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🤖🧠 Saikbilim Evirileri 🤖🧠

(Part 1, Part 2, Part 3)

III. PART: ATTEMPT TO REPRESENT NORMAL ψ PROCESSES
October 5, 1895

The so-called secondary processes must be mechanically explained by the effects a continuously occupied mass of neurons (the Ego) exerts on others with fluctuating occupations. I aim to provide a psychological depiction of such processes.

On one side, we have the Ego, and on the other, W (perceptions), i.e., occupations in ψ from Φ (originating from the external world). I require a mechanism that compels the Ego to follow perceptions and influence them. I find this mechanism in the premise that each perception necessarily stimulates ω, thereby emitting quality signals. More precisely, it stimulates consciousness in ω (consciousness of a quality), and the discharge of the ω stimulation delivers a message to ψ, which represents the quality signal. I hypothesize that these quality signals are what make ψ interested in the perception.

This would constitute the mechanism of psychic “attention.” Explaining its origin mechanically (automatically) proves challenging. I therefore assume it is biologically conditioned, i.e., preserved through the course of psychic evolution because any alternative ψ behavior has been eliminated by the development of unpleasure. The effect of psychic attention is the occupation of the same neurons that serve as the carriers of perception occupation.

This state has a precedent in the satisfaction experience, vital for overall development, and in its repetitions—desire states that evolve into wish states and expectation states. I have argued that these states contain the biological justification for all thinking. The psychic situation is as follows: Within the Ego, there is a tension of desire, as a result of which the representation of the beloved object (the wish representation) is occupied. Biological experience has taught that this representation must not be so strongly occupied as to be mistaken for a perception and that discharge must be delayed until quality signals from the representation indicate that it is now real—a perception occupation.

When a perception identical to or similar to the representation arrives, it finds its neurons preoccupied by the wish—i.e., either entirely occupied or partially so, depending on the extent of the correspondence. The difference between the representation and the incoming perception then triggers the thinking process, which concludes when the surplus perception occupations are transferred into representation occupations via a discovered pathway. At this point, identity is achieved.

Attention then consists of producing the psychic situation of the expectation state even for perceptions that do not partially coincide with wish occupations. It has become important to send occupations to all perceptions because the desired ones might be among them. Attention is biologically justified; the challenge is merely to guide the Ego in determining which expectation occupation it should establish, and quality signals serve this purpose.

The process of psychic orientation can be further analyzed. Initially, the Ego is unprepared. A perception occupation arises, followed by its quality signal. The intimate facilitation between these two messages will further enhance the perception occupation, and now the attention occupation of the perception neurons will occur. The next perception of the same object will (according to the second law of association) result in a more extensive occupation of the same perception, and only this will be the psychically useful perception.

(Even from this fragment of the depiction, an extremely significant statement emerges: The first perception occupation is of low intensity, with minimal quantity (Q); the second, with ψ preoccupation, has a quantitatively greater intensity. Judgment of the quantitative properties of the object is not fundamentally altered by attention. Consequently, the external quantity (Q) of objects cannot be expressed in ψ through psychic quantity (Qη). Psychic quantity signifies something entirely different, unrepresented in reality, while external quantity (Q) is genuinely expressed in ψ by something else—through the complexity of the occupations. As a result, external [Q] quantity is excluded from ψ.)

An even more satisfying depiction is the following: Biological experience has demonstrated that ψ attention is constantly oriented toward quality signals. These signals therefore occur on preoccupied neurons and with sufficient quantity. The thus-reinforced quality messages further enhance perception occupations through their facilitation, and the Ego has learned to direct its attention occupations according to the course of this associative movement from the quality signal to the perception.

This guidance allows it to occupy precisely the appropriate perceptions or their surroundings. Indeed, if one assumes that the same quantity (Qη) from the Ego migrates along the pathway from the quality signal to the perception, the attention occupations have even been explained mechanically (automatically). Attention therefore abandons the quality signals to focus on the now-overoccupied perception neurons.

Suppose, for some reason, the attention mechanism fails. In that case, the ψ occupation of the perception neurons will not occur, and the quantity (Q) reaching there will propagate along the best pathways (purely associatively) to the extent permitted by the relations between resistances and the quantity of the perception occupation. This flow would likely soon reach its end since the quantity (Q) divides and becomes too small in the next neuron to sustain further flow.

The flow of quantities (Wq) attached to perception can, under certain conditions, subsequently attract attention or fail to do so. In such cases, it ends unnoticed in the occupation of neighboring neurons, whose fate is unknown to us. This is a perception flow without attention, as must occur countless times daily. It cannot extend far, as the analysis of the attention process will show, and from this, one can infer the smallness of the quantities (Wq) associated with perception.

However, once the W system has received its attention occupation, various scenarios can occur, two of which stand out: the state of ordinary thinking and that of purely observational thinking. The latter seems to be the simpler case; it corresponds approximately to the state of a researcher who has made an observation and asks, “What does this mean? Where does it lead?” The process then proceeds as follows. (For the sake of simplicity, I must now substitute the complex perception occupation with that of a single neuron.)

The perception neuron is overoccupied, and the combined quantity from external and psychic sources (Q and Qη) flows along the best pathways. Depending on resistance and quantity, it will overcome certain thresholds and occupy new associated neurons, while failing to overcome others where the quotient falls below the threshold. Undoubtedly, more neurons and those farther away are occupied than would be in a simple associative process without attention. Eventually, the flow also ends here in certain terminal occupations or just one.

The result of attention is that, in place of the perception, multiple or one (connected to the initial neuron through association) memory occupations appear. For simplicity, let us assume there is only one memory image. If this could again be occupied by ψ (with attention), the process would repeat, with the quantity (Q) flowing anew and occupying (or evoking) another memory image along the best pathway.

Clearly, the intention of observational thinking is to explore the paths leading outward from the W system as far as possible; this serves to exhaust the knowledge of the perception object. We notice that the type of thinking described here leads to understanding. Thus, it requires a ψ occupation for the reached memory images and also a mechanism to direct such occupation to the correct locations. Otherwise, how would the (.) neurons in the Ego know where to direct the occupation?

An attention mechanism like the one described above again presupposes quality signals. Do these arise during the associative process? According to our premises, they do not. However, they can be obtained through a new arrangement that looks as follows: Quality signals normally only come from perception. Thus, the task is to derive a perception from the quantity flow (Qη). If an output were linked to the quantity flow (Qη) alongside the circuit, it would, like any movement, deliver a movement signal. After all, the quality signals themselves are merely output signals (we may later discuss their nature).

Now, it may happen that during the quantity flow (Q), a motor neuron is also occupied, which then discharges quantity (Qη) and delivers a quality signal. However, the goal is to obtain such outputs from all occupations. Not all are motor-related, so they must be brought into secure pathways with motor neurons for this purpose.

This goal is fulfilled by language association. It consists of linking ψ neurons with neurons that serve sound representations and have the closest associations with motor speech images. These associations have two distinguishing features over others: they are limited (few in number) and exclusive. From the sound image, excitation inevitably reaches the word image, and from there to output.

If the memory images are such that a partial flow from them can reach the sound images and motor word images, then the occupation of the memory images is accompanied by output signals, which are quality signals and thus consciousness signals of memory. If the Ego now preoccupies these word images as it previously did the perceptual output images, it has created a mechanism to direct ψ occupation to the memories emerging in the quantity flow. This is conscious, observational thinking.

Language association accomplishes something else of great importance beyond enabling recognition. The pathways between ψ neurons represent memory, the depiction of all influences ψ has received from the external world. We now notice that the Ego itself also occupies ψ neurons and initiates processes that must also leave pathways as traces. ψ has no means to distinguish the effects of thinking processes from those of perception processes.

Perception processes are recognizable and reproducible through their association with perceptual outputs. However, the pathways formed by thinking only leave the result, not a memory. The same thinking pathway might have been formed by one intense or ten less intensive processes.

Language output signals address this deficiency; they equate thinking processes with perception processes, grant them a reality, and enable their memorization.

The biological development of this critical association also deserves consideration. Language innervation initially serves as a valve-like output path for ψ to regulate quantity fluctuations (Qη), a segment of the pathway for internal alteration, which constitutes the sole output as long as specific action is yet to be identified. This pathway acquires a secondary function by alerting a helpful individual (usually the desired object itself) to the child’s desiring and suffering state, thereby aiding communication and becoming incorporated into specific action.

At the beginning of judgment, when perceptions are of interest due to their possible relation to the desired object, and their complexes are divided into an unassimilable part (the thing) and a part known to the Ego from its own experience (property, activity)—a process called understanding—language expression establishes two connections.

First, objects—perceptions that cause pain and evoke a scream—stand out as significant. This association of a sound (which also stimulates its own movement images) with an otherwise composite perception highlights the object as hostile and helps focus attention on the perception. In cases where pain previously failed to produce good quality signals of the object, the scream itself serves to characterize the object.

Thus, this association is a means of making painful memories conscious and the object of attention. The first class of conscious memories is created. It then requires little to invent language. There are other objects that consistently produce certain sounds, so within their perception complexes, a sound plays a role. Through the imitative tendency appearing during judgment, one can find the movement signal for this sound image.

This second class of memories can now also become conscious. Finally, if one associates arbitrary sounds with perceptions, memories become conscious through attention to the sound output signals, just like perceptions, and can be occupied by ψ.

We have thus identified as characteristic of the process of recognizing thought that, from the outset, attention is directed toward the discharge signals of thought—the linguistic signals. As is well-known, so-called conscious thinking proceeds with slight motor expenditure.

The process of following the quantity flow (Q) through an association can therefore continue indefinitely, typically until it reaches “fully known” associative endpoints. The fixation of this pathway and its endpoints then constitutes the “recognition” of the potentially new perception.

Now, one would like to know something quantitative about this recognition-thinking process. In comparison to the naive associative process, the perception here is overoccupied, and the process itself consists of a regulated displacement of quantities (Qη) via association with quality signals. At each station, the ψ occupation is renewed, and finally, there is a discharge from the motor neurons of the linguistic pathway. One wonders: does this process result in a significant loss of quantity (Qη) to the Ego, or is the cognitive expenditure relatively minor?

A clue to the answer lies in the fact that the linguistic innervations accompanying thought are apparently very slight. There is no actual speaking, just as the imagination of a movement image does not result in actual movement. However, imagining and moving differ only quantitatively, as we have learned from experiments on thought reading. In cases of intense thinking, one might even speak aloud.

How, then, can such small discharges occur, given that small quantities cannot flow and large quantities are typically balanced en masse by the motor neurons?

It is likely that even the displacement quantities are not very large during the thinking process. First, the expenditure of large quantities (Qη) is a loss the Ego aims to minimize, as the quantity (Q) is designated for demanding specific actions. Second, a large quantity (Qη) would activate multiple associative pathways simultaneously, leaving no time for cognitive occupation and leading to significant expenditure. Thus, it is likely that small quantities (Qη) flow during the thinking process.

Nonetheless, according to our assumption, perception and memory during thought should be overoccupied—more strongly than during simple perception. Additionally, there are different intensities of attention, which we can only interpret as varying levels of increasing occupying quantities (Qη). With stronger attention, observational tracking would then become more difficult—a conclusion so impractical that it must be rejected.

We face two seemingly contradictory demands: strong occupation and weak displacement. To reconcile these, one must assume a quasi-bound state in the neuron, where high occupation permits only minimal flow. This assumption becomes more plausible when considering that the flow in a neuron is evidently influenced by the occupations surrounding it.

Now, the Ego itself is such a mass of neurons that holds its occupation—that is, it is in a bound state—and this can likely only occur through mutual interaction.

One can imagine, then, that a perception neuron occupied with attention is temporarily incorporated into the Ego and now falls under the same quantity-binding as all Ego neurons. If it is more strongly occupied, the flow quantity may decrease rather than necessarily increase. It is conceivable that this binding specifically allows the external quantity (Q) to flow freely while the attention occupation remains bound—a relationship that need not always remain constant.

Through this bound state, which combines high occupation with low flow, the thinking process could be mechanically characterized. Other processes are conceivable in which the flow of occupation runs parallel, involving unrestrained discharge.

I hope the assumption of such a bound state proves mechanically sustainable. I would like to examine the psychological consequences of this assumption.

At first glance, the assumption seems to suffer from an internal contradiction. If the state involves leaving only small quantities (Q) available for displacement during such occupation, how can it incorporate new neurons—i.e., allow large quantities (Q) to flow into new neurons? Tracing this back, how could such a complex Ego have developed in the first place?

Thus, we unexpectedly confront the darkest problem: the emergence of the “Ego”—a complex of neurons that retains its occupation and constitutes a structure of constant levels for short periods. A genetic approach will be the most instructive.

The Ego originally consists of core neurons that receive endogenous quantity through conduits and discharge it toward internal transformation. The satisfaction experience associates this core with a perception (the wish image) and a movement signal (the reflexive component of the specific action). During repeated states of desire and expectation, this initial Ego undergoes training and development.

It first learns not to occupy the movement images so strongly that discharge occurs unless certain conditions from perception are met. Furthermore, it learns not to over-occupy the wish representation beyond a certain degree, as this would result in hallucinatory deception. If, however, it respects these two limits and directs its attention to new perceptions, it has a chance of achieving the sought-after satisfaction.

It becomes clear that the limits preventing the Ego from over-occupying the wish image and the movement image are the basis for the storage of quantity (Qη) in the Ego and compel it to distribute its quantity (Qη) to the accessible neurons within certain boundaries.

The overoccupied core neurons primarily connect to the conduits made permeable by continuous fulfillment with quantity (Qη) from the interior and must likewise remain occupied as their extension. The quantity within them will flow as much as the resistances along the path allow, until the next resistances exceed the quotient of quantity available for flow.

At this point, the entire mass of occupation is in equilibrium—held on one side by the two barriers against motility and wish, and on the other by the resistances of the outermost neurons and, internally, by the constant pressure of the conduits. Occupation within this Ego structure will not be uniform but must remain proportional—i.e., in relation to the pathways.

When the level of occupation in the core of the Ego rises, its scope can expand; when it falls, the Ego contracts concentrically. At a certain level and a certain scope of the Ego, there is no objection to the displacement of occupation within its domain.

The question now arises: how are the two barriers established that guarantee the Ego’s constant level, especially the one against movement images, which prevents discharge? Here we arrive at a decisive point for understanding the entire organization. One can only say that, before this barrier existed, and when the motor discharge occurred together with the wish, the expected pleasure was regularly absent, and the persistence of endogenous stimulus release eventually caused unpleasure. Only this threat of unpleasure, tied to premature discharge, can account for the barrier in question. Over the course of development, the facilitation has taken over part of this task. However, it remains clear that the quantity (Qη) in the Ego does not occupy movement images freely, as this would lead to the release of unpleasure.

Everything I call a biological acquisition of the neuronal system, I imagine as represented by such a threat of unpleasure, whose effect is that those neurons that lead to the release of unpleasure are not occupied. This is the primary defense—a comprehensible consequence of the original tendency of the neuronal system. Unpleasure remains the only means of education. How the primary defense—the non-occupation due to the threat of unpleasure—can be mechanically represented, I admittedly cannot specify.

From now on, I will allow myself to refrain from providing a mechanical representation of such biological rules based on the threat of unpleasure, content if I can remain true to an illustrative development from that point onward.

A second biological rule, abstracted from the expectation process, is likely that attention should be directed to quality signals because these belong to perceptions that can lead to satisfaction and should then guide the Ego from the quality signal to the emergent perception. In short, the mechanism of attention owes its emergence to such a biological rule; it regulates the displacement of Ego occupations.

One could object here that such a mechanism is superfluous with the help of quality signals. The Ego could have biologically learned to occupy the perceptual domain itself in the state of expectation instead of being prompted to this occupation by the quality signals. However, two points can be made to justify the attention mechanism:

1. The domain of discharge signals from system W (ω) is evidently smaller, encompassing fewer neurons than the domain of perception, i.e., the entire mantle of ψ related to the sense organs. Thus, the Ego saves an extraordinary amount of effort by maintaining the occupation of the discharge signals instead of the perceptions.
2. The discharge signals or quality signals are also reality signals, which are specifically meant to distinguish real perceptual occupations from wish occupations.

Thus, the attention mechanism cannot be dispensed with. It always consists of the Ego occupying those neurons where an occupation has already appeared.

The biological rule of attention for the Ego, however, states: when a reality signal appears, the simultaneously present perceptual occupation must be overoccupied.

This is the second biological rule; the first was that of primary defense. From what has been discussed so far, some general insights for mechanical representation can also be drawn. For example, the first insight was that external quantity cannot be represented by (Qη) psychic quantity.

From the representation of the Ego and its fluctuations, it follows that the level height also has no relationship to the external world and that a general lowering or raising of the Ego level does not (normally) change the image of the world. Since the world image is based on facilitation, general fluctuations in level do not alter the facilitation.

A second principle already mentioned is that, at high levels, small quantities are more easily displaced than at lower levels. These are individual points that the characterization of the still entirely unknown neuronal movement must address.

Let us now return to the description of the observational or recognizing thinking process, which differs from the expectation process in that perceptions do not coincide with wish occupations. In this case, the Ego is alerted by the first reality signals as to which perceptual domain should be occupied.

The associative sequence of the accompanying quantity (Q) unfolds across preoccupied neurons, and the shifting (QΦ) (quantity of the Φ neurons) is repeatedly set in motion. During this process, the quality signals (of language) arise, which make the associative sequence conscious and reproducible.

At this point, one could again question the utility of quality signals. Their sole function, it might seem, is to prompt the Ego to direct occupation to where an occupation emerges during the sequence. They do not bring the occupying quantities (Qη) themselves but contribute only a part to them. In that case, the Ego could let its occupation follow the quantity flow (Q) without such support.

This is certainly true. However, paying attention to the quality signals is not superfluous. It is essential to emphasize that the above biological rule of attention is abstracted from perception and initially applies only to reality signals. The linguistic discharge signals are, in a sense, also reality signals—signals of thought reality, but not of external reality—and no such rule has been established for them, as no constant threat of unpleasure is tied to their violation.

The unpleasure resulting from neglecting recognition is not as glaring as that from ignoring the external world, even though fundamentally they are one and the same. Therefore, there truly exists an observational thinking process in which the quality signals are not, or only sporadically, awakened.

This process is enabled by the Ego automatically following the sequence with its occupations. This thinking process is even by far the more frequent one, without being abnormal. It is our ordinary thinking, unconscious, with occasional intrusions into consciousness—so-called conscious thinking with unconscious intermediate steps that can, however, be made conscious.

The usefulness of quality signals for thinking is indisputable. First, the awakened quality signals reinforce the occupations in the sequence and secure automatic attention, which is evidently tied to the emergence of occupation—we do not know how. Furthermore, and more importantly, attention directed at the quality signals ensures the impartiality of the sequence. It is very difficult for the Ego to place itself in the situation of mere “research.” The Ego almost always has goal and wish occupations, whose presence during the research process affects the associative sequence, as we shall hear, resulting in a distorted understanding of perceptions.

There is no better protection against such distortions of thinking than directing a displaceable quantity (Qη) in the Ego to a region that cannot express (i.e., provoke) such deviations in the sequence. There is only one type of such information—when attention is directed to the quality signals, which are not goal representations but whose occupation, on the contrary, enhances the associative sequence by contributing to the occupation quantity.

Thinking that involves occupation with thought-reality signals or linguistic signals is therefore the highest and safest form of the recognizing thought process.

Given the undeniable usefulness of awakening thought signals, one can expect mechanisms that secure this awakening. Unlike reality signals, thought signals do not arise spontaneously, without input from ψ. Observation tells us, however, that these mechanisms do not apply equally to all cases of thinking processes, as they do for research-oriented thinking.

The condition for the awakening of thought signals is their occupation by attention; they then arise according to the principle that the pathway between two connected and simultaneously occupied neurons is facilitated. Yet, the lure created by the preoccupation of the thought signals has only limited power to counteract other influences. For example, any additional occupation near the sequence (goal occupation, affective occupation) will compete and render the sequence unconscious. Similarly, larger quantities in the sequence will accelerate the flow and the entire sequence, as experience confirms. The common claim, “something happened so quickly within me that I didn’t notice it,” is entirely accurate. It is also well known that affect can disrupt the awakening of thought signals.

From this, a new principle emerges for the mechanical representation of psychic processes: the sequence, which is not altered by the level of occupation, can nonetheless be influenced by the flowing quantity itself. In general, a large quantity (Q) takes different paths through the network of facilitations than a small one. It does not seem difficult to illustrate this:

For every threshold, there is a limit below which quantity (Q) cannot pass at all, let alone a quotient of it. A very small quantity (Q) will still divide along two other paths for which the quantity (Q) suffices to facilitate. If the quantity (Q) increases, however, the first path will come into consideration and promote its quotients, and now occupations beyond the threshold that can now be overcome may also assert themselves. Indeed, another factor may become relevant. One might assume that not all paths from a neuron are equally receptive to quantity (Q); this difference could be called “path width.” Path width is independent of resistance, which is altered by sequence quantity (Abq), whereas path width remains constant.

Now, suppose that with increasing quantity (Q), a path is opened that can assert its width. In that case, it becomes apparent that the sequence of quantity (Q) could be fundamentally altered by the increase in flowing quantity (Q). Everyday experience strongly supports this conclusion.

The awakening of thought signals thus seems to be tied to sequences with small quantities (Q). This does not mean that every other sequence must remain unconscious, as the awakening of linguistic signals is not the only way to awaken consciousness.

How, then, can one illustrate thinking with interrupted consciousness, such as sudden insights? Our ordinary aimless thinking, though under preoccupation and automatic attention, places no value on thought signals. Biologically, they have not proven indispensable for the process. However, they tend to arise under two conditions:

1. When the smooth sequence comes to an end or encounters an obstacle.
2. When it evokes a representation that, for other reasons, awakens quality signals—that is, consciousness.

Here, this discussion may conclude.

There are clearly other types of thinking processes that are not guided by the selfless goal of recognition but by some practical purpose. The state of expectation, from which thinking generally originates, is an example of this second type of thinking. Here, a wish occupation is maintained, and simultaneously, a second emerging perception occupation is followed under attention. The goal is not to determine where this perception leads in general but rather how it leads to the activation of the wish occupation being held.

This biologically more original type of thinking process can be easily represented according to our premises. Let V+ be the wish representation that is kept particularly occupied, and W the perception to be followed. The effect of the attention occupation of W will initially be that (Qη) flows to the best-facilitated neuron a; from there, it would again proceed along the best pathway, and so on. However, this tendency to follow the best pathway will be disrupted by the presence of side occupations. If three paths lead from a—ordered by their facilitation to b, c, d—and d lies adjacent to the wish occupation +V, the result may be that (Qη) flows not to c or b but to d, from there to +V, thus revealing the path W → a → d → +V as the one sought.

Here, the principle long acknowledged by us is at work: occupation can mislead facilitation, counteracting it and allowing side occupations to modify the quantity sequence. Since occupations are variable, it is within the discretion of the Ego to modify the sequence from W toward any goal occupation.

By “goal occupation,” we do not mean uniform occupation, as seen with attention covering an entire domain, but rather a focused, heightened occupation surpassing the Ego level. It is likely necessary to assume that in this type of thinking with goal occupations, quantity also flows from +V, so that the sequence from W is influenced not only by +V but also by its subsequent stations. Only the path +V… is known and fixed, while the path from W…a… is to be discovered.

Since our Ego always maintains goal occupations, often multiple at once, we can now understand both the difficulty of purely recognizing thought and the possibility of practical thinking taking widely varying paths under different conditions, at different times, and for different individuals.

In practical thinking, one can also gain an appreciation for the difficulties of thought, which are familiar from personal experience. To revisit the earlier example, where the QΦ flow would branch off to b and c according to the facilitation, while d is distinguished by its proximity to the goal occupation or its subsequent representation: the influence of the facilitation in favor of b and c can be so strong that it greatly outweighs the attraction of d and +V.

To still direct the sequence toward +V, the occupation of +V and its subsequent representations would need to be further increased, perhaps altering attention on W to achieve a greater or lesser binding and a flow level more favorable to the path d…+V. Such effort to overcome strong facilitations in order to redirect the quantity (Q) onto less well-facilitated but goal-proximate paths corresponds to the difficulty of thought.

The role of quality signals in practical thinking is not much different from their role in recognizing thought. Quality signals stabilize and secure the sequence but are not indispensable to it. If one substitutes individual neurons with complexes and individual representations with complexes, one encounters an unrepresentable complexity in practical thinking and understands why rapid resolution becomes desirable. During such thinking, however, quality signals are often not fully awakened, and their development serves to slow down and complicate the sequence. Where the sequence has already repeatedly occurred from a given perception to certain target occupations and been stereotyped through memory facilitations, there is usually no reason to awaken quality signals.

The goal of practical thinking is identity—the convergence of the displaced Qy occupation with the wish occupation that has been held in the meantime. This is purely biological in nature: with this convergence, the compulsion to think ceases, allowing the complete innervation of the movement images encountered along the way, which constitute an accessory part of the specific action, justified under the circumstances.

Since during the sequence, these movement images are occupied only in a bound manner, and since the thought process originates from a perception that is then pursued only as a memory image, the entire thought process can become independent of both the expectation process and reality, progressing in an unaltered manner until identity is achieved. It begins with a mere representation and does not lead to action even after its completion, yet it produces practical knowledge that can be utilized in a future real situation. It proves advantageous not to initiate the practical thinking process only when faced with reality but to have it prepared in advance.

It is now time to qualify a previous assertion, namely, that a memory of thought processes can only be enabled by quality signals because otherwise their traces would not be distinguishable from the traces of perception facilitations. It remains true that the reality memory must not be altered by any thinking about it. However, it is undeniable that thinking about a subject leaves extremely significant traces for subsequent reconsideration, and it is highly questionable whether only thinking accompanied by quality signals and consciousness does this.

Thus, there must be thought facilitations, yet the original associative pathways must not be blurred. Since there can only be one type of facilitation, one might think these two conclusions are incompatible. However, their reconciliation and explanation must lie in the fact that thought facilitations were all created at high levels and likely become active again at high levels, whereas associative facilitations, formed during full or primary sequences, reemerge when the conditions for unbound sequences are established. This does not rule out every possible influence of thought facilitations on associative facilitations.

Thus, we gain the following characterization for the unknown neuronal movement: memory consists of facilitations. Facilitations are not altered by changes in level, but there are facilitations that apply only to a specific level. The direction of the sequence is not initially altered by changes in level but is influenced by the flow quantity and side occupations. At high levels, smaller quantities (Q) are more readily displaceable.

In addition to recognizing and practical thinking, there must also be a reproductive or recollective thinking process that partly overlaps with practical thinking but does not exhaust it. This recollection is the prerequisite for any examination of critical thinking; it traces a given thought process in reverse, back, for example, to a perception, again without a goal, distinguishing it from practical thinking, and it makes extensive use of quality signals.

In this backtracking, the process encounters intermediate elements that had previously been unconscious and left no quality signals, whose quality signals, however, emerge retroactively. It follows that thought sequences in and of themselves leave traces even without quality signals. In some cases, it indeed appears as if one must infer certain segments of the path, as their starting and endpoints are indicated by quality signals.

The reproducibility of thought processes far exceeds their quality signals; they can later be made conscious, although it may often be the result of the thought sequence, rather than its stages, that leaves traces.

Various events can occur during the thought process that merit representation, whether in recognizing, examining, or practical thinking. Thinking can lead to unpleasure or contradiction. Let us follow the case where practical thinking with goal occupations leads to the release of unpleasure.

The most common experience shows that this event creates an obstacle to the thought process. How can this occur at all? When a memory evokes unpleasure upon its occupation, this is generally because the corresponding perception at the time evoked unpleasure, thus belonging to a painful experience. Such perceptions, as experience shows, attract significant attention but evoke less of their own quality signals than those of the reaction they provoke; they associate with one’s own affective and defensive expressions.

If one traces the fate of such perceptions as memory images, one notices that the first repetitions still evoke both affect and unpleasure, but over time, they lose this ability. Simultaneously, they undergo another change. Initially, they retain the character of sensory qualities; when they are no longer capable of affect, they also lose this quality and become like other memory images.

If the thought sequence encounters such an unbridled memory image, it generates its quality signals, often sensory in nature, along with feelings of unpleasure and discharge tendencies, whose combination characterizes a specific affect, interrupting the thought sequence.

What happens to affective memories until they are subdued? It is not clear why time or repetition weakens their affective potency, as these factors typically contribute to strengthening an association. Something must occur during the passage of time and through repetitions that brings about this subjugation, and this can only be the establishment of a connection to the Ego or its occupations, granting power over the memory. If this process takes longer than usual, a specific reason must be found, particularly in the origin of these affective memories.

As traces of painful experiences, they were (according to our assumption about pain) occupied by excessively large QΦ quantities and acquired an overly strong facilitation toward unpleasure and affective release. Especially significant and repeated binding from the Ego is required to counterbalance this facilitation toward unpleasure.

The fact that the memory retains a hallucinatory character for so long also demands an explanation, one that is significant for understanding hallucinations. It is reasonable to assume that this hallucinatory capability, like the affective capability, indicates that the Ego occupation has not yet exerted influence over the memory. Instead, the primary discharge directions and the primary or full process dominate in these cases.

We are compelled to view hallucination as a backflow of quantity (Q) to Φ and thus to W (ω); a bound neuron does not permit such backflow. The question remains whether it is the excessively large occupation quantity of the memory that enables this backflow. However, we must recall that such a large quantity (Q) is present only during the initial painful experience. In subsequent repetitions, we are dealing merely with an ordinarily strong memory occupation, which still produces hallucination and unpleasure, presumably due to an unusually strong facilitation.

It follows that the common Φ quantity suffices for backflow and for triggering discharge, and the inhibitory effect of the Ego’s binding gains significance.

Eventually, the painful memory will be occupied in such a way that it no longer produces backflow and only minimally releases unpleasure; it is then subdued. This subjugation occurs through such a strong thought facilitation that it exerts a lasting effect and acts as an inhibitor during every subsequent repetition of the memory. Gradually, through disuse, the pathway to unpleasure release increases its resistance. Facilitations are, after all, subject to gradual decay (forgetting). Only then does this memory become a subdued memory like any other.

However, it seems that this process of subjugation leaves a lasting mark on the thought sequence. Since the thought sequence was previously disrupted each time the memory was reactivated and unpleasure awakened, there is now a tendency to inhibit the thought sequence whenever the subdued memory releases its trace of unpleasure.

This tendency is highly useful for practical thinking, as an intermediate element that leads to unpleasure cannot lie on the desired path to identity with the wish occupation. Thus arises the primary thought defense, which, in practical thinking, uses the release of unpleasure as a signal to abandon a certain path, i.e., to redirect attention and occupation elsewhere.

Here, once again, unpleasure directs the flow of quantity (Qη), as in the first biological rule. One might ask why this thought defense did not act against the still affective memory. However, in that case, we can assume that the second biological rule prevailed, which demands attention where a reality signal is present, and the unsubdued memory was still capable of forcing real quality signals. It is evident that both rules coexist purposefully.

It is interesting to see how practical thinking is guided by the biological defense rule. In theoretical (recognizing, examining) thinking, the rule is no longer followed. This is understandable, as goal-directed thinking involves any chosen path, discarding those associated with unpleasure, while theoretical thinking aims to recognize all paths.

Further, the question arises: how can error arise in the thought process? What is error?

The thought process must now be examined more closely. Practical thinking, its origin, remains the ultimate goal of all thought processes. All other types of thinking are derivatives of it. It is an evident advantage if the thought process in practical thinking does not take place only during the state of expectation but has already occurred, because:

1. This saves time for the formulation of the specific action.
2. The state of expectation is not particularly favorable for the thought sequence.

The value of promptness—the short interval between perception and action—becomes clear when we consider that perceptions change rapidly. If the thought process takes too long, its result becomes unusable in the meantime. Therefore, it is pre-thought.

The origin of derivative thought processes lies in judgment formation, which the Ego achieves through an adaptation in its organization, based on the partial coincidence of perception occupations with signals from the body itself. This process separates the perception complexes into a constant, incomprehensible part—the “thing”—and a variable, comprehensible part—its property or movement.

As the thing-complex repeatedly combines with various property-complexes, and these, in turn, with various thing-complexes, the possibility arises of elaborating thought paths from these two types of complexes to the desired state of the thing in a generally valid manner, independent of the particular real perception. Working with judgments instead of disordered individual perception complexes thus represents a great economy. Whether the psychological unity thus gained is also represented by a neuronal unity in the thought sequence—different from the word representation—shall remain unexamined.

Error can already intrude into the creation of judgment. The thing or movement complexes are never entirely identical, and among their differing components, there may be elements whose neglect disrupts the outcome in reality. This flaw in thinking stems from the effort, which we are imitating here, to substitute a single neuron for the complex, made necessary by the immense complexity involved. These are errors of judgment or errors of premises.

Another cause of error may lie in the fact that the perception objects of reality were not fully perceived because they were outside the sensory domain. These are errors of ignorance, unavoidable for all humans. Where this condition does not apply, psychic preoccupation may be deficient (due to the Ego’s distraction from perceptions), leading to inaccurate perceptions and incomplete thought sequences; these are errors due to insufficient attention.

Now, if we take the material of thought processes as judged and ordered complexes rather than naive ones, an opportunity arises to abbreviate the practical thought process itself. If it turns out, for instance, that the path from perception to identity with the wish occupation leads through a movement image M, it is biologically assured that once identity is achieved, M will be fully innervated.

The simultaneity of the perception and this M creates an intense facilitation between them, and a subsequent perception image will evoke M without requiring further associative sequence. It is assumed here, of course, that it is always possible to establish a connection between two occupations. What was initially a laboriously constructed thought connection becomes, through simultaneous full occupation, a strong facilitation.

It then remains only to determine whether the facilitation always follows the initially discovered path or can take a more direct route. The latter seems more likely and practical because it eliminates the need to fix thought paths, which should remain free for various other connections. If repetition of the thought path is eliminated, no facilitation from it is to be expected, and the result is better fixed through a direct connection.

However, the source of the new path remains an open question. If both occupations, W and M, share a common association with a third element, the task becomes easier.

The segment of the thought process from perception to identity through M can also be highlighted and yields a similar result when attention fixes on M and integrates it into an association with the equally fixed perceptions. This thought facilitation will then reestablish itself in the real situation.

In this mental effort, errors are initially not apparent, though an impractical thought path can be chosen, leading to an effort-intensive movement, because the selection in practical thinking depends solely on reproducible experiences.

With the growth of memories, new displacement paths emerge each time. Therefore, it is advantageous to thoroughly follow individual perceptions in order to identify the most favorable paths among them. This is the work of recognizing thinking, which thus serves as preparation for practical thinking, although it develops from the latter only at a later stage. The results of recognizing thinking are then useful for more than one type of wish occupation.

The errors of recognizing thinking are evident: they include bias, when goal occupations are not avoided, and incompleteness, when not all paths are explored. It is clear that a major advantage arises when quality signals are simultaneously awakened; when these selected thought processes are incorporated into the expectation state, the associative sequence from the initial to the final element can proceed via the quality signals instead of traversing the entire thought sequence. Here, the quality series does not even need to fully correspond to the thought sequence; in theoretical thinking, unpleasure plays no role and is thus possible even with subdued memories.

We must also consider another type of thinking: critical or reviewing thinking. This arises when, despite adherence to all the rules, the expectation process followed by specific action leads to unpleasure instead of satisfaction. Critical thinking seeks, without a practical goal, in leisure and with the awakening of all quality signals, to repeat the entire quantity sequence in order to identify a thought error or a psychological shortcoming. It is recognizing thinking with a given object—namely, a thought sequence.

We have already discussed what these thought sequences can consist of. But what constitutes logical errors?

In short, they stem from the neglect of the biological rules for the thought sequence. These rules dictate where the attention occupation should be directed at each stage and when the thought process should halt. They are protected by threats of unpleasure, derived from experience, and can easily be translated into the rules of logic, as will be demonstrated in detail.

The intellectual unpleasure of contradiction, at which the reviewing thought sequence halts, is nothing other than the stored unpleasure that protects the biological rules and is activated by an incorrect thought process.

The existence of such biological rules can thus be proven by the feeling of unpleasure in the face of logical errors.

Now, we cannot conceive of action except as the full occupation of those movement images that were highlighted during the thought process, possibly including those belonging to the voluntary component of the specific action (if it was in the expectation state). Here, there is a relinquishment of the bound state and a retraction of attention occupations. The former likely proceeds as the first discharge from the motor neurons causes the level within the Ego to drop irreversibly.

One would not expect a complete discharge of the Ego for individual actions but only for the most extensive acts of satisfaction. Remarkably, action does not occur through an inversion of the pathway that brought about the movement images but rather along specific motor pathways. Thus, the movement affect is not necessarily identical to the intended one, as it would be if the same pathway were inverted.

During the action, a new comparison must take place between incoming movement signals and the preoccupied ones, with the excitation of corrective innervations until identity is achieved. This case repeats what occurred on the perceptual side, only with less variety, greater speed, and continuous full discharge, whereas the former occurred without such discharge.

The analogy between practical thinking and purposeful action is noteworthy. From this, we can infer that movement images are sensitive. However, the peculiarity that action involves new pathways rather than the much simpler inversion suggests that the conduction direction of neuronal elements is likely fixed and perhaps that neuronal movement may exhibit different characteristics in these scenarios.

Movement images are perceptions and, as such, naturally possess quality and awaken consciousness. It cannot be denied that they occasionally attract significant attention. However, their qualities are less striking, likely less varied than those of the external world, and they are not associated with word representations; instead, they partly serve these associations themselves.

However, they do not originate from highly organized sensory organs; their quality is likely monotonous.