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(All parts in English)

KAUFMANN

LACAN

Let us not forget that this year I resolved that this seminar should truly be a seminar, especially since we have more than one person capable of participating in a most effective way. Thus, I can refer to our friend Pierre KAUFMANN, Assistant at the Sorbonne, who for a long time has followed and engaged most effectively with what transpires in this seminar.

Perhaps a number of you are familiar with his Thursday chronicles in Combat, philosophical chronicles where, on several occasions—not least for the Royaumont Congress—he has provided a very comprehensive report on the events.

On many other occasions, he has revisited what takes place here in our teachings. Quite recently, for instance, in connection with an article that alluded to our teachings, he offered clarifications in his chronicle that were all the more useful as some authors, for example, criticized perceived shortcomings in our teaching based solely on a portion of it or on an article. He had the great kindness to inform them of more current developments in the continuation of this teaching.

Thus, the article Besoin et langage (Need and Language) served a very useful function regarding certain points raised by Henri LEFEBVRE. That said, the other day we discussed together a brief article by BERNFELD, which I mentioned two seminars ago. Mr. KAUFMANN kindly took an interest in it, and I believe he will address some details and perhaps pose a few questions regarding it.

Moreover, this dialogue has expanded. I believe he himself has been drawn well beyond the confines of this brief article, so much so that he recently shared something with me that seemed sufficiently suggestive and promising to encourage him to fully develop it as he sees fit and as he finds agreeable, presenting to us the reflections inspired by this article and the extensions to which it has led him.

I draw your special attention to this: on several occasions in this article, Mr. KAUFMANN made very interesting references—what I can only describe as references alongside his own deep investigations into the sources of the material he encountered in the psychological field when he first engaged with it.

On this subject, it must be said that, in both French- and English-speaking countries, we are rather ignorant of an extremely rich German tradition. It is entirely implausible to suppose that FREUD carefully isolated himself from this tradition when, on the contrary, all evidence indicates that his reading of it was meticulous, extensive, and, to put it plainly, immense.

In many respects, we would have much to learn from matters that even Mr. KAUFMANN has not yet fully uncovered or published. I believe today you will get an idea of this.

I now yield the floor to him, thanking him for what he has prepared for us.

Pierre KAUFMANN

The article by BERNFELD that I wish to discuss was published in 1922 in Imago. [S. Bernfeld: Bemerkungen über «Sublimierung», Imago, 1922, VIII, Heft 3, p. 333]. This article presents itself to us primarily as a set of historical considerations. BERNFELD appears as a reader and commentator of FREUD. In particular, he has noted a number of FREUD’s texts concerning sublimation, and in the second part, he applies FREUD’s views, as they were understood at the time of his writing, to examples of social creation.

Unfortunately, I have not had access to the work where these original observations on adolescent poetry were published. He provides us with a summary that at least allows us to fix his theoretical thought. Finally, he revisits these examples with views that could not—nor does he himself attempt to—be qualified as systematic on the subject of sublimation. Nevertheless, they give us a certain orientation, which BERNFELD himself imbues with historical significance in his writing.

Moreover, when we refer to the publication date, these historical aspects become more pronounced, as the article dates from 1922, just before the elaboration of FREUD’s doctrine of the ideal ego. This is especially interesting since BERNFELD focuses his analysis precisely on the role of the ideal ego in sublimation. Thus, one could say that BERNFELD, in this article, is in some ways more interesting for the distortions he represents regarding what we know of FREUD’s doctrine in its entirety than for his genuinely positive contributions. Therefore, it is an article of interest due to its place within the evolution of Freudian thought.

However, it also holds another significance, and this is where the necessity of recalling it within a broader history emerges, one that predates even the appearance of Freudianism. Indeed, from the outset, BERNFELD tells us regarding sublimation that this concept was forged by psychoanalysis and transmitted by psychoanalysis to psychology, particularly to child psychology, since BERNFELD situates himself halfway between these two fields.

And if we refer to Three Essays on Sexuality, this assertion by BERNFELD about the origin of the very concept of sublimation is contradicted by FREUD, who explicitly states that he borrowed the notion from sociology. Sociologists, he says, seem to agree that the forces creating all the processes to which the name sublimation has been given constitute one of the most important factors. FREUD adds that the same process plays a role in individual development. Thus, this small divergence between FREUD and his commentator leads us to a fundamentally methodological problem: the interpretation of psychoanalysis, that is, the position of psychoanalysis vis-à-vis sociology, as FREUD puts it here.

This observation prompted me to investigate which sociologists FREUD might have been referring to. In fact, I embarked on this without any guide, as I assume references might exist on this subject. By chance, I came across certain authors. I encountered three names: IHERING, VIERKANDT, and finally SIMMEL.

The first direction, toward IHERING, was suggested to me by a note from HÖFFLING in his Psychologie fondée sur l’expérience. Indeed, starting from the problem of the relations between drives and civilization, HÖFFLING refers here to IHERING’s contribution, citing his work La finalité dans le droit (Purpose in Law). I included this citation from HÖFFLING because, for reasons I will explain later, HÖFFLING seems to me to be a good intermediary in the theoretical investigation of Freudianism’s distant origins.

The second reference, to VIERKANDT, I found simply in the sociological dictionary authored by him. Lastly, the final reference, which turned out to be the most interesting, is that of SIMMEL. I was drawn to it due to the title of one of SIMMEL’s well-known works, Philosophie des Geldes (The Philosophy of Money). I wondered if this work might contain interesting anticipations of what FREUD articulates about anal sublimation. While IHERING and VIERKANDT offered little beyond general directions, SIMMEL, through the reading of this book, appears as one of the precursors to Freudian doctrine on sublimation—or at least as one of those who help situate its interpretation.

I will be brief regarding the first two authors.

IHERING, first.

In his book, which is difficult to read as I could only access it at the National Library, one finds two orders of considerations. First, there are reflections that might seem relatively banal on the transcendence of Triebe (drives). However, it is noteworthy that IHERING concerns himself with how two orders, which do not directly derive from one another, might align. That is, he speaks of collaboration between the order of drives and the order of civilization. More specifically, he contrasts two groups: what he calls the social drives, on the one hand—retribution and constraint—and, on the other, the sense of duty and love.

So, what is interesting to note is that [IHERING] seeks to understand how a collaboration between these two groups of principles can take place. However, there is a more intriguing aspect to IHERING’s work, as a suggestion: the fundamental role he assigns to language in ethics. In the second volume of this book, in Chapter IX: On Ethics, he speaks of the authority of language in matters of ethics. Here is what he tells us:

“There is a sort of repository of human experience in language, and often in consciousness, a confrontation occurs between the feeling a subject may have regarding their practical motivations and, on the other hand, the social significance embedded in language. The use of language, which contains this treasure—namely, the accumulated experience of humanity—can serve as a reference at each moment of trial and produces an accentuation of feeling through language. This use of language is a fact that science must respect.”

Thus, his method of analyzing ethics involves seeking to access the very essence of ethics through ethical terminology. In this perspective, he develops a general theory of what sociologists today call regulation—particularly the civility and social control of civility, or politeness. He specifically references works housed at the Bibliothèque Nationale by Abbé MORVAN DE BELLEGARDE, Reflections on What Can Please or Displease in Worldly Interactions. These books seem to hold great promise.

As for VIERKANDT, I will be brief. VIERKANDT himself investigates this alignment—which, in summary, can be said to be the object of sublimation—between the order of drives and the order of culture.

I now turn directly to SIMMEL’s book, The Philosophy of Money. This book, published in 1900, comprises two parts: one analytical and one synthetic. The analytical part includes three chapters: The Value of Money, The Substantial Value of Money, and Money in Final Series.

In his third chapter, SIMMEL introduces both the idea of series and the idea of purpose, doing so simultaneously and integrally. The second part includes a chapter on individual freedom and personal values that can serve as equivalents to money. The following chapter addresses lifestyle. Within this chapter, as well as in the preceding ones, one finds the germ of the problem raised by FREUD regarding anal character. Generally speaking, what interests us in SIMMEL’s book is his explicit linkage of the problem of the significance of money to the problem of satisfying needs, the distance from the object (in a sense very close to that discussed here), and finally, sublimation.

The term sublimation appears in relation to art on page 24. SIMMEL evokes sublimation in connection with the distancing of the object. I will draw on SIMMEL’s insights from his first chapter, starting on page 16. He states that, although the drive normally requires an object for its satisfaction, in many cases, this drive focuses solely on satisfaction in such a way that the very nature of the object becomes indifferent. He uses the example of the feminine object, regardless of any specific choice, and then demonstrates how consciousness, on the contrary, seeks to specify this object of satisfaction.

Initially, he says, there is a getrieben werden—that is, we are, in essence, pushed from behind—whereas, on the contrary, as the object becomes more specified, we encounter a terminus ad quem. Progressively, satisfaction is sought toward a terminus ad plus. Thus, an object emerges that assumes intrinsic significance. According to SIMMEL’s thinking, this significance becomes associated precisely with a value.

Incidentally, one can observe that SIMMEL introduces a notion that, in many respects, recalls FREUD’s concept of narcissism. Indeed, he states that as specialization and refinement of the consciousness’s need occur, a certain amount of forces is withdrawn from the solipsistic need. In other words, we encounter something analogous to the transition from narcissistic libido to object-libido.

To describe this transition, SIMMEL explicitly introduces the notion of distance—the thing being precisely what presents itself at a distance. “Where one recognizes,” he says, “the profound, inherent meaning of the thing, there is distance.” He adds, in subsequent pages, that this constitution of an object independent of the self and distant from the self corresponds to a mitigation, a weakening of the affects of desire. With this distancing of the object, a separation between subject and object arises. Here is how he presents it:

“We call the act where a unification of the subject and the object of satisfaction occurs a subjective act. Whereas in reality—here, three terms intervene: Hindernis (obstacle), Versagung (denial), and Verschiebung (deferral)—it is through an obstacle, a denial, a postponement that the division between subject and object occurs.”

A rupture thus takes place here between the subject and the object, and he adds:

“…with this same process of inhibition and distancing, we see the emergence of a distinct significance for the self and a distinct significance for the object.”

And it is in this context that he introduces the term and the concept of sublimation. What is particularly interesting is that this concept of sublimation is associated with the notion of distance. He contrasts the case where we have a concrete feeling of the Thing with the case where we have abstraction and sublimation. Here, he introduces the term “distancing” to describe this separation from the object and the relationship of the self to a distant object, particularly in art.

This simple text demonstrates that there is merit in questioning the very source of the term sublimation and the context within which BERNFELD framed his interpretation. I mentioned that one of BERNFELD’s primary aims is to present himself to us as a reader of FREUD, meaning that he quotes a number of FREUD’s texts. However, what he omits from these texts is at least as interesting as what he cites, because everything that BERNFELD excludes in his citations of FREUD pertains precisely to the cultural aspect that SIMMEL had considered.

In general, within the systematization of the texts, there is nothing particularly original in BERNFELD’s exposition. Here is what he tells us about sublimation as he understands it according to FREUD. He begins by stating that sublimation is a fate that the sexual drive must undergo due to external or internal denial of its aim. For this, he refers to Leonardo da Vinci, Three Essays, the article on anal erotism, and On Narcissism.

Secondly, he states that this specific fate occurs insofar as it involves object-libido. It consists in the drive being displaced onto another aim, distant from sexual satisfaction, with an emphasis on its deviation from the sexual. He then references a text from Group Psychology….

Here, there is a small issue that I have not yet resolved, but which seems too significant to ignore. The problem lies in the fact that he does not cite the text as it appears in the edition of Imago that I consulted. The discrepancy concerns a point that is, in truth, quite important for interpreting the very notion of sublimation. According to BERNFELD’s reference, it appears to relate to the 1918 edition of Small Writings. Here is the text:

“The distortion of the drive’s aim defines sublimation…”

And he then cites FREUD:

“deren Abteilung vom Idealich ausgeht.”

He states that this sublimation originates—the term is very strong: ausgeht—in the ideal ego. He continues:

“…whose fulfillment, its realization, remains entirely independent of such stimulation, of such excitation.”

However, the Imago text uses the phrase angeregt macht, which means that according to the version we now have, it no longer states that sublimation originates in the ideal ego. It no longer claims that it emerges from this ideal ego but that it may be stimulated, excited. Here, two hypotheses can be formulated: either he misread the text, or the text was modified.

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LACAN

That can happen, as I’ve experienced in my own notes.

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Pierre KAUFMANN

And this issue becomes all the more important for the overall interpretation because his entire reading of sublimation rests precisely on the alignment he posits between repressed object-libido, on the one hand, and the aims of the ego on the other. In other words, he emphasizes what he calls the aims of the ego, the role played by the ego in sublimation.

I now turn to the examples that BERNFELD provides. His first example is that of the poetic creation of an adolescent who wrote between the ages of 13 and 19. Here is the general outline of the observation.

The young man began composing rhymes—he always refers to poems but takes care to specify that it is only in the third phase of this poetic development that one can truly speak of art—at the age of 13. At this time, he wrote ballads, the content of which was generally borrowed from school teachings. At 14 and a half, he composed his first lyrical poem, which drew from his personal life. Between the ages of 15 and a half and 19, he wrote prolifically, producing novellas, dramas, poems, and autobiographical narratives, all exclusively rooted in his personal life.

The general commentary is that before the age of 14 and a half, the situation was dominated by a castration complex. At 14 and a half, the experience of puberty occurred, along with an attempt at object-choice in relation to a maternal imago.

At the age of 15, says BERNFELD, a repression of sensitive components occurs due to a regressive reactivation of the Oedipus complex, and this phenomenon culminates between the ages of 16 and 17.

Given this, BERNFELD raises the question of what energy drives the poet to write. From the age of 13 to 14 and a half, he tells us that the source of energy is the Ichtrieb (ego drive) and Ichlibido (ego libido). The young poet channels these energies into his ideal ego: “I would like to be something great and, later, a poet.”

Thus, from the outset, emphasis is placed on the ideal ego, and BERNFELD’s entire analysis revolves around this idea: the object-libido, which is initially repressed, later liberated, and eventually, in a third phase, partly repressed again and partly put into the service of the ideal ego and what he calls the aims of the ego.

In this first phase, the ideal is assumed, but repression also occurs. He describes the repression of sexual objects—namely, the mother and the sister. Concurrently, a struggle against masturbation takes place, generating fantasies. BERNFELD notes that, in this first phase, the fantasies have no connection to the young man’s poems, meaning that he writes poetry solely as an exercise to see what he can accomplish. BERNFELD states that during this phase, the repressed aims of the object-libido flow into daydreams rather than into his poems.

The second phase spans from 14 and a half to 15 and a half, during which he writes lyrical poems with considerable ease. At this time, sexual drives force their way into consciousness and begin to coalesce around an object.

He falls in love with a certain Melitta. His love for Melitta aligns with the aims of the ego, and he presents it as a genius-like force modeled after the young GOETHE in Strasbourg. However, the dynamics of his daydreams remain unchanged during this phase. They absorb the use of the object-libido, are colored in content by Melitta, but remain, as before, disconnected from the aims of the ego. Their function, like that of dreams, is entirely determined by the unconscious.

During this phase, the feelings arising from his love for Melitta serve as the source of his poetry. BERNFELD adds that it would take too long to specify the role of object-libido in the blossoming of this poetic activity. He makes it clear, however, that during this period, there is no question of a distortion of the aims of the object-libido.

Nonetheless, he says, the young poet takes care of his poems—for example, revising them—but this is merely a manifestation of the activity of the ego drives and the object-libido. These drives have not yet relinquished the goal of becoming a poet and instead annex the products of sexual drives that appear without directly participating in their creation. Thus, what occurs is an annexation by the ego drives and the object-libido of a spontaneous product of feelings.

In the third phase, he asserts, we can finally characterize the artistic production as such. The essential point here is that the object-libido directed toward Melitta expends energy. We will observe how this object-libido becomes divided. First, a significant portion is repressed, flows back into the Oedipus complex, and excessively intensifies the young man’s daydreams.

LACAN

These Versagungen (denials), this denial, is considered as an internal, spontaneous emergence. At that moment, there is no external intervention. A shift occurs in his relationship with the Melitta in question.

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Pierre KAUFMANN

Yes. In his initial analysis, he speaks of an internal or external Versagung.

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LACAN

But in the specific case under discussion, it is clear that this arises in connection with the resistance of the Oedipus complex. It is, unmistakably, his idea that this resistance gives rise to guilt within this childish love. He attributes the most direct role to this guilt in the shift that the entire literary production takes.

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Pierre KAUFMANN

He emphasizes his relationship with Melitta. He says that a certain amount of libido remains uninhibited and directed toward Melitta, who appears to him not as forgotten but as unerreichbar (unattainable). On the other hand, the ego becomes significantly strengthened in its libidinal portion, tied to the goal of becoming a poet. A new and powerful libidinal investment is made in the original ego—poet and ascetic, superman, moralist, etc. From the object-libido directed toward Melitta, feelings emerge. Robert’s poems are completely transformed; they gain breadth and are characterized by imagery that arises from reverie.

At the same time, emotional experiences are processed in his poems. We will see that the term Bearbeitung (working-through) is central here, and its meaning is essential. Here is what BERNFELD says:

“I have characterized this period in my work as a consciously artistic period, because during this time, a very considerable amount of energy is used for the artistic elaboration of feelings.”

At times, he contrasts Stimmung (mood) and reverie, saying, “der Stimmung,” unless this means that the energy is used for the elaboration of feelings and especially of reveries.

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LACAN

That primarily refers to daydreams.

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Pierre KAUFMANN

A tertiary elaboration thus occurs, which serves the goals of the ego. Through this elaboration, the dreamer becomes a poet. This tertiary elaboration is understood here in light of the secondary elaboration that FREUD discusses in relation to fantasy and phantasy.

Now, what energy sustains this elaboration? Undeniably, he says, it is the energy of the object-libido, which is no longer repressed but diverted, redirected from the object Melitta toward the poetry itself. He says he is in love with his novels, emphasizing this displacement. Essentially, the true characterization of artistic activity comes when the fantasies are elaborated by the ego in accordance with the aims of the ideal ego, using the energy of the object-libido that is no longer repressed.

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LACAN

In other words, I think what emerges from your account are the ambiguities of BERNFELD’s theory in this context, or the inconsistencies in its application to the particular case he examines. The result is something rather unclear and problematic. The issue is that one can only speak of sublimation when there is a transfer of energy from the object-libido to the Ichziele (ego-goals). The Ichziele preexist, and sublimation can only be discussed when this transfer of energy occurs, brought to light and reanimated during the pubertal phase into which the individual enters.

It is this portion of energy that is transferred from pleasure goals to Ichgerechte (ego-conforming) goals. It is only at this point that one can speak of sublimation. Furthermore, it is entirely clear that, while FREUD’s distinction between Verdrängung (repression) and Sublimierung (sublimation) is maintained, sublimation as such becomes perceptible only when Verdrängung occurs.

What you call tertiary elaboration could be described as the third phase he identifies in this case. It is to the extent that the childish love for this Melitta undergoes a process of repression that what is preserved—what does not entirely succumb to the process of repression—shifts to another plane, the plane of sublimation. I believe we are entirely in agreement on this point.

Thus, even though the distinction maintained between what he says about Sublimierung (sublimation) and Verdrängung (repression) involves a sort of synchronism between the two processes, we note, as BERNFELD explicitly states—this is not my interpretation but his—that he cannot grasp sublimation except insofar as it has an immediate and contemporaneous correlation with repression.

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Pierre KAUFMANN

In essence, there are two moments. First, there is the repression in the second phase, and in the third phase, one part is repressed, and the other is sublimated. However, I did not perceive a clear relationship that he establishes during this phase between the two, because in the definition he ultimately gives of sublimation, he places considerable emphasis on the fact that the difference between sublimation and reaction formation lies precisely in the release of libido in the case of sublimation.

At the beginning, he even cites FREUD and mentions an ambiguity in the texts of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. He adds, however, that it is clear that sublimation is distinguished from reaction formation by the non-repressed nature of the libido.

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LACAN

In reality, in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, there is considerable ambiguity regarding the relationship between reaction formation and Sublimierung. This issue originates from the text on pages 78 and 79 of the Gesammelte Werke.

At that point, we encounter a formulation that has caused much difficulty for commentators, who are left wondering whether, in certain passages, FREUD presents Sublimierung as a specific form of reaction formation, or whether, conversely, reaction formation is to be situated within a broader framework where Sublimierung has a wider scope.

The only significant point to retain, I believe, is the brief sentence at the bottom of note 79. This note, as BERNFELD rightly observes, has not been detailed, explored, or further developed in FREUD’s text. It concludes the entire paragraph on reaction formation and sublimation with the following:

“There can also be sublimations through other, simpler mechanisms.”

In summary, the enigma that this analysis of the energy economy in the poetic activity of this young boy leaves open is clearly articulated by BERNFELD himself on page 340, where he states:

“The energy with which the tertiary Bearbeitung (elaboration) is carried out is now undoubtedly unrepressed object-libido.”

Here lies the problem: if we accept the idea that sublimation is something closely dependent on the distinction between Libidoziele (libidinal aims), Ichziele (ego-goals), and Lustziele (pleasure-goals), a certain vagueness arises in BERNFELD’s text.

If we pivot the discussion—and this is where STERBA, whose article was published the previous year, also falters—around what might be called the transference of energy from one sphere to another, involving a type of aim that undergoes a profound transformation during puberty, the moment when BERNFELD identifies the critical turning point in the boy’s poetic production, we are led to position this kind of childish poetic evocation as something that must be explicitly attributed to the category of Ichziele.

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In other words, the question is resolved roughly as follows: becoming a poet is an ego-goal. This is something that, in this boy, manifests very early through activities that, as BERNFELD sees it, are only distinguishable as a kind of reflection of what he is taught in school—in a way that could be described as diffuse or non-personalized. There is, if you will, a kind of devaluation, a lesser worth attributed to all productions of this period.

These productions appear to him—as they likely should, though we lack the means to evaluate them ourselves—to only become interesting from a certain point onward, when the boy feels more dramatically engaged in his production.

Here, I stress these points in the most favorable light for the author, in the sense of his coordinated, clinical development.

I believe that the activity of this child… who, like many other children, experiences a fleeting phase—how many children, during the latency period, engage in episodic poetic activities? And FREUD, who observed such phenomena in one of his own children, was well aware of this. Nonetheless, during this period, there exists a problem that, to emphasize the point, is fundamentally distinct from mere cultural diffusion or imitation. The question of sublimation must be posed early on.

What I mean is that if we do not confine ourselves to the realm of individual development, the question of why there are poets and why poetic engagement can manifest very early in a young human being is not a matter that can be resolved solely by considering the genetic development presented here or the new characteristics that emerge when, as it were, sexuality comes into play in a manifest way.

To fail to recognize that sexuality exists in the young child from the very beginning—and even, I would argue, from before the beginning, meaning the phase preceding the latency period—is to run directly counter to the essence of FREUD’s aspirations and discoveries. This is precisely why so much emphasis has been placed on the pregenital sources of sublimation.

The question of what sublimation is arises much earlier than the point when the division between the aims of libido and the aims of the ego becomes entirely clear, manifest, and accessible at the level of consciousness.

If I may underscore a particular point here, I would say that if we use the term I employ with you to articulate sublimation in accordance with the problem we are addressing—the Thing, or what I call das Ding—this concept occupies a decisive place around which the definition of sublimation must revolve. This happens before the “I” is born, and even more so, before the ego-goals (Ichziele) appear.

The same observation applies—but I will return to this shortly—to the connection you drew between my use of the image of the Thing and SIMMEL’s use of a similar concept. There is something in SIMMEL that interests me, specifically his notion of not just distancing but of an object as inherently unattainable. However, it remains an object.

By contrast, what is unattainable in the Thing is precisely the Thing itself, not an object in the sense that I articulate it to you. This marks a radical difference from what SIMMEL indicates. It is evident that this difference is entirely consistent with the emergence, in the interim, of the essential distinction that constitutes the Freudian unconscious as such. SIMMEL may approach something akin to what you have grasped as a connection to anal characteristics. If I understand correctly, his text does not explicitly reference the anal style, but he cannot fully articulate it precisely due to the lack of this fundamental distinction—one we attempt to articulate within the framework of the Freudian unconscious.

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Pierre KAUFMANN

Regarding BERNFELD’s definition of sublimation as a harmony between released libido and the aims of the ego, one can note the methodological advantage he sees in excluding any reference to social evaluation from the definition of sublimation.

From the outset, he establishes a methodological principle that characterizes his entire article. He states that introducing the notion of value into the analysis of sublimation can only obscure the problem. For example, he explicitly asserts that no distinction should be made, at the level of analysis, between a work of art and a stamp collection. He proposes proceeding through a sort of progressive specification. He suggests taking the concept of sublimation in its most general form, examining as varied examples as possible, and gradually narrowing the scope of the concept to specific types of sublimation.

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LACAN

This comparison extends not only to a collection of artworks and a collection of stamps but also to a collection of art versus, for instance, a child’s or a patient’s collection of dirty scraps of paper.

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Pierre KAUFMANN

He reiterates this point at the end of his article, stating that when he defines sublimation as the redirection of an unrepressed object-libido toward the realization of an often predetermined ego-goal, this formulation avoids the difficulties of social evaluation.

LACAN
He is reluctant to introduce criteria that are foreign to those of psychic development.

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Pierre KAUFMANN
It seems to me that in SIMMEL’s perspective, even though he does not explicitly address psychoanalysis or the unconscious, there are certain affinities between the two viewpoints. In this social evaluation, I believe SIMMEL’s position and his use of the notion of distancing enable a separation between the concept of evaluation and the concept of the social. For SIMMEL, there is value insofar as there is distancing.

What BERNFELD sought to avoid was appealing to a value or dimension of value that is socially defined. Yet the phenomenon can, in essence, be approached at two levels:

• First, there is distancing, which represents a form of valorization, but one that does not appear as socialization.
• Second, there is socialization, which is precisely what BERNFELD seeks to exclude.

It seems to me that his conception of ego-goals (Ichziele) complicates the problem because his description of sublimation makes no reference to the reality principle or FREUD’s analysis of the reality principle in The Two Principles of Mental Functioning. It is true that FREUD may not explicitly use the term sublimation in that context, but the issue under discussion is indeed sublimation.

This text is entirely parallel to Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, although the treatment of the two principles here is much denser and more precise than in the Introductory Lectures. FREUD states that art, in a sense, returns to reality (Realität), but to a new kind of reality, which is Wirklichkeit. In this context, he poses the question of sublimation in a particularly satisfactory manner, saying that sublimation involves a return to reality, though not the reality one might expect.

FREUD explains something to the effect that this is the reality of a lack, not the reality of a fullness. He suggests that sublimation returns to reality because, contrary to what monists believe, it is not the convergence of positive interests that brings people together, but rather the recognition of their respective lacks, their affinity and community in negativity, in their shared lack.

This idea of a Versagung (denial) that others also experience is an idea that has not been revisited. BERNFELD does not cite this text. Admittedly, FREUD does not use the term Sublimierung (sublimation) here, but that is precisely what is at issue. The question one might ask is whether this dimension is precisely what is missing in his analysis.

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LACAN
And yet, there is the entire story of the group of children. Could you summarize it for us? Could you give us a summary of the end of the article, particularly what it says about sublimation, while trying to articulate it around this curious experience of a youth group and how it attempts to situate the impact of sublimation?

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Pierre KAUFMANN
This involves a group of 14-year-old children from a Jewish community who founded a school association. BERNFELD identifies four phases in the life of this group. The first three phases are characterized by activities detached from reality, such as drafting statutes or creating a secret language.

In the fourth phase, by contrast, we witness real activities, such as organizing a boycott against one of their peers or demonstrating solidarity with one of their teachers. BERNFELD’s analysis focuses on the relationship between these developments and certain exhibitionist behaviors. Indeed, it is during this phase that the children engage in exhibitionist activities.

He emphasizes that these exhibitionist activities align with social goals—that is, with the goals of each child insofar as they converge with the goals of the group. In these exhibitionist activities, he notes, there is an aspect that conforms to the ego and its goals, but there is also an aspect that is unrelated to these goals: genital excitation. BERNFELD argues that the genital effects of exhibitionism are repressed, and as a result, part of the libido is also repressed, while the remainder reinforces the ego’s goals.

In other words, he draws a parallel between the division within the libido in the case of exhibitionism and what occurred in the poet’s relationship with Melitta, where part of the libido was repressed and another part reinforced the ego’s goals. He concludes that we are witnessing a sublimation that serves the ego-libido.

LACAN

He says verbatim:

“Here arises the pubertal conflict between the ego and the object-libido. The observation of the size of the penis…

Since this, in his view, is the essential significant element of this mutual exhibition…

…confirms the ego’s goals insofar as the ego, narcissistically, displays itself as the most beautiful, the strongest, the greatest.
And there is another part that is contrary to the ego insofar as it leads to genital excitation.”

Thus, he identifies the decisive turning point in the history of this association: this sort of ceremony, so to speak, internal to the esoteric group. It is from here that he traces the development of what, strictly speaking, characterizes the fourth phase—namely, the moment where sublimation in their collective activity begins to emerge in a proper sense.

It must be said—and this deserves emphasis—that the problem posed by this is nevertheless highly problematic. Particularly if we add that at this decisive moment, this exhibitionism among certain members of the group—those who consider themselves the strongest and the boldest—is accompanied by collective masturbation.

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Pierre KAUFMANN

He also says that it is impossible to determine whether this promotion benefits the leader or the society as a whole. That is, he acknowledges a form of sublimation, but he also says that it is unclear what it pertains to or what its effect is.

These two examples—although he does not explicitly connect them, the connection is evident in his text—allow him to compare two types of sublimation: on the one hand, artistic sublimation, and what he calls social sublimation, and on the other, temporary sublimations observed in everyday life, such as when one is working or grieving.

In his analysis, he starts from this concept of temporary sublimation—and, in essence, one could say he returns to it at the conclusion—and distinguishes two possibilities, which he presents as limiting cases. These ultimately define the two poles of his conception of sublimation. Two scenarios, in essence, are possible:

• Either the drive fails to achieve satisfaction and then seeks paths that might provide it, or
• The ego is too weak and calls for reinforcement through an additional energy source, namely, the object-libido.

Between these two extremes lie the various forms of sublimation, and one can say that his analysis of artistic sublimation and social sublimation is situated within these boundaries. In essence, everything hinges on the preexisting goals of the ego and, on the other hand, the destiny of the libidinal drive depending on whether or not it can align with the ego’s goals.

In short, BERNFELD was unlucky. He addressed sublimation in relation to the ideal ego (Ichideal) just before FREUD was able to elucidate the nature of this ideal ego, particularly the necessity of considering the relationship with others.

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LACAN

You are quite optimistic. Because those who wrote after him do not appear to have made better use of the ideal ego. If you read later writings—including the Notes on Sublimation or the article Neutralization and Sublimation, which appeared in the volume of Analysis Studies—you will find no hint of any articulation between sublimation and the ideal ego.

That, indeed, is where things currently stand. And that is where we ourselves will attempt to move forward.

I truly thank you very much for what you have done for us today. Allow me to conclude with the citation of a phrase, to underscore what we have gained today and where the distinctly Bernfeldian theory takes shape:

“These components of a whole of instinctual agitation, which remain under the impact and pressure of repression, can be sublimated. Thus, the particularities of these components enable the support of an ego function through the repression of tendencies—a function, not the ego itself, through the repression of tendencies of the ego that are currently endangered.”

Here is the definition BERNFELD adheres to, encompassing the two extremes you have highlighted:

• On the one hand, the notion of a particular strength of the ego, which is already clearly evident and explicitly articulated in BERNFELD’s work. He identifies those who possess these elevated ego tendencies early on as, so to speak, an aristocracy or an elite. While he tries to bracket this without assigning value, it is nonetheless difficult not to imply some value.
• On the other hand, the idea of certain ego tendencies being endangered and calling upon the resource provided by these instinctual tendencies, insofar as they can escape repression.

This is the conception BERNFELD ultimately adopts. It should be apparent, I think to everyone, that what I have been presenting to you this year can be situated between what might be called a Freudian ethics and a Freudian aesthetics.

Freudian ethics is present insofar as it shows us that one phase of the function of ethics—and it is remarkable that this is not more emphasized, even though, on the other hand, it runs through the psychoanalytic discourse, often mentioned by JONES as moral compliance—is, in a sense, what renders this Thing inaccessible to us, though it is already inaccessible. Today, I am trying to show you, along the lines of a Freudian aesthetics in the broadest sense of the term aesthetics—namely, the analysis of the entire economy of signifiers—that Freudian aesthetics reveals this Thing to us as inaccessible.

This is something fundamentally essential to establish at the outset of the problem in order to articulate its consequences. It is within these consequences, in particular, that the problem of idealization arises. What you saw begin to take shape last time around the sublimation of courtly morality—what is it?

The emergence of the ideal type!

We can introduce here a term that will carry significant weight in what we will discuss moving forward. There is a certain style of honesty insofar as, within the realm of ethics, we distinguish between three levels—already apparent in the meditations of the Ancients. A passage from De Officiis, which I will share with you later, discusses these three levels of the ethical problem:

1. The summum bonum (the highest good), with the question of whether this summum bonum should be articulated in terms of honestas—as the honorable man—structured as a particular organization, a particular style of life, precisely oriented around this something that is initial sublimation.
2. Utilitas (utility), on the other hand, articulated as the foundation of utilitarianism. This is where I began posing the ethical problem this year, and to which we will return subsequently.

We will then demonstrate what truly constitutes the essence of utilitarianism. You will see that there are perspectives here that can already be addressed now.