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Entwurf einer Psychologie 2 — Sigmund Freud

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(Part 1, Part 2, Part 3)

II. PART: PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

The first part of this draft contained what could be derived a priori from fundamental assumptions, modeled and corrected based on specific actual experiences. This second part seeks to infer further determinations of the system founded on these assumptions through the analysis of pathological processes. A third part will aim to construct the characteristics of normal psychological functioning from the preceding two.

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF HYSTERIA

The Hysterical Compulsion

I will begin with phenomena observed in hysteria, which are not necessarily unique to it. Any observer of hysteria immediately notices that hysterics are subject to a compulsion exerted by excessively strong ideas. For instance, a particular idea may appear unusually often in consciousness without justification from the sequence of thoughts, or its activation might be accompanied by psychological consequences that are incomprehensible. The emergence of these overly strong ideas is linked to effects that are, on the one hand, impossible to suppress and, on the other, inexplicable: affective discharges, motor innervations, or inhibitions. The individual is not unaware of the peculiar nature of this condition.

Excessively strong ideas also occur in normal circumstances. They give individuality to the ego. We do not find them surprising when we know their genetic development (education, experiences) and their motives. We are accustomed to seeing such strong ideas as the result of significant and legitimate motivations. In contrast, hysterical excessively strong ideas stand out due to their peculiarity. These are ideas that, in others, remain inconsequential, and we fail to understand their significance. They appear as upstarts, usurpers, and thus, seem ridiculous.

The hysterical compulsion is therefore characterized by the following:

  1. It is incomprehensible.
  2. It is insoluble through intellectual effort.
  3. Its structure is incongruent.

There exists a simpler neurotic compulsion, which can be contrasted with the hysterical one. For example, a man falls from a carriage, experiences danger, and henceforth is unable to ride in a carriage. This compulsion is:

  1. Understandable, as we know its origin.
  2. Congruent, since the association with danger justifies linking carriage-riding with fear.

However, it is also insoluble through intellectual effort. This last trait is not entirely pathological; even our normal strong ideas are often insoluble. We would not consider this neurotic compulsion pathological if experience did not show that in healthy individuals, such compulsions persist only briefly after the triggering event and then dissipate over time. The persistence of the compulsion is therefore pathological and indicates a simple neurosis.

Our analyses reveal that the hysterical compulsion is immediately resolved when it is explained (made comprehensible). These two characteristics are essentially the same. During the analysis, one also learns about the process that created the appearance of absurdity and incongruence. The general result of the analysis can be summarized as follows:

Before the analysis, A is an overly strong idea that intrudes into consciousness too frequently, each time provoking tears. The individual does not understand why they cry at A, finds it absurd, yet cannot suppress it.

After the analysis, it is found that there is an idea B that legitimately provokes tears and legitimately recurs often until a certain complicated psychological task is performed by the individual to counter it. The effect of B is not absurd, is understandable to the individual, and can be actively resisted.

B has a specific relationship to A. There was an event consisting of B + A, where A was a secondary circumstance, and B had the capacity to leave a lasting effect. The reproduction of this event in memory has been structured as though A had taken the place of B. A has become the substitute, the symbol for B. Hence, the incongruence: A is accompanied by consequences it does not seem worthy of, that do not align with it.

Symbol formation also occurs under normal circumstances. A soldier sacrifices himself for a multicolored piece of cloth on a pole because it has become the symbol of the homeland, and no one considers this neurotic.

However, the hysterical symbol behaves differently. The knight who fights for a lady’s glove knows, first, that the glove derives its meaning from the lady. Secondly, his reverence for the glove does not hinder him in any way from thinking of or serving the lady directly. The hysteric who cries at A knows nothing of the association A-B and does not engage with B at all in their psychological life. The symbol here has completely substituted for the thing itself.

This claim is accurate in the strictest sense. One observes that in all external stimuli or associative connections that should rightfully evoke B, A emerges in consciousness instead. Indeed, one can infer the nature of B from the circumstances—strangely enough—that evoke A.

The situation can be summarized as follows: A is compulsive, B is repressed (at least from consciousness).

The analysis has produced the surprising result that every compulsion corresponds to a repression, and every excessive intrusion into consciousness corresponds to an amnesia.

The term “excessively strong” points to quantitative characteristics. It seems plausible to assume that repression involves a quantitative depletion (of “quantity” or “Q”) and that the sum of the two would equal the normal amount. Thus, only the distribution has changed. Something has been added to A, which has been taken away from B. The pathological process is one of displacement, similar to what we have encountered in dreams—a primary process.

The Formation of Hysterical Compulsion

This raises several substantive questions: Under what conditions does such pathological symbol formation or, conversely, repression occur? What is the driving force behind it? What is the state of the neurons involved in the excessively strong idea and the repressed idea?

There would be nothing to deduce or further develop if clinical experience did not teach us two facts. First, repression consistently involves ideas that evoke an unpleasant affect (displeasure) for the ego. Second, these ideas often pertain to sexual life.

One might already suspect that it is this affect of displeasure that enforces the repression. We have already assumed a primary defense mechanism, which consists of the reversal of thought flow whenever it encounters a neuron whose activation releases displeasure.

The justification for this assumption arises from two observations:

  1. Such neural activation is certainly not the sought-after one when the thinking process originally aims to establish the situation of ψ-satisfaction.
  2. When a painful experience is reflexively terminated, the distressing perception is replaced by another.

However, one can directly verify the role of the defensive affect. When investigating the state in which the repressed idea (B) is found, it is discovered that this idea is easily located and brought to consciousness. This is surprising, as one might have thought that B was truly forgotten, leaving no trace of memory in ψ. Yet, B is a memory image like any other, not erased. However, when B typically constitutes a complex of associations, a remarkably strong, difficult-to-overcome resistance arises against intellectual engagement with B. One can unhesitatingly interpret this resistance against B as a measure of the compulsion exerted by A and believe that the force that once repressed B can be observed here again at work.

At the same time, another observation is made. It was only known that B could not become conscious; nothing was known about the behavior of B concerning mental occupation. Now it is learned that the resistance turns against any intellectual engagement with B, even when B has been partially made conscious. Thus, instead of saying “excluded from consciousness,” one may say: “excluded from the thought process.”

This means that the hysterical repression, and therefore the hysterical compulsion, results from a defense process originating in the occupied ego. In this respect, the process seems to differ from ψ-primary processes.

Pathological Defense

We are still far from a solution. As we know, the outcome of hysterical repression differs significantly from that of normal defense, about which we are well informed. Generally speaking, we avoid thinking about things that only bring displeasure, and we achieve this by directing our thoughts elsewhere. However, if by doing so we succeed in keeping the incompatible idea B from frequently entering our consciousness, because we keep it as isolated as possible, we are never able to forget B so thoroughly that we cannot be reminded of it by new perceptions.

Even in hysteria, such reminders cannot be prevented. The difference lies only in that instead of B, A always becomes conscious and occupied. This kind of symbol formation is the additional achievement that surpasses normal defense.

The immediate explanation for this additional achievement would be to blame the greater intensity of the defensive affect. Yet experience shows that the most distressing memories, which must necessarily evoke the greatest displeasure (e.g., memories of remorse for bad deeds), cannot be repressed or replaced by symbols. The existence of the second condition for pathological defense—sexuality—also indicates that the explanation must be sought elsewhere.

It is entirely implausible to assume that distressing sexual affects are so vastly superior in intensity to all other unpleasant affects. It must be another characteristic of sexual ideas that explains why only sexual ideas are subject to repression.

One more observation must be added here. Hysterical repression evidently occurs with the aid of symbol formation and displacement onto other neurons. One might think that the mystery lies only in the mechanism of this displacement and that there is nothing to explain about repression itself. However, as we will hear in the analysis of obsessive neurosis, repression occurs there without symbol formation, and indeed repression and substitution occur temporally apart. Thus, the process of repression remains the core of the mystery.

The Hysterical Case

We have learned that hysterical compulsion arises from a peculiar type of movement of quantities (symbol formation), which is likely a primary process since it can be easily demonstrated in dreams; that the driving force of this process is the defense of the ego, which, however, achieves more here than under normal circumstances. We need an explanation for how an ego process results in outcomes that we are accustomed to observing only in primary processes. Special psychological conditions must be expected here. From a clinical perspective, we know that all this occurs only in the sexual domain; perhaps, therefore, we must explain the particular psychological condition from the inherent characteristics of sexuality.

In the sexual domain, however, there is indeed a particular psychological constellation that could be useful for our purpose. We will discuss it, based on experience, with an example.

Emma is currently under the compulsion that she cannot enter a shop alone. To justify this, she recalls an incident from when she was 12 years old (shortly after puberty). She went into a shop to buy something, saw two clerks—one of whom she remembers—laughing together, and ran away in some kind of shock. Associated thoughts emerge that the two laughed at her dress and that she found one of them sexually attractive.

The relationship between these fragments and the effect of the event are incomprehensible. If she felt displeasure at being mocked for her dress, this should have been corrected long ago, especially since she is now dressed as a lady. Also, her going into the shop alone or accompanied does not alter her attire. The fact that she does not need direct protection is evident because, as with agoraphobia, the mere company of a small child suffices to make her feel secure. Completely irreconcilable is the idea that she found one of the clerks attractive; companionship would not change that either. Thus, the recalled memories neither explain the compulsion nor the determination of the symptom.

Further investigation uncovers a second memory, which she claims to have had at the time of Scene I but now denies. It is unprovable. At the age of eight, she went twice alone to the shop of a grocer to buy sweets. The grocer pinched her genitals through her clothing. Despite the first experience, she went a second time. After the second incident, she stopped going. She now reproaches herself for having gone the second time, as if she had provoked the assault by doing so. Indeed, a state of “oppressive bad conscience” can be traced back to this experience.

We now understand Scene 1 (clerks) when we incorporate Scene II (grocer).
We only need an associative connection between the two. She herself indicates that this connection is provided by the laughter. The laughter of the clerks reminded her of the grin with which the grocer had accompanied his assault. The sequence of events can thus be reconstructed as follows: In the shop, the two clerks laugh, and this laughter (unconsciously) evokes the memory of the grocer. The situation also bears a resemblance: she is alone in the shop again. The grocer is remembered for pinching her through her clothes, but in the meantime, she has reached puberty. This memory triggers, for the first time, something it certainly could not have at the time—a sexual release, which transforms into fear. With this fear, she becomes afraid that the clerks might repeat the assault and flees.

It is absolutely certain that two types of ψ-processes are intermingled here and that the memory of Scene II (grocer) occurred in a different state than the other. The sequence of events can be represented as follows:

Among these, the darkened ideas (V) are perceptions that are also remembered. The fact that the sexual release also reached consciousness is evidenced by the otherwise incomprehensible idea that the laughing clerk appealed to her. The conclusion—that she should not stay alone in the shop due to the risk of assault—is entirely logical, taking into account all elements of the associative process. However, of the entire sequence of events (illustrated below), nothing reaches consciousness except the fragment “clothing,” and the conscious mind constructs, from the available material (clerks, laughter, clothing, sexual sensation), two false connections: that she was laughed at because of her clothing and that one of the clerks sexually appealed to her.

The entire complex (illuminated) is represented in consciousness by the single idea of “clothing,” evidently the most harmless element. This is a case of repression with symbol formation. The fact that the conclusion—the symptom—was then formed correctly, so that the symbol plays no role in it, is actually a peculiarity of this case.

One could say it is entirely normal for an association to pass through unconscious intermediary links until it reaches a conscious one, as happens here. Probably, the link that enters consciousness is the one that arouses special interest. In our example, however, it is noteworthy that the link entering consciousness is not the one that arouses interest (the assault) but another one, functioning as a symbol (clothing).

If one asks what the cause of this inserted pathological process might be, only one emerges: the sexual release, which is also testified to by consciousness. This release is tied to the memory of the assault. However, it is highly remarkable that it was not tied to the assault itself when it was experienced. This is a case where a memory evokes an affect that the actual experience did not evoke, because the changes brought about by puberty have since enabled a different understanding of the remembered event.

This case is now typical of repression in hysteria. Everywhere, it is found that a memory is repressed, which only retroactively becomes traumatic. The cause of this phenomenon is the delay of puberty compared to the otherwise normal development of the individual.

Conditions of ψψψ

Although it is unusual in psychological life for a memory to evoke an affect that it did not bring with it as an experience, this is quite typical for sexual ideas, precisely because the delay of puberty is a universal characteristic of the organism. Every adolescent has memory traces that can only be understood with the onset of their own sexual sensations, so everyone should theoretically carry the seeds of hysteria within themselves. Clearly, additional factors must be involved for this general predisposition to be restricted to the small number of people who actually become hysterical.

Analysis points out that the disruptive factor in a sexual trauma is evidently the release of affect. Experience identifies hysterics as individuals who are, in part, known to have become sexually excitable prematurely, whether through mechanical or emotional stimulation (masturbation), and in part, presumed to have an inherent predisposition toward premature sexual release. Premature onset or stronger sexual release is apparently equivalent. This factor is thus reduced to a quantitative one.

The Role of Prematurity in Sexual Release

What, then, is the significance of prematurity in sexual release? All importance lies in the prematurity itself, for the idea that sexual release inherently leads to repression cannot be upheld; otherwise, repression would become a process of normal frequency.

The Disturbance of Thought by Affect

We cannot dismiss the notion that the disturbance of normal psychological processes had two conditions:

  1. That the sexual release was tied to a memory rather than an experience.
  2. That the sexual release occurred prematurely.

These two factors together produce a disturbance that exceeds the normal range, though it is also foreshadowed in normal functioning.

It is a very common observation that affective development disrupts normal thought processes in various ways. First, by causing many possible thought pathways to be forgotten, similar to what happens in dreams. For example, it has happened to me that, in the agitation of a significant worry, I forgot to use the telephone I had recently installed. The recent pathway was overridden by the state of affect. Familiar pathways, i.e., older patterns, took precedence. With this forgetting, the selection, practicality, and logic of the sequence vanish, much like in dreams.

Second, without forgetting, pathways are taken that are normally avoided, particularly pathways of discharge, such as actions taken in affective states. Finally, the affective process approaches the uninhibited primary process.

From this, several conclusions can be drawn. First, that during the release of affect, the releasing idea itself is strengthened. Second, that the primary function of the occupied ego lies in preventing new affective processes and suppressing the established affective pathways. This relationship can only be conceptualized as follows:

Originally, a perceptual occupation, as the residue of a painful experience, released displeasure, gained strength from the released quantity, and proceeded along partially pre-channeled pathways toward discharge. Once an occupied ego had formed, “attention” developed, targeting new perceptual occupations, following their pathways from W (the stimulus) with auxiliary side-occupations. This mechanism quantitatively restricted the release of displeasure, and the onset of such a release served as a signal for the ego to initiate normal defense. This process prevented new painful experiences and their pathways from forming too easily. However, the stronger the release of displeasure, the more difficult the task for the ego, which, with its auxiliary side-occupations, can only counterbalance quantities up to a certain limit and must therefore allow for a primary process to take place.

Furthermore, the larger the quantity striving toward discharge, the more difficult it becomes for the ego to engage in intellectual processing, which, according to all indications, consists of experimentally shifting small quantities (Qη). Reflection is a time-consuming activity of the ego, which cannot occur at high levels of quantity (Qη) in the affective range. Hence, the impulsiveness and the selection of pathways resembling a primary process during an affective state.

Thus, the ego’s task is to prevent any release of affect, as this would permit a primary process to occur. Its best tool for this is the mechanism of attention. If an occupation that releases displeasure escapes this mechanism, the ego is too late to intervene. In the case of the hysterical proton pseudos, this is precisely what happens. The attention is directed toward perceptions that would normally provoke the release of displeasure. Here, however, it is not a perception but a memory trace that unexpectedly triggers the release of displeasure, and the ego becomes aware of it only after it is too late; it has allowed a primary process to occur because it did not anticipate one.

Still, it happens in other contexts that memories release displeasure. Indeed, this is entirely normal in the case of fresh memories. Initially, when the trauma (painful experience) occurs—the very first traumas escape the ego altogether—at a time when an ego is already present, a release of displeasure occurs, but simultaneously, the ego is active in creating auxiliary side-occupations. When the memory is reoccupied, the displeasure is repeated, but the ego pathways are already present. Experience shows that the release diminishes with each repetition until it shrinks to a level acceptable to the ego, serving only as a signal. The key, therefore, is that during the first release of displeasure, the ego’s inhibition is not entirely absent, and the process does not unfold as a posthumous primary affective experience. This condition is fulfilled when, as in the case of the hysterical proton pseudos, the memory first initiates the release of displeasure.

One of the conditions derived from clinical experience has thus been evaluated in its significance: the delay of puberty enables posthumous primary processes.

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