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(All parts in English)

KAUFMANN

LACAN

Today, you will not hear the continuation of my discourse. You will not hear it for personal reasons. By this, I mean that this interruption was occupied by my drafting of a work that will appear in the next issue of our journal on “The Structure.” This process has brought me back to an earlier stage of my developments and, in turn, disrupted my momentum.

It is evident that the progression of what I am unfolding before you this year—regarding this deeper dimension of the movement of thought, of analytic work, and of the technique that I call ethics—relies on a certain momentum. I reread what I delivered to you last time. Believe me, upon rereading, it stands up quite well. It is with the intent of regaining that level that I will defer its continuation until next time.

For now, we remain at this barrier, beyond which lies the analytic Thing—this Thing that constitutes the core of what I am elaborating before you this year. We stand at this barrier where hindrances arise, where the organization of the inaccessibility of the object takes place. I am attempting to remind you where, ultimately, the battlefield of our experience is located: the inaccessibility of the object as an object of jouissance, and how this crucial point in our experience is, at the same time, what analysis introduces as new, even if it remains accessible in the field of ethics. Beyond this barrier lies, to some extent compensating for this inaccessibility, the projection of all individual sublimation, as well as the sublimations of systems of knowledge—and why not include analytic knowledge itself?

This is likely the topic I will articulate for you next time: how the ultimate word of Freud’s thought—particularly regarding the death drive—emerges in the field of analytic thought as a sublimation whose characteristics, I believe, are worth our attention.

In this perspective, it seemed not without use—indeed, as a kind of parenthesis, one I believe necessary—to provide you with a background against which this notion, concerning the meaning of Freud’s final theory on the death drive, can be formulated. As a parenthesis, then, I have arranged for Pierre Kaufmann to summarize, in the usual spirit of a seminar, the reflections of key figures from a generation of analytical thought—one I consider a strong generation—specifically Bernfeld and his collaborator Weinterberg. They have pondered the general meaning of the drive, attempting to give it full development within the epistemological context of their time, within the scientific framework where it seemed to them it belonged.

In this respect, you will be presented today with a moment in the history of analytic thought. You know the importance I attribute to these moments in the history of analytic thought, insofar as I claim to teach you, often through its very aporias, how to rediscover an authentic ridge of the terrain upon which we move.

You will see the difficulties that Bernfeld’s theorization of the notion of the drive, and more specifically the death drive, encounters within the general relationships he attempts to insert it—relationships framed by an energetics. Admittedly, this energetics is somewhat outdated, as energetics has since evolved, but it represents the scientific context in which Freud himself spoke.

In this regard, Mr. Kaufmann has made various pertinent remarks about the shared foundation of scientific notions from which Freud borrowed some of his terms—terms we struggle to situate simply by taking them at face value and contenting ourselves with the sequence of Freud’s statements to contextualize them.

There is, of course, an internal and evident coherence that gives them their significance. However, understanding the discourses of the time from which they were borrowed is never without value. On this subject, Mr. Kaufmann will provide reminders from his own research that I find particularly qualified.

I now leave the floor to him.

Presentation by Pierre KAUFMANN

The articles in question were published in Imago, issues fifteen and sixteen, in 1929 and 1930.

In 1929, issues III-IV, there is an article by Bernfeld and Feitelberg titled:

“Das Prinzip von LE CHATELIER und der Selbsterhaltungstrieb”
(Imago, 1929, 3-4, pp. 289-298)
The Principle of LE CHATELIER and the Self-Preservation Drive

In 1930, by the same authors:

“Über psychische Energie, Libido und deren Meßbarkeit”
(Imago, 1930, 1, pp. 66-118)
On Psychic Energy, Libido, and Its Measurability

And two articles—of which I will disregard the first—from 1932 by the same authors, titled:

“Über die Temperaturdifferenz zwischen Gehirn und Körper”
The Temperature Difference Between Brain and Body

I will disregard this one because it may lack the rigor of the other articles. Similarly, the second:

“Der Entropiesatz und der Todestrieb”
The Entropy Principle and the Death Drive, which was translated into English in the International Journal.

These articles form a cohesive body of work (Energie und Trieb, 1930) and can be considered a reflection on the relationships between two aspects of the concept of Trieb (drive): its energetic aspect on the one hand, and its historical aspect on the other.

Moreover, Bernfeld and his collaborator focus solely on the energetic aspect of the concept of Trieb. This focus constitutes the main interest of their effort, which can be seen as a thought experiment—a kind of attempt to see how far one can go when dissociating the energetic and historical aspects within the notion of Trieb.

To accomplish this dissociation, Bernfeld develops an energetic model of the person, aiming to define certain conditions for applying Le Chatelier’s principle and—if we use modern terminology—the principle of homeostasis or certain interpretations of this principle.

Once this system is defined, Bernfeld undertakes certain conceptual elaborations regarding the notion of drive, especially the death drive. Specifically, using this system, Bernfeld aims to demonstrate that the expression and the very notion of the death drive are not justified. He separates the notion of the death drive from that of the destructive drive and proposes expressing all the concepts encompassed by the notion of the death drive solely through the “Nirvana principle.”

Thus, Freud’s notion of the death drive should either be rejected or, more precisely, reassigned to energetics, while the notions of the destructive drive and the sexual drive would instead be characterized by the historical dimension inherent to the concept of drive.

Bernfeld’s objective in dissociating the energetic and historical aspects of the concept of drive ultimately leads to rejecting the death drive and favoring a purely energetic interpretation. This does not mean, of course, that Bernfeld intends to neglect the historical aspects of the concept of drive. Rather, he explores how far one can go along the energetic path. In his view, one can go so far as to subsume the concept of the death drive entirely within energetics.

The problem posed by Bernfeld thus reveals two fundamental directions in the elaboration of the concept of Trieb, since this concept contains:

1. Elements that are meaningful within an energetic perspective;
2. Others within a historical perspective.

If we consider the first perspective, we can refer to Triebe und Triebschicksale (Drives and Their Vicissitudes), where the concept of drive is defined in terms that are precisely those of thermodynamics.

The passage where Freud successively considers the drive’s pressure, aim, object, and source

The concepts Freud employs are evidently traditional in thermodynamics. When he tells us that the expression of a drive’s pressure refers to the “moment”—motorische, he says, referring to motricity—the sum of “force” or the measure of the “work demand” it represents, he is using a framework deeply rooted in thermodynamic language.

Moreover, we are further justified in interpreting this passage of Freud’s in a thermodynamic sense because, when we consult thermodynamic or energy theory treatises with which Freud was evidently familiar, we see that the notion of Trieb (drive) is used explicitly in thermodynamic terms, in the very language Freud employs here.

The use of the term Trieb has been traditional since Helmholtz and appears in the work of all the German physicists of Freud’s era. Trieb was specifically the term used to translate the English word motivity, which corresponds directly to this motorisches Moment—this motor moment—in its proper sense. It is the term used to translate motivity as found in Thomson’s thermodynamic works. Thus, this terminology was already established and traditional at the time Freud was writing.

A speculative suggestion

At this juncture, I would like to offer a small suggestion. I do not propose this as an interpretation, but rather as what might be called a dream of interpretation. It pertains to the enigmatic letter appearing in Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology, the first Entwurf, where he uses the expressions N and Qή.

It has been noted that some scholars have attached themselves to various interpretations of this letter ή. However, when one peruses the thermodynamic treatises Freud likely encountered, it becomes evident that ή is consistently used to denote the economic ratio: ή = r / Q, where r is the work a system can perform. Thus, in Qή, with Q representing a certain energy capacity and ή this economic ratio, we find an expression for a particular possibility of work. It is entirely plausible to imagine that Freud, working within the orbit of such notations, simply adopted Qή, which aligns perfectly with his conceptual framework.

Lacan
The editors settle for a rather weak interpretation.

Pierre Kaufmann
I consider mine richer, though it is gratuitous.

The historical dimension of the concept of Trieb

There is another dimension to consider in the constitution of this concept of Trieb: a historical one. It is worth noting that thermodynamics serves as a kind of bridge between the physical and historical perspectives through the concept of energy transformations. While the idea of energy transformation is not itself inherently historical, it opens a pathway to understanding the problems that a historical interpretation of the notion entails.

On this subject, I would like to highlight—though this is likely already known—that Freud undoubtedly studied the works of Groos, particularly The Play of Man and The Play of Animals. In The Play of Animals, one finds an extensive historical account of the notion of Trieb, translated here as “instinct,” though it is indeed Trieb being discussed.

Groos’s historical exposition is valuable for tracing the notion of Trieb back to sources Freud likely consulted, extending as far back as the 18th century and the Enlightenment philosophy concerning the progression from the animal realm to the cultural one. It is reasonable to think Freud referred to Groos’s The Play of Animals when developing the concept of Trieb.

Certain affinities—at least suggestive ones—are apparent between Freud’s ideas and those found in Groos, even though Freud’s thought far exceeds Groos’s in depth. For example, there are interesting overlaps between Freud’s notion of repetition and some of the ideas presented in Groos’s work on human play. These overlaps, while not exhaustive, merit attention.

The historical trajectory of the notion of drive

This gives us a historical aspect of the notion of drive. The problem becomes one of determining how far the notion of drive can take us along the path of historicity. In essence, starting from a thermodynamic conception, the question is this: What traces can the transformations of energy leave?

One might argue that historicity arises when energy is not merely considered transformable but when its transformations leave behind traces that themselves mark its passage. It is this characteristic—energy leaving its traces—that can define historicity. This framework allows us to articulate the two dimensions—the thermodynamic and the historical—together.

Freud’s influences and conceptual elaboration

Here, I have suggested that the influence of Zimmer was decisive in Freud’s conceptual development. Another author I have mentioned elsewhere is Paul […], who did not specifically rely on the notion of Trieb, yet undoubtedly contributed significantly to Freud’s conceptual elaboration of his discoveries.

Thus, it becomes clear that the problem Bernfeld raises—namely, the interplay of thermodynamics and historicity in constituting the notion of drive—has its roots in the entire framework of Freudian thought. To present Bernfeld’s perspective, I will follow an order opposite to the one he adopts in his articles. Accordingly, I will revisit three of the four articles.

The first article begins by recalling certain notions from thermodynamics and physics, centered around Le Chatelier’s principle, which governs the general functioning of natural systems. On this point, as an aside unrelated to Bernfeld, it is worth noting that Bernfeld incidentally references Chowlson’s physics treatise. Chowlson was a professor at the Imperial University of Saint Petersburg, and his manual held significant authority in Germany, where it was translated and often cited by German authors such as Köhler. This remark is made parenthetically, merely to point out that much of what Bernfeld discusses in this first article is drawn almost verbatim from Chowlson. Indeed, Bernfeld references Chowlson, and the traditional thought synthesized by Chowlson underpins the entire structure of Bernfeld’s work.

Thus, the first article establishes the concept of “system” and introduces Le Chatelier’s principle as governing the functioning of “systems.” Bernfeld undertakes the task of exploring to what extent Le Chatelier’s principle can elucidate psychic phenomena.

The second article aims to enrich the concept of the system as presented in the first article. Bernfeld proposes a model of the person designed to represent the energetic functioning that could determine, from an energetic perspective, several psychoanalytic notions and even processes.

This model demonstrates how the energetic input from the environment integrates into the person. Furthermore, it defines the notion of libido in energetic terms. The model also introduces the concept of “psychic entropy,” which is distinct from physical entropy in that its application to psychic processes must be understood within the specific conditions prevailing in the personal system.

Thus, the second article already shows that psychoanalytic phenomena can be understood through a framework consistent with Le Chatelier’s principle. The discussion here engages a debate that remains central today. Bernfeld, as early as 1930, not only uses this thought experiment to explore a homeostatic interpretation of psychoanalytic phenomena but also fundamentally rejects such an interpretation based on the experiment.

Even within energetics, Bernfeld argues, homeostasis as conceived by Le Chatelier’s principle can only be considered a limiting case under certain states of rest for the individual. However, as soon as the individual becomes engaged, such a reduction becomes untenable. In this second article, the pleasure principle also receives an interpretation that dissociates it from any homeostatic conception. One aspect of the system designed as a model of the person is to attribute meaning to the psychic process.

Significantly, this system introduces from its conception the notions of structure and structuration, which Bernfeld interprets in a very specific sense, explicitly linked to Gestalt theory. This article reveals a correspondence between what Freud, drawing from Helmholtz, refers to as “bound energy” (Energiebindung) and what Gestalt theory identifies as structure and structuration.

In other words, what Helmholtz called binding, and what Freud also referred to as binding, Bernfeld interprets in terms of structuration. Binding, therefore, should not be considered as occurring between representable energy quantities in a mechanistic view, as in the mechanistic theory of dynamic phenomena. Instead, binding is structural, meaning that relationships between charges are defined within a particular totality. What is essential is that structuration operates here as an energetic process through pathways that we will detail later.

The third article revisits, at the level of a general discussion of concepts, the notions introduced in the preceding articles. It is here that Bernfeld examines the concept of the death drive and its relationship to the concept of the destructive drive. I begin with this third article—at the risk of not finishing—because it presents the authors’ most overarching views and suffices to provide an overall indication of their orientation for the discussion.

The articles by Bernfeld were published in 1930, and as I mentioned, Bernfeld explicitly references Köhler’s work. I believe he cites the well-known book Physical Forms at Rest and in Stationary States, which dates back to 1920.

In this book, Köhler demonstrates that the notion of structure allows for an isomorphic transposition of physical concepts into the realm of psychology, as the concept of structure encompasses the formal qualities introduced in Ehrenberg’s 1892 article. To fully understand Bernfeld’s articles, it is necessary to note the elaboration of this concept of structure by Kurt Lewin between 1920 and 1930, particularly in a series of articles published in 1926 on the psychological field.

Thus, Köhler’s ideas were enriched here by Lewin, even though Lewin followed Köhler’s intellectual trajectory. Thirdly, we must highlight a more diffuse influence—that of embryology. Bernfeld references an author whose work, unfortunately, I was unable to locate in Paris: Ehrenberg’s Theoretical Biology, published in 1923. I only know of it through Bernfeld’s citations. However, a brief examination of theoretical biology texts from that period allows us to discern the intellectual lineage in which Ehrenberg, and thus Bernfeld, was situated. Clearly, these intermediate ideas between the philosophical and biological domains were introduced by advances in embryology, particularly experimental embryology, through analyses of the irreversibility of structuration processes. That is, there comes a point beyond which structuration processes occurring in the psyche become irreversible.

Bernfeld essentially argued, in alignment with Ehrenberg’s ideas (though I am not familiar with Ehrenberg’s work), that the notion of irreversible structuration of vital fluidity could be transposed to the psychological level, enabling discussion of an irreversible structuration of psychic fluidity.

What I term “psychic fluidity” corresponds to free energy as opposed to bound energy—structured energy. Here, I employ the term “structure” in the sense of genetic biology and psychophysics, without prejudice to other interpretations of the idea of structure, including linguistic interpretations. Nevertheless, one of the intriguing aspects of Bernfeld’s thought experiment is its ability to provoke a confrontation between these two interpretations of the concept of structure.

On to the third article, which provides the overarching orientation.
The question posed concerns the relationship between entropy in the energetic sense and the death drive. Essentially, it is a matter of determining to what extent Freud’s concept of the death drive can be reduced to energetics and how this drive should be interpreted. Once again, throughout his research, Bernfeld adopts an exclusively energetic perspective, explicitly excluding the historical aspects of the notions.

However, his core proposition is that there is nothing in the concept of Todestrieb (death drive) that cannot be reduced to energetic phenomena, provided the notion of structure is incorporated into the framework of energetics. In other words, insofar as the concept of structure allows for the characterization of the opposition between free energy and bound energy, death can be understood as structuration. Consequently, the notion of death can be entirely integrated into energetics. As I mentioned earlier, to avoid any misunderstanding in terminology, Bernfeld suggests abandoning the term “death drive” in favor of “Nirvana principle.”

Does this mean that there will be no historical components of the phenomenon capable of giving meaning to the notion of death? Not entirely. Bernfeld does not go so far as to claim, of course, that we do not die. Instead, he argues that we die historically to the extent that we do not die energetically; in other words, we die because structure accumulates.

Essentially, ossified elements replace fluid ones, leading to death from the outside—in historical terms—as death is experienced as an event. Internally, however, death is no longer death per se but structuration: entropy interpreted in terms of structuration. It no longer requires the label of “death” and can instead be understood as submission to the Nirvana principle.

In this conceptual framework, what was previously called internal death—interpreted as the Nirvana principle—falls under a purely thermodynamic explanation involving the concepts of structuration and the ossification of vital fluidity. This framework accounts for a system that dies internally, while externally, there is a historical aspect: death as an event.

None of this, Bernfeld strongly asserts, pertains to the notion of drive. He insists that anything lacking historicity cannot be associated with the concept of drive. Where there is drive, there is historicity. Internal death, the irreversible binding of vital processes into inert structures, lacks historicity and thus cannot be considered a death drive. In this context, Bernfeld briefly discusses the concept of suicide.

It cannot be said that humans tend toward death as an event. Consequently, the idea of death as Freud understands it will generally be excluded from the domain of drives. Death, having been relegated to energetics and stripped of its association with drives and historicity, will thus be contrasted with authentic drives—those, as Bernfeld puts it, that deserve the dignity of being called drives—namely, the sexual drive and the destructive drive.

In these, we find historical moments that are characteristic of drives. It is precisely because they are characteristic that we can speak of drives, whereas the historical aspect of death is not characteristic of death understood as internal death, as death by structuration, as death in itself. On this occasion, Bernfeld engages in an analysis of the notion of the death drive and seeks to reveal its ambiguous status in Freudian thought. Essentially, Bernfeld critiques the notion of the death drive as such for failing to teach us anything.

He argues that everything truly instructive in the concept of the drive—particularly its capacity to differentiate between types of behavior—is foreign to the idea of the death drive. In contrast to the heuristic nature of other notions, the death drive, according to Bernfeld, holds only theoretical interest.

Furthermore, Bernfeld shows that, contrary to Freud’s intent, the death drive as we have just defined it contains no opposition; death has no opposite. Death, as Bernfeld understands it, lacks a counterpart. We will return to this point if time permits.

A reading of Bernfeld’s third article

Now, I will read you my translation of a few passages from Bernfeld’s third article, which, as I mentioned, is the one under discussion. First, Bernfeld tells us that death cannot be understood merely as an event. Assuming a connection between the notion of death and the notion of entropy, how should we understand death? What kind of death are we talking about?

A first interpretation of death considers it as an event. This understanding of death as an event pertains to its historical aspect. Here, death is defined in relation to the definition of vital processes as stationary processes. Insofar as vital processes are stationary, death cannot arise internally.

Certainly, a grain of sand may disrupt the system, but this disruption is external to the system. Bernfeld explains:

“And at present, physiology and biology have not advanced beyond an energetics of vital processes, but it is nevertheless certain that vital processes are stationary processes. Such processes are characterized by the fact that specific conditions within the system impose a cycle that always returns to the initial phase. As long as the energy input from outside the system is maintained and the system’s conditions remain unchanged, the system perpetuates itself; death intervenes only as an accident.”

Bernfeld then cites Ehrenberg, though not Ehrenberg’s final conclusions:

“Death as an event, as Ehrenberg puts it, the unique accident of an individual’s dying, would not occur.”

Bernfeld then relates this to entropy, connecting it to his broader arguments. Thus, he identifies a primary death—death as an event.

“However…and here the notion of internal death is introduced, though, once again, it should no longer be called death.”

“Nevertheless, the proposition ‘The aim of all life is death’ receives a highly satisfying energetic confirmation for the living organism if one adheres to the conceptual definition that corresponds to it.”

In other words, Bernfeld maintains that the aim of all life is death, but he strips life and death of their historical character. The expression “the aim of life is death” takes on a purely energetic meaning. According to the laws of energetics and the principle of entropy, the aim ceases to be an aim; instead, the endpoint of vital processes assumes a structure of binding.

“Ehrenberg,” Bernfeld notes, “constructed a historical biology of elementary vital processes. Life sustains itself through the continuous process of structuration, the accumulation of substance at the expense of fluidity—an accumulation from which no further work can be derived and which, through this process, separates itself to form the body.”

Embryological insights

This perspective aligns with embryological observations. Structural substance—for example, the nucleus of cells—determines the speed and intensity of the remaining course of life. Essentially, we begin with original fluidity, within which structures emerge. These structures exert a feedback effect on the material’s fluidity, such that speed and intensity are now regulated by the structure, which continues to accumulate, like an ossification.

Life is this exchange, this production of substance, this “becoming-death.” What we call the life of an individual is the integration of a multitude of elementary fluid vital processes into a unified whole determined by the structures produced by these vital processes. Each elementary vital process, in its singularity, leads to the irreversible binding of energies into structures—death. Once again, I begin with the third article to present the most general ideas.

But Bernfeld’s conception of the person is aimed precisely at making this process of structuration possible. He envisions the person as a coupling of two components: elementary cells that are sources of energy on the one hand, and on the other, a central apparatus that plays a structuring role. This conception of the person allows for a clear understanding of how Ehrenberg’s biological theory is embodied in the principle:

“The life of the individual tends to fill its living space with structure.”

There is a verbal analogy here with Lewin’s terminology:

“It is, in its intensity, saturated, determined by the slope assignable between its living space and its capacity to be filled […] at some point prior to the end, which is probably inaccessible.”

This aligns with what is referred to as the third theorem of Nertz, which states:

“The state of absolute rest cannot be achieved by a finite system.”

Thus:
“At some point, prior to the end, probably inaccessible, the event of death can bring the life-death process to a state of rest.”

We thus have a process, which we might provisionally call the life-death process—the process of structuration. This process tends, in principle, under the constraints of Nertz’s third theorem, toward a state of rest. However, before this state of rest—whether achieved through structuration or, in Freudian terms, through total binding—an external event may intervene to disrupt the system. The event of death, for instance, might bring the process to a state of rest. Yet there remains an internal process of structuration governed by thermodynamics, specifically a thermodynamics augmented by the notion of structure. Here, Bernfeld references energy theory and the distinction between the intensity and extensity factors of energy. In this context, it is the intensity factor of energy that acts as the structuring factor.

I emphasize this to clarify that Bernfeld’s work is rooted in highly traditional physics. It does not engage in speculative philosophical considerations about energy theory but instead uses foundational principles that any physics graduate in Germany at the time would have studied. I mention this not to diminish the significance of Bernfeld’s endeavor but to show that it is thoroughly classical and that his exploration of the energetic interpretation of Trieb operates within the framework of classical energetics.

“When Freud,” Bernfeld continues, “assigns to the organism a tendency to strive toward stable states, to achieve durable states of rest, and when he designates the death drive as the executive agent of this tendency, it seems reasonable to expect that advances in biology and physiology will provide rigorous proof that this tendency represents a particular instance of the entropy principle in organic systems.”

Thus, it seems plausible to interpret Freud’s death drive as entropy. But far from reducing Freudian interpretation entirely to thermodynamic determinations, this reduction of the death drive to entropy allows for a differentiation. On one hand, we have homeostasis, which pertains to physical systems in the general sense of natural physical systems; on the other hand, we have what Bernfeld refers to as “the dignity of the principle that is properly historical.”

This reduction of the death drive to entropy is intended to distill Freud’s framework, separating what can be attributed to energy from what belongs to the concept of drive. However, Bernfeld does not address the question of how historicity is assumed by drives. Thus, the death drive, as he understands it from the perspective of theoretical biology, abstracts from its historical moment.

If we speak of the death drive, its historical moment is merely the proverbial tile falling on one’s head—a random event. As for the historical aspect of other drives, Bernfeld does not determine it. However, in any case, it concerns something purely external. Thus, the death drive is defensible as a scientific position, not merely a speculative one. Yet, Bernfeld acknowledges that terms like “death” and “drive” bring the historical moment of the system’s behavior to the forefront and can easily lead to misunderstandings. For this reason, Bernfeld argues, it would be preferable to rename the death drive—understood in the full sense of the Freudian notion—as the Nirvana principle.

To summarize this text: Bernfeld argues that the death drive cannot be interpreted purely in physical terms. However, such an interpretation would not, as a result, encompass the overall concept of drive, particularly the concepts of the destructive drive and the sexual drive.

On the contrary, Bernfeld seeks to associate the death drive with these two notions in the following paragraphs. After introducing the idea of the death drive as a thermodynamic notion under the name of the Nirvana principle, he offers an interpretation of the pleasure principle that preserves within a Freudian framework the connection between the notions of stability, death, and the pleasure principle. That is, the pleasure principle becomes subject to a thermodynamic interpretation within the context of entropy.

However, for this interpretation of the pleasure principle to be fully developed, it is necessary to introduce the concept of libido. This notion of libido is addressed in Bernfeld’s second, more technical article, where it is related to the concept of pleasure. I may return to this point later, as it integrates into his conception of the system.

Thus, we see that the notion of the death drive, in a way, runs counter to Freud’s systematization of drives. Bernfeld directly engages with Freud’s systematization and, in opposition to what he sees as Freud’s doctrine, attempts to separate the death drive from the destructive drive.

Once again, the death drive is relegated to energetics, while the destructive drive and the sexual drive are imbued with historicity. Bernfeld writes:

“However, the task Freud set for himself cannot yet be considered fulfilled by these considerations, as the Freudian approach has scarcely retained an analytic discussion when speaking of the death drive. An entirely different series of elements emerges in Freud’s construction, above all death as an event. One can sometimes find…”

The continuation is of interest but serves more as a parenthesis. Bernfeld refers to articles by Ferenczi on suicide, which I will skip over here. The essential difficulty lies in psychoanalytic descriptions of the destructive drive.

“If Freud, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, finds the death drive in speculative biology within the ego as a pleasure principle, this is the aspect we have discussed exclusively thus far. Since then,” Bernfeld says, “Freud has increasingly admitted a clearer identification of the death drive with the destructive drive.”

Thus, in 1930, Bernfeld is responding to Civilization and Its Discontents, which he references explicitly. He contrasts this text with Beyond the Pleasure Principle. According to Bernfeld, Freudian thought evolved after 1920. Freud used the terms “destructive drive” and “death drive” interchangeably, and the question arises as to whether this identification is valid from both energetic and economic perspectives. The considerations that follow demonstrate that such an equivalence is not possible. The death drive, as Freud identifies it with the notion of drive itself, can only retain the meaning Freud ascribed to it in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, as a special case of the principle of stability.

It is striking that, in Freud’s perspective, the death drive or the destructive drive is presented without a theoretical biological characterization. This is, in a sense, the novelty of Civilization and Its Discontents. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the concept is more firmly tied to theory and is therefore closer to an energetic elaboration. In contrast, Civilization and Its Discontents marks a shift, where the death drive becomes equated with the destructive drive and takes on a different orientation.

However, it is notable that the destructive drive is addressed without theoretical biological characterization and not in connection with the principle of stability, as was done in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Instead, it is understood solely as a dynamic psychological phenomenon, not an economic one, in opposition to the sexual drive and unrelated to the pleasure principle.

To summarize Bernfeld’s argument here: There was an evolution in Freud’s thought. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, there is a solidarity between stability, the pleasure principle, and the death drive. Consequently, these concepts belong to the realm of theory and economics. In contrast, in Civilization and Its Discontents, the death drive, now equated with the destructive drive, becomes a psychological phenomenon. This is the new thesis Bernfeld challenges.

“Thus,” he writes, “in Civilization and Its Discontents, one must admit that we grasp the death drive even less clearly, as it appears as nothing more than a remnant to be guessed at beneath Eros, eluding us wherever it is not masked by its fusion with Eros.” (p. 56)

Bernfeld’s critique arises from the idea that the death drive lacks a concrete meaning. It has only theoretical significance. In contrast, the destructive drive and the sexual drive possess concrete—rather than economic—value. The destructive and sexual drives represent two modes of behavior and must be understood as distinct drives. Drives, in this sense, are forces directed toward renewal.

This concept of a relationship with the environment reflects the influence of Gestalt psychology on how the concept of Trieb (drive) is understood as being characterized by its ability to define behaviors in relation to the environment. Bernfeld then references the definition found in Beyond the Pleasure Principle:

“The drive is a push toward the renewal of a lost state of satisfaction. If, furthermore, one cannot clearly assign a specific position of satisfaction concerning either of these two drives, broadly speaking, the direction of the destructive drive and the renewal (Wiederherstellung) of the state of satisfaction may occur through the annihilation of the environment or through withdrawal from objects…”

Indeed, the system Bernfeld develops allows him to represent precisely the two modes of functioning of the person: one, where a decrease in libidinal tension is achieved through seeking stimulation in the environment; the other, through a narcissistic withdrawal from the environment. Based on his model, Bernfeld deduces two orientations of Trieb: the direction of the sexual drive, aiming for satisfaction by turning toward the environment, engaging with objects and preserving them; and, conversely, withdrawal from objects to find satisfaction. Both mechanisms can operate to regain a state of satisfaction.

“Love designates the first of these drives, hate the second. These two drives are undoubtedly biological in nature, though not, like the death drive, of the order of biological theory. These two distinct attitudes can be observed concretely, even in the animal world, up to protozoa.”

Bernfeld does not delve into the historical aspect of the problem. However, this comparison suggests he seeks to align human historicity with the historicity of protozoa. In any case, he states clearly that these two distinct attitudes—destructive drives and sexual drives—are, like all drives, characterized by the recovery of a lost satisfaction. They possess a general biological significance applicable to all animal species, tracing back to protozoa.

“In studying the sexual drive and the destructive drive, we remain within the domain of qualitative analysis. These questions align with Freud’s perspective. While drives in general can be characterized as oriented toward satisfaction—and satisfaction, in fact, entails the establishment of a state of rest or equilibrium—the satisfaction sought, even if it involves the system’s increase in entropy, is always a qualitatively determined situation, one that arises historically with the involvement of non-energetic conditions.”

Again, Bernfeld does not specify these conditions. The quantitative aspect of energy theory can be considered significant, while the qualitative and historical belong to other perspectives. He then shifts his focus to the notion of the death drive, examining it more deeply.

After demonstrating that the death drive, sexual drives, and destructive drives are characterized by different criteria, he concludes that the notion of the death drive is inherently ambiguous.

“If one gathers the formulas Freud has successively proposed regarding the death drive from various perspectives and on different occasions, and if one proceeds in this way—as suggested by the consistent use of the same expression ‘death instinct’ across these passages—one arrives at an image that is contradictory. This contradiction arises because Freud’s considerations alternately align with the dynamic perspective and the economic perspective. The destructive drive is synonymous with the death drive, partners with the sexual drive, and is both a dynamic concept within the theory of drives and a historical concept incorporating decisive qualitative elements. Like the sexual drive, it can be detected in its natural state, often appearing intertwined with it. Perhaps it raises more problems than the sexual drive, but not of a different nature. Just like the sexual drive, it belongs to the biological perspective.”

Bernfeld remarks that the concept of the death drive contains “a little bit of everything.” He then examines the conditions under which the death drive and destructive drive can be dissociated. His text becomes more intricate here.

Bernfeld’s argument proceeds as follows: He seeks to determine whether distinct ideas of the death drive exist independently of other drives. He argues that no qualitative criterion can differentiate the death drive from sexual and destructive drives, just as no qualitative criterion distinguishes destructive drives from sexual drives. Thus, the sole criterion for differentiating the death drive from other drives is the one previously developed: the energetic characterization of the death drive. The destructive drive is nothing other than the death drive insofar as it is considered in physical terms or when the term “death drive” refers to the entropic tendency of all natural systems.

Essentially, Bernfeld asserts that the death drive—implicitly referencing Freud—can only be differentiated from other drives if the destructive drive is understood as a specific case of the principle of stability. However, this distinction applies solely within that framework.

And so, Bernfeld revisits the idea by stating that the condition under which Freud posits the possibility of this distinction—namely, the connection to the principle of stability—is expressed, in Bernfeld’s terms, as the case where the expression of death designates the entropic tendency of all systems in nature. Furthermore, while these systems adhere to the law of entropy under defined conditions, this leads to clarifying the concept of drive, as the terminology obscures the central issue: What functions do the drives, particularly the destructive and sexual drives, serve in the general process of the system?

In other words, if we classify the death drive as a drive, we obscure the real problem posed by the concept of drive—namely, the specific determinations that drives receive within the functioning of the individual.

This task, Bernfeld asserts, begins in his second article, where he writes:
“Assuming that these considerations contain a kernel of truth, Freud’s construction of the death drive would certainly lose the philosophical elegance that makes it so appealing, yet also so controversial. Freud contrasts the pair of opposites—destructive drive and sexual drive—with the pair of death drive and Eros. However, there is no place for Eros in a biophysical conception of the death drive. Energy theory does not recognize a partner, adversary, or opponent to the legality of entropy—except, at most, mechanical conditions that delay the path toward entropy and necessitate detours.”

In essence, there is no dialectical aspect to this phenomenon. There is no interplay with the Other.

“Similarly, the aggregation of increasingly large quantities of substances into units does not align with the direction of the physical process, which instead tends toward not only the dispersion of energy but also the dispersion of matter. The philosophically satisfying idea of forces combating death has little physical meaning and none from the perspective of energy theory. The death drive, as a mode of activity within the system, has no Eros alongside it. Eros is not a general mode of activity of systems; it is specific to organic systems. Likewise, the tendency toward destruction is not a physical mode of activity for systems but is also a determination specific to organic systems. These two modes of activity possess, in the narrowest sense, the dignity of distinct drives—distinct in these organic systems from those of other systems.”

Bernfeld notes that it is unnecessary to dissociate his theses from those of Jung and emphasizes that he does not advocate any form of energetic monism. He concludes:
“The general mode of activity for systems, known as Le Chatelier’s principle, according to which all systems resist external influences and thus tend to preserve themselves, is a special formulation of the broader, more comprehensible principle of entropy. It applies only to systems in stable equilibrium. The ‘system-person’ cannot reliably operate within Le Chatelier’s principle, as it possesses stable equilibrium only in specific limiting states.”

Three levels of analysis emerge here:

1. A limiting state for organic systems that aligns with Le Chatelier’s principle, potentially corresponding to a specific function. Bernfeld states that this represents only a limiting case.
2. Systems governed by entropy, not in the limited sense of Le Chatelier’s principle, but more broadly by the principle of entropy.
3. The domain of energetics, encompassing drives and historicity.

“The ‘system-person’ cannot simply operate within the field of Le Chatelier’s principle, as it possesses stable equilibrium only in specific limiting states. In such states, the system’s activity consists only of the simplest behaviors—resistance or avoidance of the notion of rest. However, in general, its task is not merely to achieve energetic equilibrium with the environment, which might occur sooner or later, but to manage the more complex ‘system-person’ tied to the structure of the person.”

From the hypothesis of the coupled system, presented in the second article, it follows that the dignity of drives—understood as specific modes of activity for living systems—belongs to the sexual and destructive drives, within the framework of an osmotic coupled system.

“Meanwhile, the death drive, in the sense of the Nirvana principle, and the drive for preservation, the instinct for self-preservation, represent general modes of activity for natural systems. However, for the ‘system-person,’ these can only operate under historically determined mechanical conditions through the action of destructive and sexual drives.”

This means that while the death drive may indeed characterize all natural systems, not just organic ones, and while an energetic interpretation of the death drive is valid in this context, the individual—the person—can only engage with this Nirvana principle under conditions specific to itself, conditions that are historically determined.

And specifically because the internal structure that governs energetic functioning is itself historically determined, and at the same time, it is the destructive drives and sexual drives that, within the structural framework of the person thus historically defined, alone make it possible to give force, essentially, to the energetic principle of Nirvana at the level of the individual.

Lacan

I extend my heartfelt gratitude, with all the emphasis I can express, to Mr. Pierre Kaufmann for providing us the service of untangling and articulating for us the chain of reflections represented by these three essential articles by Bernfeld. If, for some—and I hope their number is as small as possible—this may have seemed like a detour within the general framework of our research, it is certainly not a mere side note.

What I mean is that if—as Bernfeld puts it—the death drive in Freud faces the objection that it supposedly teaches us nothing about the phenomenon itself, you will see that the death drive will, in any case, teach us a great deal about the position of Freud’s thought, namely, the space within which it operates. To put it plainly, I think you have heard enough from the overall substance of this presentation to see that the following points are clearly demonstrated by such an analysis:

1. That the dimension in which Freud’s thought operates is, properly speaking, the dimension of the subject.
2. That this dimension is absolutely necessary for the natural phenomenon of the entropic tendency to be revisited at the level of the individual and for it to take on the value of a directed tendency, one that is meaningful within the system insofar as the entire system moves within an ethical dimension.

This, of course, is something we should not be surprised by at all, since otherwise, it would not align with the method, the therapeutic path, or even the ascetic way as it exists in our experience.