

The occupancy of the second neuron functions like an intensification of the occupancy of the first. Here again, occupancy demonstrates equivalence with facilitation for the flow of quantity.

Direction of Quantity Flow

Thus, we identify a second important factor directing the flow of quantity. A quantity in neuron α flows not only toward the most facilitated barrier but also toward the side that is occupied. These two factors can either reinforce or counteract one another.

As a result of the satisfaction experience, facilitation forms between two memory images and the core neurons occupied during the state of drive. With the satisfaction discharge, quantity (Qη) likely also flows out of the memory images. When the state of drive or desire reappears, occupancy extends to the two memories, reanimating them. Initially, the object memory image is likely to be affected by this activation of desire.

Hallucinations and Desire Activation

I have no doubt that this activation of desire initially results in the same phenomenon as perception: a hallucination. If reflexive action is initiated based on this hallucination, disappointment inevitably follows.

The Pain Experience

Under normal circumstances, ψ is exposed to quantities (Qη) from endogenous pathways. Abnormally, though not yet pathologically, ψ is exposed when excessive quantities (Q) breach the shielding mechanisms of Φ, resulting in pain. Pain produces the following effects in ψ:

Significant elevation of the quantitative level, perceived by W as displeasure.
A discharge tendency, which may be modified in certain directions.
Facilitation between this discharge tendency and a memory image of the pain-inducing object.

Additionally, pain undoubtedly has a special quality distinct from displeasure, which asserts itself alongside it.

If the memory image of the (hostile) object is reoccupied—e.g., through new perceptions—it creates a state similar to pain but not identical to it. This state contains both displeasure and a discharge tendency analogous to the pain experience.

Since displeasure corresponds to a quantitative elevation, the question arises: Where does this quantity (Qη) come from? In actual pain experiences, it was the invading external quantity (Q) that elevated the ψ level. In its reproduction—affect—the only new element is the quantity occupying the memory. It is clear that this occupation, being a characteristic of perception, cannot lead to a general elevation of Qη.

The only remaining assumption is that the occupation of memories releases displeasure from the body’s interior, which is then elevated anew. The mechanism of this release can only be conceived as follows: just as there are motor neurons that direct quantities (Qη) into the muscles upon fulfillment, leading to discharge, there must also be secretory neurons. When excited, these neurons generate internal stimuli that act on endogenous pathways toward ψ, influencing the production of endogenous quantities (Qη). Instead of discharging Qη, these neurons indirectly introduce it.

These “motor” neurons may be called key neurons, and they likely only become excited when ψ reaches a certain level. During the pain experience, the memory image of the hostile object establishes a strong facilitation to these key neurons, which then release displeasure during the affect state.

Parallels with Sexual Release

This seemingly peculiar but essential assumption finds support in the behavior of sexual release. It also suggests that endogenous stimuli, in this and similar cases, consist of chemical products, potentially numerous in variety. Since even minimal occupancy of the hostile memory can provoke extraordinary displeasure release, we may conclude that pain leaves particularly strong facilitations.

Facilitation, it seems, is directly linked to the magnitude of quantity reached. For example, the facilitative effect of 3(Qη) may far exceed that of 5 × (Qη).

Affects and States of Desire

The residuals of the two types of experiences described—affects and states of desire—share a common feature: they both involve an increase in quantitative tension in ψ. In affects, this increase results from sudden release, while in states of desire, it arises through summation.

Both states are of great importance for ψ processes, as they leave compelling motives for future activity. Desire states directly attract the system toward the object of desire or its memory image. Pain experiences, conversely, result in repulsion, a reluctance to maintain occupancy of the hostile memory image.

These are the primary attractions of desire and the primary defenses.

Primary Attraction and Defense

The attraction of desire is easily explained by the assumption that the occupancy of the friendly memory image during the state of craving far exceeds the quantity (Qη) of mere perception. This results in particularly strong facilitation from the ψ core to the corresponding neuron in the mantle.

The primary defense or repression, however, is more challenging to explain. It is the observation that hostile memory images are abandoned as soon as possible. This can be explained by the fact that primary pain experiences were resolved through reflexive defense. The emergence of a different object in place of the hostile one signaled the end of the pain experience. The ψ system, biologically conditioned, attempts to reproduce the state in ψ that marked the cessation of pain.

The Role of Biological Conditioning

By introducing the term “biologically conditioned,” we establish a new explanatory principle that should hold independently, even as it requires and complements a reduction to mechanical principles (quantitative factors).

In this case, the explanation may be straightforward: the increase in quantity (Qη) consistently associated with the occupation of hostile memories prompts an increased discharge activity, including the release of those memories.

Introduction of the Ego

With the assumption of wish attraction and the tendency toward repression, we have already touched on a state of ψ that has not yet been explored in detail. These two processes indicate that an organization has formed within ψ, which disrupts processes that were originally carried out in a certain manner. This organization is called the Ego and can be easily described by considering that the regularly repeated absorption of endogenous quantities into specific neurons (the core neurons) and the facilitating effects emanating from them form a group of neurons that remain consistently occupied. This corresponds to the reservoir required by the secondary function.

Thus, the Ego can be defined as the totality of current ψ occupancies, separating a permanent component from a variable one. It is easy to see that the facilitations between ψ-neurons, as possibilities for directing the modified Ego’s spread in the next moments, are part of the Ego’s assets.

Inhibition and the Role of the Ego

The Ego’s aim must be to discharge its occupancies through the path of satisfaction. However, it inevitably influences the recurrence of pain experiences and affects through a process commonly referred to as inhibition.

When a quantity (Qη) enters a neuron from any source, it will follow the path of least resistance toward the most facilitated contact barrier, producing a flow in that direction. More precisely, the flow of quantity (Qη) will distribute itself inversely to the resistance of each contact barrier. Where a contact barrier is struck by a fraction of the flow that is below its resistance threshold, practically nothing will pass through.

For every quantity (Qη) in a neuron, this distribution may vary, as different fractions may exceed the thresholds of other contact barriers. Thus, the flow depends on quantities (Qη) and the relationship of facilitations.

However, we have encountered a third powerful factor: if an adjacent neuron is simultaneously occupied, it acts as a temporary facilitation for the contact barrier between the two neurons, modifying the flow that would otherwise follow the most facilitated barrier. A side occupancy thus acts as an inhibition for the flow of quantity (Qη).

The Ego as a Network

Imagine the Ego as a network of occupied neurons, well-facilitated with one another. For example, a quantity (Qη) entering neuron a from outside (Φ) would have flowed unimpeded to neuron b. However, due to a side occupancy in a or α, it now only passes a fraction to b, or possibly does not reach b at all.

If an Ego exists, it must inhibit primary psychic processes. Such inhibition, however, is a distinct advantage for ψ.

Repression and Inhibition

Assume a represents a hostile memory and b a key neuron for displeasure. Primarily, when a is activated, displeasure is released, potentially in an unnecessary or excessive manner. If α inhibits the flow, the release of displeasure is significantly reduced, sparing the neuronal system from developing and discharging quantities to its detriment.

We can easily imagine a mechanism through which the Ego, alerted by the arrival of a new occupancy in the hostile memory image, employs extensive side occupancy to inhibit the flow from the memory image to the displeasure release. If we further assume that the initial displeasure (Qη) release is absorbed by the Ego itself, this provides the very resource required for the inhibitory side occupancy exerted by the Ego.

The stronger the displeasure, the stronger the primary defense.

Primary and Secondary Processes in ψ

From the preceding developments, it follows that the Ego in ψ—treated according to its tendencies like the entire nervous system—faces two forms of helplessness and harm in uninfluenced ψ processes:

In the state of desire, when it reoccupies the memory of the object and initiates discharge, satisfaction cannot occur because the object is not real but only a fantasy representation. ψ is initially unable to distinguish between perception and representation, as it operates solely based on analogous states within its neurons. It requires a criterion from elsewhere to differentiate between perception and representation.
In the state of reoccupation of a hostile memory, ψ requires a signal to alert it to the resulting displeasure release and to enable preventive side occupancy. If ψ can enact this inhibition in time, the displeasure release—and thus the defense—will be minor. Otherwise, excessive displeasure and primary defense result.

Both the desire-based occupancy and the displeasure release due to the reoccupation of the relevant memory can be biologically harmful. Desire occupancy is harmful when it exceeds a certain threshold, prompting discharge. Displeasure release is harmful whenever the occupancy of the hostile memory arises not from the external world but from ψ itself (e.g., through association). Thus, in both cases, a signal is required to distinguish perception from memory (representation).

The Reality Marker

It is likely that the perceptual neurons provide this signal, the reality marker. During every external perception, a quality excitation arises in W, which initially holds no significance for ψ. Additionally, perception excitation leads to perceptual discharge, and, like every discharge, this sends a message to ψ.

The discharge message from W (ω) then serves as the quality or reality marker for ψ.

When the desired object is extensively occupied, such that it is animated hallucinatorily,

the same discharge or reality signal occurs as it does during external perception. In this case, the criterion fails. However, if the wishful occupation is inhibited, as is possible with an occupied Ego, a quantitative scenario arises in which the wishful occupation, not being sufficiently intense, does not generate a reality signal, whereas external perception would. In this situation, the criterion retains its value. The difference lies in the fact that the reality signal occurs externally at any intensity of occupation, but in ψ, only at high intensities.

Thus, Ego inhibition enables a criterion for distinguishing between perception and memory. Biological experience will teach the system not to initiate discharge until the reality signal has been received and to limit the occupation of desired memories below a certain threshold to achieve this purpose.

Protection Through Perception Neurons

On the other hand, the excitation of perceptual neurons can also serve to protect the ψ-system by drawing attention to the presence or absence of a perception. For this purpose, we must assume that the perceptual neurons (ωN) are anatomically connected to the pathways from individual sensory organs and that their discharge is again directed toward motor apparatuses belonging to these same sensory organs. In this way, the latter discharge signal (that of reflexive attention) becomes a biological signal for ψ, guiding it to send quantities of occupation along the same paths.

Reality Signals in Action

Thus, when inhibited by an occupied Ego, the ω discharge signals universally become reality signals, which ψ biologically learns to utilize. If the Ego is in a state of wishful tension when a reality signal arises, it will allow discharge toward the specific action. If the reality signal coincides with an increase in displeasure, ψ will employ substantial side occupancy at the indicated location to organize a defense of appropriate magnitude. If neither condition is met, occupation will proceed unhindered, following the patterns of facilitation.

The wishful occupation leading to hallucination, the full development of displeasure, and the complete effort of defense represent primary psychic processes. In contrast, those processes that are enabled solely by the strong occupancy of the Ego and serve to moderate the aforementioned represent secondary psychic processes. The condition for these latter processes, as can be seen, is the proper utilization of reality signals, which is only possible through Ego inhibition.

Recognition and Reproductive Thinking

Having introduced the assumption that Ego inhibition moderates the occupation of the desired object, allowing it to be recognized as not real, we may now continue the analysis of this process. Several scenarios can occur:

The desired memory image coincides with its perception. In this case, the two occupancies overlap, which is biologically irrelevant but generates the reality signal from W, leading to a successful discharge. This case is straightforward.
The wishful occupation exists alongside a perception that only partially matches it. It is important to recall that perceptual occupancies never involve single neurons but always complexes. We have so far neglected this characteristic, but now it must be addressed. Suppose the wishful occupation generally involves neurons a + b, while the perceptual occupation involves neurons a + c. This scenario is more common than a complete match and requires further consideration.

Biological experience will teach that initiating discharge is uncertain if the reality signal confirms only part of the complex rather than the whole. However, a method emerges to refine the similarity to identity. The W-complex decomposes during comparison into a constant component (neuron a) that remains mostly unchanged and a variable component (neuron b) that typically varies. Language later formalizes this distinction as judgment, identifying the similarity between the Ego’s core and the constant perceptual component, while attributing the variable component to the mantle. Neuron a is labeled the “thing,” and neuron b its activity or property, i.e., its predicate.

Judgment and Secondary Processes

Judgment, then, is a ψ-process enabled by Ego inhibition and prompted by the dissimilarity between the wishful occupation of a memory and its perceptual counterpart. One may assume that the coincidence of the two occupancies serves as a biological signal to terminate the thinking process and allow discharge. Their divergence, however, initiates the work of thinking, which concludes once they coincide again.

The process can be analyzed further: if neuron a coincides while neuron c is perceived instead of neuron b, the Ego follows the connections of neuron c, allowing new occupancies to emerge along its paths until access to the missing neuron b is found.

Action Through Reproduction

Typically, this results in the emergence of a movement image interposed between neuron c and neuron b. When this image is revived through an actual movement, the perception of neuron b and thus the sought-after identity is established. For instance, the desired memory image might be the full view of a mother’s breast and nipple, while the initial perception is a side view of the same object without the nipple. The child’s memory includes the experience, made while sucking, that a specific head movement transforms the full view into the side view. The perceived side view prompts the head movement, and an attempt shows that its counterpart must be executed, leading to the perception of the full view.

While this example involves little judgment, it illustrates the possibility of reproducing occupancies to initiate an action already part of the specific action’s incidental phase.

Quantity and Goal-Oriented Thinking

There is no doubt that the quantity (Qη) involved in these movements along facilitated neurons originates from the occupied Ego. Moreover, this movement is not governed by the facilitation but by a goal. What is this goal, and how is it achieved?

The Goal of Thinking

The goal is to return to the missing neuron b and trigger the sense of identity—the moment when only neuron b is occupied, and the wandering occupation converges in neuron b. This is achieved through trial-and-error shifting of quantities along all available paths. It becomes evident that varying amounts of side occupancy are required depending on whether existing facilitations can be utilized or whether they must be counteracted.

The struggle between established facilitations and shifting occupations characterizes the secondary process of reproductive thinking in contrast to the primary process of associative succession.

Guidance in Thinking

What guides this wandering process? The fact that the wishful representation of the memory remains occupied while the association is pursued from neuron c. We know that by occupying neuron b, all of its potential connections are facilitated and become accessible.

During this wandering, the quantity (Qη) may encounter a memory related to a painful experience, thereby triggering displeasure release. This is a clear indication that neuron b cannot be reached via this path, and the flow is immediately diverted away from that particular occupation. However, the displeasure pathways retain their significance as guides for directing the reproductive flow.

Memory and Judgment

Reproductive thinking thus has a practical purpose and a biologically defined endpoint: to redirect a wandering quantity (Qη) from a perception back to the missing neuron occupation. Once identity is achieved, and if the reality signal from neuron b also appears, the goal is reached, and discharge can occur.

However, the process can detach itself from this final goal and merely aim for identity. In this case, it constitutes a pure act of thinking, which can nonetheless later prove to be of practical value. The occupied Ego behaves in precisely the same way during this process.

Interest in New Perceptions

A third possibility arises during the state of desire: if the emerging perception does not align with the desired memory image (Er+), interest develops in recognizing this perception to potentially find a path from it to Er+. For this purpose, the perception may be over-occupied by the Ego, as previously described with neuron c. If the perception is not entirely novel, it will evoke the memory of a similar perception, bringing it to mind and aligning with it at least partially. At this memory image, the previous thinking process repeats, but without the goal that the occupied wishful representation previously provided.

Wherever the occupations overlap, no further thinking effort is required. However, the diverging components “arouse interest” and may initiate two types of thinking processes:

Memory exploration: The flow focuses on the awakened memories, initiating a purposeless exploration of differences rather than similarities.
Judgment work: The flow remains in the newly emerged components, leading to equally aimless judgment work.

Recognition of the Other

Assume that the object provided by perception resembles the subject—a fellow human. The theoretical interest can be explained by the fact that such an object is simultaneously the first object of satisfaction, later the first hostile object, and ultimately the only source of help. Humans thus learn recognition from the fellow human.

The perceptual complexes stemming from this fellow human will partially be new and incomparable, such as visual features like facial expressions. Other perceptions, like hand movements, may overlap with the subject’s memories of their own visual impressions and associated experiences of self-performed movements. Still, other perceptions, like crying, may evoke memories of the subject’s own crying and related pain experiences.

This fellow human complex thus separates into two components: one characterized by its constant structure, remaining intact as an object, and the other understood through memory work—being linked back to information derived from the subject’s own body. This decomposition of a perceptual complex is called recognition, containing a judgment and concluding upon reaching its ultimate goal.

Judgment and Its Purpose

Judgment, as can be seen, is not a primary function but presupposes the Ego’s occupancy of the disparate component. Initially, judgment has no practical purpose, and it appears that during judgment, the occupancy of the disparate components is discharged. This explains why activities or “predicates” become loosely associated with the subject complex.

While a deeper analysis of judgment could follow from here, it would divert from the main topic. Let us suffice to observe that it is the original interest in achieving the satisfaction situation that generates, on the one hand, reproductive thinking and, on the other, judgment as methods of transitioning from the given perceptual situation to the desired one. This presupposes that ψ-processes are not uninhibited but occur under the control of an active Ego. The eminently practical purpose of all thinking work is thus demonstrated.

Thinking and Reality

The goal and endpoint of all thinking processes is to create an identity state by transferring a quantity (Qη) originating from an external occupation into a neuron occupied by the Ego. Recognizing or judging thinking seeks an identity with a body-based occupation, while reproductive thinking seeks an identity with the subject’s psychic occupation (a personal experience). Judging thinking prepares the way for reproductive thinking by offering established facilitations for further associative wandering.

When the thinking process concludes with the perception of a reality signal, the reality judgment, belief, and the ultimate goal of the entire work are achieved.

Prerequisites for Judgment

Judgment relies on the presence of personal bodily experiences, sensations, and movement images. In their absence, the variable component of the perceptual complex remains uninterpreted—it can be reproduced but offers no direction for further thinking.

For instance, and significantly for later considerations, sexual experiences have no effect until the individual has sexual sensations—generally not before the onset of puberty.

Primary Judgment and Its Role

Primary judgment seems to require less influence from the occupied Ego than reproductive acts of thinking. In cases where associations are pursued through partial overlap without modification, there are instances in which the judgment association process proceeds with full quantity.

For example, perception corresponds to an object core combined with a movement image. While perceiving W, one may imitate the observed movements, innervating one’s own movement image to such an extent that the movement is actually performed. This phenomenon can be described as the imitation value of perception. Similarly, perception might evoke the memory of one’s own pain sensation, causing one to feel the corresponding displeasure and repeat the associated defensive movements. This is referred to as the compassion value of perception.

In these two cases, we likely observe the primary process underlying judgment. We may assume that all secondary judgment arises through moderation of these purely associative processes. Judgment, later serving as a tool for recognizing potentially practical objects, originally functioned as an associative process between external inputs and internal bodily-derived occupations—an identification of Φ and internal signals or occupations. It is also plausible to speculate that this mechanism offers a pathway for transferring and discharging quantities (Q) from Φ. What we call things are residuals that elude judgment.

Quantitative Differences Between Thinking and Primary Processes

The example of judgment provides an initial insight into the quantitative differences between thinking and primary processes. It is reasonable to assume that during thinking, a subtle motor innervation stream flows from ψ, though this occurs only when motor or key neurons are innervated. However, it would be incorrect to consider this discharge as intrinsic to the thinking process; it is merely an unintended side effect.

The thinking process itself involves occupying ψ-neurons while modifying facilitation through side occupancy by the Ego. Mechanically, only a portion of the quantity (Qη) can follow the facilitations, and the size of this portion is constantly regulated by the occupancies.

This regulation ensures that sufficient quantity (Q) is preserved to make reproduction meaningful. Otherwise, all the quantity necessary for discharge would be expended at motor endpoints during circulation. Thus, the secondary process is essentially a repetition of the original ψ flow but on a lower level with smaller quantities.

Small Quantities in Thinking

One might question how such small quantities (Qη) can navigate pathways that are generally traversable only by the larger quantities ψ typically handles. The only plausible explanation is that this must be a mechanical consequence of side occupancies. The system adjusts so that small quantities (Qη) can flow through facilitated pathways that otherwise would only permit larger quantities. Side occupancy binds a portion of the quantity flowing through the neuron, effectively reducing the threshold for small quantities to pass.

Preserving Facilitations in Thinking

Thinking must also adhere to another condition: it must not significantly alter the facilitations established by primary processes; otherwise, it would distort the traces of reality. This condition aligns with the observation that facilitation is likely the result of a single large quantity and that occupancy, while powerful in the moment, leaves no comparably lasting effect. The small quantities involved in thinking generally do not disrupt established facilitations.

Traces of Thinking Processes

It is undeniable, however, that thinking leaves lasting traces, as subsequent reflections require much less effort than the initial one. To avoid distorting reality, special traces or markers must differentiate thinking processes, forming a distinct thinking memory that is yet to be fully understood. Later, we will explore how the traces of thinking processes are distinguished from those of reality.

Primary Processes—Sleep and Dreams

This raises the question: What quantitative resources fuel the primary ψ process?

During pain experiences, it is the quantity (Q) breaking in from the outside.
In affects, it is the endogenous quantity released through facilitation.
In the secondary process of reproductive thinking, a greater or lesser quantity (Qη) from the Ego can be transferred to neuron c, which we may refer to as thinking interest, proportional to the interest generated by the affect.

The question remains whether primary ψ processes can be driven solely by the quantity (Q) brought in from Φ or whether a ψ contribution (e.g., attention) must be added to the Φ occupation of a perception to enable a ψ process. This question remains open for resolution through specific psychological adaptations.

Primary Processes During Sleep

An important fact is that primary ψ processes, biologically suppressed during the development of ψ, are observed daily during sleep. Another equally significant fact is the striking similarity between the pathological mechanisms revealed through psychoanalytic analysis of neuroses and the processes of dreaming. This comparison, to be elaborated later, yields critical insights.

Sleep and the ψ System

The phenomenon of sleep must be incorporated into the theory.

In children, the essential condition for sleep is evident: the child sleeps as long as no need or external stimulus (e.g., hunger or cold) disturbs it. It falls asleep after satisfaction (e.g., at the breast). Adults also easily fall asleep post coenam et coitum (after eating or sexual activity). Thus, the condition for sleep is the reduction of endogenous charge in the ψ core, making secondary function unnecessary.

In sleep, the individual is in an ideal state of inertia, freed from any quantity reserve (Qη).

The Ego and Sleep in Adults

For adults, this reserve is stored in the Ego. We may assume that Ego discharge is what conditions and characterizes sleep. This immediately provides the conditions for primary psychic processes.

Complete Ego Discharge?

It is uncertain whether the Ego completely discharges during adult sleep. Nevertheless, it withdraws a multitude of its occupancies, which are effortlessly reinstated upon waking. This observation aligns with our premises and highlights that flows occur between well-connected neurons, akin to communicating vessels. Although the level in individual neurons may vary proportionally, the overall system’s level remains interconnected.

Insights from Sleep Characteristics

Sleep offers several unique features that reveal aspects not otherwise discernible:

Motor Paralysis (Will Suppression):
Sleep is marked by the paralysis of motor activity, which reflects the discharge of all ψ quantities (Qη). During sleep, spinal tone is partially diminished. It is likely that motor discharge from Φ manifests as tone, while other innervations and their excitation sources remain active.
The Role of Sensory Organ Closure:
Sleep begins with and is induced by the closing of sensory organs capable of being shut. During sleep, perceptions are not processed, and nothing disrupts sleep more than sensory impressions that cause Φ-based occupancies in ψ. This suggests that during wakefulness, mantle neurons receiving perceptions from Φ are continuously, albeit variably, occupied (as in attention). This allows primary ψ processes to proceed with contributions from ψ. Whether the mantle neurons themselves or adjoining core neurons are preoccupied remains uncertain. When ψ withdraws these mantle occupancies, perceptions occur in unoccupied neurons, making them weak and perhaps incapable of producing a quality signal. As hypothesized, with the depletion of perceptual neurons (ωN), the innervation enhancing attention also ceases. This could also explain the enigma of hypnosis, potentially rooted in the withdrawal of attention-based occupancies.
Automatic Exclusion of Φ Impressions:
Through an automatic mechanism—the counterpart to the attention mechanism—ψ excludes Φ impressions as long as it remains unoccupied.
Dreams as ψ Processes During Sleep:
The most intriguing aspect is that ψ processes, namely dreams, occur during sleep, exhibiting many misunderstood characteristics.

Dream Analysis

Dreams form a bridge between wakefulness and normal ψ processes. However, their quintessential elements can be isolated:

Motor Paralysis in Dreams:
Dreams lack motor discharge and motor elements, as one is paralyzed in dreams. The simplest explanation lies in the cessation of spinal preoccupancy due to the absence of Φ discharge. Motor excitation cannot cross barriers in unoccupied neurons. In certain dream states, movement is not entirely excluded, suggesting that motor paralysis is not the most defining characteristic of dreams.
Illogical and Absurd Associations:
Dream connections often appear nonsensical, weak, or outright absurd. This is explained by the dominance of associative compulsion in dreams, reflecting the primary state of psychic life. Any two simultaneously present occupancies must seemingly be connected. Examples from wakeful life illustrate this phenomenon (e.g., provincial observers at a French parliament session concluding that after every good speech, shots are fired as applause). The illogical nature of dreams reflects a lack of Ego occupancy, causing biologically learned associations that normally inhibit primary processes to be absent. This leads to associations aligning either with the nearest facilitations or adjacent occupancies.
Hallucinatory Nature of Dream Imagery:
Dream representations are hallucinatory, evoke consciousness, and are believed as real. This feature is most striking and is evident even in the initial stages of sleep when closing the eyes produces hallucinations, and opening them prompts verbal thinking. Multiple explanations for this hallucinatory nature exist:
- One theory suggests that during wakefulness, the flow from Φ to motility prevents reverse occupancy of Φ neurons by ψ. Once this flow ceases, Φ neurons become reversely occupied, allowing for quality sensations.
- Another theory attributes it to the primary process, positing that the original memory of a perception was always hallucinatory and only Ego inhibition taught the system not to occupy W in a manner that reversely projects to Φ.
The vividness of hallucinations corresponds directly to the quantitative occupancy of the associated representation, implying that quantity (Q) underpins hallucination. During wakefulness, perceptions from Φ are made clearer by ψ-based occupancy (interest) but do not become more vivid, preserving their quantitative characteristics.
Purpose and Meaning of Dreams:
The purpose and meaning of dreams, at least normal ones, are well-defined—they represent wish fulfillments. As primary processes, they replicate satisfaction experiences but are not recognized as such because they lack strong pleasure releases (low reproduction of discharge traces) and generally proceed with minimal affect (i.e., without motor discharge). This nature is easily demonstrated, leading to the conclusion that the primary wishful occupation was also hallucinatory.
Poor Memory and Minimal Impact of Dreams:
Dreams leave little memory and cause negligible harm compared to other primary processes. This can be attributed to their reliance on old facilitations, making no changes, avoiding Φ experiences, and leaving no discharge traces due to motor paralysis.
Consciousness in Dreams:
Remarkably, consciousness in dreams provides quality sensations as effectively as it does in wakefulness. This indicates that consciousness does not belong exclusively to the Ego but can accompany any ψ process. It also warns against equating primary processes with unconscious ones. These insights are invaluable for further study.

The Hidden Nature of Dreams

When one recalls dream content, it becomes evident that the wish-fulfillment nature of dreams is obscured by a series of ψ processes that reappear in neuroses and characterize their pathological nature. These resemblances further support the biological and psychological importance of dream mechanisms.

Dream Consciousness

The consciousness of dream representations is, above all, discontinuous. Not an entire chain of associations becomes conscious but only isolated segments. Between these, there are unconscious intermediary links that can easily be identified upon waking.

When investigating the reason for this skipping, the following becomes evident: Suppose A is a dream representation that has become conscious and leads to B. Instead of B, however, C appears in consciousness because it lies along the path between B and a simultaneous D occupation.

Thus, there is a diversion caused by a simultaneous, differently characterized occupation, which itself remains unconscious. As a result, C substitutes for B, even though B would have better aligned with the thought connection or the fulfillment of a wish. For example, suppose O. gave Irma an injection of propyl; then I vividly see trimethylamine before me, hallucinating it as a chemical formula. The simultaneous thought here pertains to the sexual nature of Irma’s illness. There exists an association in sexual chemistry between this thought and propyl, which I had discussed with W. Fl., who had emphasized trimethylamine. The chemical formula becomes conscious due to mutual reinforcement.

The Mystery of Unconscious Intermediary Links

It is puzzling why neither the intermediary link (sexual chemistry) nor the diverting thought (sexual nature of the illness) also becomes conscious, requiring an explanation. One might assume that the occupations of B or D alone are not sufficiently intense to result in a reverse hallucination, whereas the jointly occupied C achieves this.

However, in the chosen example, D (sexual nature) was undoubtedly as intense as A (propyl injection), and their shared derivative, the chemical formula, was extraordinarily vivid.

The enigma of unconscious intermediary links applies equally to wakeful thinking, where similar occurrences are commonplace. What remains characteristic of dreams, however, is the ease with which quantities shift, allowing for B to be replaced by a quantitatively favored C.

Wish Fulfillment in Dreams

Similarly, in wish fulfillment during dreams, the wish itself does not become conscious, followed by its hallucinatory fulfillment. Instead, only the latter appears, while the intermediary link must be inferred. It is certain that this intermediary was traversed without being developed qualitatively.

It becomes evident that the occupation of the wishful representation cannot be stronger than the motivating force driving it. Thus, the psychic process in dreams follows the quantity (Q), but the quantity (Q) alone does not determine whether something becomes conscious.

Insights from Dream Processes

Dream processes suggest that consciousness arises during a flow of quantity (Qη), meaning it is not triggered by a constant occupation. Furthermore, one might speculate that an intense flow of quantity is not conducive to the emergence of consciousness, as consciousness seems to follow the resolution of movement or a more stable occupation.

It is difficult to determine the exact conditions under which consciousness arises amidst these contradictory observations. It will also be necessary to consider the circumstances under which consciousness emerges in secondary processes.

Explanation of Dream Consciousness

The previously mentioned peculiarities of dream consciousness might be explained by the hypothesis that a backflow of quantity (Qη) to Φ is incompatible with a vigorous flow along (.)-association pathways. For Φ-consciousness processes, different conditions appear to apply.

September 25, 1895.