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(All parts in English)

[On the board]

‘That which one says as deed remains forgotten behind what is said, in what is heard.’

Today, I take my leave of you. Of those who have come and then those who have not come and who come for this leave-taking.

There you have it! There’s no need to make a big show of it, right? Well! What can I do? For me to sum myself up, as they say, is absolutely out of the question.

For me to mark something, a point, an ellipsis. Of course, I could say that I continued to grasp this impossible in which what is, for us, gathers itself together, for us in analytic discourse, groundable as real. There you have it!

At the last moment, and indeed due to a stroke of luck, I received the testimony that what I say is heard. I got it thanks to the one who was willing—and that is a great merit—to speak at the last moment, like that, of this year, who was willing to prove to me that indeed, for some, for more than one, for veins whose direction I absolutely cannot predict, in short, to find interest in what I try to articulate.

Well. I therefore thank the person who gave me, not just to me, who gave to all a sort of… I hope there are enough for whom it resonated, who realized that it can give something. It is always difficult, naturally, to know, to know just how far it extends.

In Italy, I allude to this a bit because after all it doesn’t seem superfluous to me, I met someone I find very nice, who is in… I don’t know, the history of art, the idea of the work. One doesn’t know why, but one can come to understand it, that which is stated under the title of structure, and namely what I myself was able to produce on it, interests him. It interests him due to personal problems. This idea of the work, this history of art, this vein, it makes one a slave, that’s for certain.

This is obvious when you see what someone who is neither a critic nor a historian, but who was a creator, fashioned as an image, as an image of this vein: the slave, the prisoner. There’s a certain Michelangelo who showed us this.

So on the sidelines, there’s the historian and critic who prays for the slave. It’s just one mummery among others, it’s a kind of divine service that can be practiced. Yes! That seeks to make us forget who is in command, because the work always comes on command, even for Michelangelo.

Well, the one who commands, that’s what I first tried to set out for you this year under the title ‘Yad’lun’ [there is One, a play on words]. Right? What commands is the One: the One makes Being… I urged you to go seek this in the ‘Parmenides’. Perhaps some of you have, in fact, complied. …the One makes Being as the hysteric makes the man.

Yes! Obviously, this Being that the One makes, it is not Being, it makes Being.

Obviously, it is that which is unbearable, a certain creative infatuation, and in the case of the person I’m speaking about, who was truly very nice to me and explained very well how he clung to what he himself calls ‘my system’ in order to denounce its barbs, and that’s also why I’m singling it out today, to avoid a certain confusion: he clung to what he finds to be too much ontology on my part.

Still, it’s funny, well, I don’t think here, of course, that there are only open ears. I think, as everywhere, there are a fair number of the deaf. But to say that I do ontology, that is still quite funny!

And to place it in this big Other… which I very precisely show must be barred and very precisely pinned down by the signifier of that very barring… it’s curious!

Because what must be seen in the resonance, in the response that one gets, is that after all, people answer you with their problems.

And as for his problem, it is that ontology, and even Being already, remain stuck in his throat because of this: if ontology is simply the grimace of the One, then obviously everything that is done on command becomes, for the One, suspended, and—my God—it bothers him…

So, what he would like, in short, is for the structure to be absent.

It would be more convenient for the ‘passez-muscade’ [play on words: sleight of hand, also refers to a conjuring trick]. What is wanted is that the sleight of hand… the sleight of hand that takes place, doesn’t it, and that is the work of art… is that the sleight of hand would not need cups.

You just have to look at it, there is a painting by Breughel… who was an artist far above that… he does not hide how, how it is that the captivation of the gawkers is done. Well!

So here, obviously, that is not what we are dealing with. We are concerned with analytic discourse.

And as for analytic discourse, I thought it would not be a bad idea, before leaving you, to punctuate something, to give you precisely the idea that not only is it not ontological, it is not philosophical, but it is only necessitated by a certain position.

A certain position that I recall, which is the one where I believed I could condense the articulation of a discourse, and still show you what relation it has with this fact that analysts still have a relation… and you would be wrong to think that I ignore it… with something that is called like that ‘the human being’, yes, of course, but I do not call it that.

I do not call it that so that you do not get ideas, so that you stay exactly where you need to be, as long as, of course, you are capable of perceiving what are the difficulties that present themselves to the analyst.

Let us, of course, no longer speak of ‘knowledge’, because the relation of man to a ‘world of his own’, it is clear that we have started from there for a long time, that moreover, always, it has only ever been a masquerade in the service of the discourse of the Master.

There is only a world as one’s own as the world that the master controls with a snap of the fingers and a glance. And as for the famous ‘self-knowledge’: γνῶθι σἑαυτόν [gnôthi seauton], supposed to make the man, let us start from this which is after all simple and tangible, isn’t it: yes, if one wants, it takes place, it takes place in the body: self-knowledge is hygiene.

Let us start from there, shall we. So for centuries, illness remained of course. Because everyone knows that it cannot be resolved by hygiene.

There is illness, and that is certainly something attached to the body. And illness lasted for centuries, it was the physician who was supposed to know it.

To know, I mean ‘knowledge’, and I think I emphasized quickly enough during one of our last talks—I no longer even know where—the failure of these two approaches, isn’t that so. All this is clear in history, it spreads out there in all sorts of aberrations.

So, nevertheless, the question I would like you to feel today is this: it is the analyst who is there and who seems to take up the relay.

One speaks of illness, one does not know: at the same time, one says that there is none… that there is no mental illness, for example… rightly so in the sense that it is a nosological entity as used to be said, mental illness is not at all an entity.

It is rather mentality that has flaws, let us put it like that for the sake of brevity.

So, let us try to see what, for example, is implied by this, which is written here, and which is supposed to state where is placed a certain chain that is very certainly and without any kind of ambiguity, the structure:

– we see two signifiers succeeding each other there,
– and the subject is there only insofar as ‘a signifier represents him for another signifier’,
– and then it has something resulting from it and for which we have, over the years, developed enough reasons to motivate us to note it as the object (a).

Obviously, if it is there in this form, in this form of a tetrad, it is not a topology that is without any kind of meaning. That is the novelty brought by Freud. The novelty brought by Freud is not nothing.

There was someone who had done something very well, by situating, by crystallizing the discourse of the master, thanks to a historical insight he was able to grasp, and that is Marx.

It is nevertheless a step, a step that does not at all need to be reduced to the first, nor is there any need to make a mixture between the two, one wonders on what grounds they should absolutely be reconciled. They are not reconciled, they are perfectly compatible: they fit together.

They fit together and then there is certainly one which has its place in all comfort, and that is Freud’s. What, in short, did he bring that is essential? He brought the dimension of overdetermination. Overdetermination is exactly what I illustrate with my way of formalizing, in the most radical way, the essence of discourse, inasmuch as it is in a revolving position with respect to what I have just called a support.

It is nevertheless from discourse that Freud made this emerge: that what happened at the level of the support had to do with what was articulated in discourse. The support is the body.

It is the body, and still, one must be careful when one says ‘it is the body’: it is not necessarily a body. Because from the moment one starts from jouissance, that means very exactly that the body is not alone, that there is another.

It is not for that reason that jouissance is sexual, since what I have just explained to you this year is that the least one can say is that it is not referred to as such, it is the jouissance of body to body.

What is proper to jouissance is that when there are two bodies… even more so when there are more, naturally… one does not know, one cannot say which one enjoys.

That is what makes it possible in this affair, to involve several bodies and even series of bodies. So overdetermination consists in this, it is that the things which are not meaning, where meaning would be supported by a signifier, precisely the property of the signifier…

And I do not know, I found myself like that, following the thread, God knows why, and then a little more… It does not matter… I found something again, a seminar that I gave at the beginning of a term, just the term that was the end of the year on what is called the case of President Schreber, it was April 11, 1956.

It is very precisely just before: it is the first two terms that are summarized in what I wrote:

‘On a preliminary question to any possible treatment of psychosis’.

At the end, on April 11, 1956, I posed what it was that… then, just like that, I call it by its name, the name it has in my discourse… the structure.

It is not always what a vain people thinks, but it is perfectly well stated at that level. It will amuse me to republish it, this seminar… if the ‘typist’ had not made a great number of small holes, for lack of having understood well. If she had only correctly reproduced the Latin sentence that I had written on the board, whose author I no longer remember now. [Cicero: ‘Ad usum autem orationis, incredibile est, nisi diligenter attenderis quanta opera machinata natura est.’] …I will do it, I don’t know, in the next issue of Scilicet.

The time it will take me to find out whose Latin sentence this is will certainly make me lose time, well, no matter, everything I said at that moment about the signifier… about the signifier at a time when one really cannot say it was in fashion: in 56… it remains struck from a metal where I have nothing to retouch.

Yes! What I say about it very precisely is that it is distinguished in that it has no meaning. I say it sharply because at that moment I had to make myself heard by… You realize, moreover, that it was doctors who were listening to me! What could they have cared? Simply that it was from… well, they heard Lacan. Well, Lacan: that is to say, that sort of clown, isn’t it, who… Well, he performed marvelously on the trapeze of course.

Meanwhile, they were already eyeing how they could return to their digestion, because one cannot say that they dream. That would be beautiful. They do not dream, they digest! It is, after all, an occupation like any other.

What one must still try to see is that what Freud introduces is something that… people imagine I ignore it because I talk about the signifier… it is the return to that foundation which is in the body, and which makes it so that… quite independently of the signifiers with which they are articulated… these 4 poles [1 in each discourse] which are determined by the very emergence of jouissance, precisely as elusive, well, it is that which brings forth the 3 others [in each discourse], and in response! The first [pole] which is truth, that—the truth—already implies discourse.

That does not mean it can be said, I keep saying that it cannot be said, or that it can only be half-said. But in any case for jouissance, well, that, that exists. We must be able to talk about it. By which there is something else that is called ‘saying’.

Well, I have basically explained to you for a year, I have taken enough time to articulate it, because to articulate it… it is in that you must see that the necessity which is mine, the way I proceed… precisely, I can never articulate it as a truth.

It is necessary, according to what is the destiny of all of you, it is necessary to go around it. More exactly, to see how it turns, how it tilts, how it tips over as soon as you touch it and even up to a certain point, it is unstable enough to lend itself to all sorts of errors.

Be that as it may, if I have issued… which is all the same a certain cheek… the title ‘Of a discourse that would not be of semblance’.

I think it was to make you feel, and you have felt, that discourse as such is always discourse of semblance, and that if somewhere there is something that authorizes itself from jouissance, it is precisely to make semblance.

And it is from this starting point that one can come to conceive that something which we can only grasp there, but in a way already so assured, so assured by someone whose memory must be saluted, the memory as I write it [mé-moire], giving to ‘mé’ the same sense as the ‘mé’ of méconnaissance [misrecognition], the one so well memorized [mes mots risée: my words mocked] that it is rather a matter of making a mockery of his words, namely Plato.

All the same, if there is someone who has grasped what is at stake in surplus-jouissance [plus de jouir: also ‘more to enjoy’], something that makes one think that Plato is not only ‘the Ideas’ and ‘the Form’ but everything we have… with a certain grid—a grid which, I admit, is plausible… translated from these statements.

Plato is the one who nevertheless put forward the function of the dyad as being that point of fall, where everything passes, where everything escapes: no ‘greater’ without ‘smaller’, no ‘older’ without ‘younger’, and the fact that the dyad is
– the place of our loss,
– the place of flight,
– the place thanks to which he is forced to forge this One of the Idea, of the Form, this One which moreover at once multiplies itself, ‘One-seizes itself’ [s’Un-saisit, play on words]
…yes, it is indeed because he is there like all of us plunged into that single supplement…
I talk about all this on 11 April 1956
…the supplement, the difference between the supplement and the complement.

In short, I had said all this very, very well since the year 56, it could have served, it seems to me, to crystallize something on the side of this function that is to be fulfilled, that of the analyst and which seems to be so impossible—more so than others—that one only thinks of disguising it.

Yes! So, it is on this point that it turns and that one must see certain things clearly. It is that between this support, what happens at the level of the body, and from where all sense emerges, but unconstituted, because after what I have just stated about jouissance, truth, semblance, and surplus-jouissance as making up the background, the ground, as the person who kindly came here the other day to talk to us about Peirce expressed it, insofar as it is in Peirce’s note that he had heard what I was saying.

No need to tell you that it is more or less around the same period that I brought out the quadrants of PEIRCE to which… it was of course completely useless, because what could you possibly think… that the remarks on the total ambiguity of the Universal, whether Affirmative or Negative, and of the Particular as well… what could that matter to those who in all this only thought of finding their refrain?

Yes! The ground, then, is there. It is indeed a matter of the body with its radical senses over which there is no hold. Because it is not with truth, semblance, jouissance nor surplus-jouissance that one does philosophy. One does philosophy from the moment there is something that stuffs, that stuffs the support, that can only be articulated starting from discourse, that stuffs it with what?

It must be said, right, that what you are all made of, and all the better if you are a little bit philosophers, it happens sometimes, but well, it is rare, you are above all ‘astudés’ as I once said, you are in the place where university discourse places you. You are taken as a-formed [as ‘subjects’: S].

For some time now, a crisis has been happening, but we will talk about that later. It is secondary. The question, then, is different. You must realize that what you fundamentally depend on… because, after all, the university was not born yesterday… is still the discourse of the master, which is the first to emerge, and it is the one that lasts and is unlikely to be shaken.

It could be compensated, balanced, with something that would be—well, the day it happens!—the analytic discourse. At the level of the master’s discourse, one can perfectly well state what exists
– between the field of discourse, between the functions of discourse as they are articulated from this S1, S2, the S and the a…

– and then this body, this body that represents you here, and to whom—as an analyst—I address myself.

Because when someone comes to see me in my office for the first time and I punctuate our entry into the matter with a few preliminary interviews, what is important is this, it is the confrontation of bodies. It is precisely because this is where it starts, this encounter of bodies, that from the moment one enters analytic discourse, it will no longer be a question.

But it remains that at the level where the discourse functions… which is not the analytic discourse… the question arises of how this discourse managed to capture bodies.

At the level of the master’s discourse, it is clear. At the level of the master’s discourse from which, as bodies, you are shaped, do not fool yourselves, whatever your antics, it is what I will call ‘the sentiments’ and very precisely the ‘good sentiments.’

Between the body and discourse, there is what analysts gargle with by pretentiously calling them ‘affects.’ It is quite evident that you are affected in an analysis, that is what makes an analysis, it is what they obviously claim, they have to hold onto the rope somewhere to be sure not to slip.

Good sentiments, what are they made with? Well, one is forced to get to this point, at the level of the master’s discourse it is clear: they are made with jurisprudence. It is still good not to forget this at the moment I am speaking, when I am the guest of the Faculty of Law, not to ignore that good sentiments are founded on jurisprudence and nothing else.

And when something like this all of a sudden turns your heart because you do not really know if you are not a little responsible for the way an analysis turned out badly. Listen! right? Let’s be clear! If there were no deontology, if there were no jurisprudence, where would this heartache be, this affect as they say?

One should even try from time to time to tell the truth a little. A little, that means what I have just said is not exhaustive. I could also say something else incompatible with what I have just said, it would also be the truth.

And that is precisely what happens when, simply by the fact not of a quarter turn, but of a half turn, of two quarter turns, of slippage of these elements functioning in discourse, it happens, it happens because in this tetrad there are vectors, vectors whose necessity can easily be established, they do not depend on the tetrad, nor on truth, nor on semblance, nor on anything of that kind, they depend on the fact that the tetrad is 4.

On this sole condition of requiring that there are vectors in both directions, namely that it is 2 coming in or 2 going out, or 1 coming in or 1 going out, you are absolutely required to find the way in which they are connected here, it depends on the number 4, on nothing else.

Naturally, semblance, truth, jouissance and surplus-jouissance do not add up. So they cannot make 4 by themselves, that is precisely what the real consists in, it is that the number 4, it exists all by itself. This is also something I say on 11 April 1956, but very precisely I had not yet brought all this out. In fact, I had not even constructed all this.

Only, this is what proves to me that I am in the right vein, since the fact that I said at that time that the number 4 was an essential number to be remembered, proves that I was indeed on the right track, since now, I find nothing superfluous about it. I said it at the right time, at the time when psychosis is in question. Well!

So, the question is this: if sentiments, if…

Do not worry about the people who are leaving, they have things to do at this hour, they have to go to the funeral of someone whose memory I salute here, and who was someone from our School, whom I truly cherished. I regret, given my commitments, not being able to join them myself.

…yes, what is there in analytic discourse, between the functions of discourse and this support, which is not the meaning of the discourse, which depends on nothing that is ‘said’?
– Everything that is ‘said’ is semblance.
– Everything that is ‘said’ is true, on top of that.
– Everything that is ‘said’ produces jouissance.

‘What is said’, and as I repeat, as I have rewritten it on the board today:

‘That which one says as deed—the saying—remains forgotten behind what is said.’
‘What is said’ is nowhere but in what is heard, and that is speech.

Only ‘the saying’, that is something else, it is another level, it is discourse. It is what of relations, relations which bind all of you and each of you together, with people who are not necessarily those present, what is called relation, religio, social connection, this happens at the level of a certain number of ‘connections’ which are not made by chance, which require—with very little wandering—this particular order in the articulation of signifiers.

And for something to be said there, it requires something other than what you imagine under the name of reality. Because ‘reality’ follows very precisely from the saying.

The saying has its effects, which constitute what is called fantasy, that is, this relation between the object little (a)… which is what is concentrated from the effect of discourse in order to cause desire… and this something which around and like a gap, condenses, and which is called the subject.

It is a gap because the object little (a), it is always between each of the signifiers and the one that follows, and that is why the subject, for his part, is always not between, but rather gaping.

Yes! So to return to Rome, I was able to grasp, to touch with my finger the effect, the rather striking effect, the effect in which I recognized myself very well, of the copper plates that someone named Fontana, apparently deceased, and who after having demonstrated great abilities as a builder, sculptor, etc., devoted his last years to making… in Italian it is said ‘squarcio’ apparently, but I do not know Italian, I had it explained to me… it is a gash, like that, he made a slit in a copper plate.

It has a certain effect. It has a certain effect for those who are a bit sensitive, but there is no need to have heard my discourse on the Spaltung of the subject to be sensitive to it. The first person who comes along, especially if she is female, may have a little wavering like that. It seems that Fontana was not one of those who totally ignored the structure, those who thought it was too ontological.

So what is at stake in analysis?

Because if one believes me, one must think that it is indeed as I state, that it is as ‘in body’, with all the ambiguity of this term which is motivated, it is because the analyst ‘in body’ installs the object little (a) in the place of semblance, that there is something which exists and is called analytic discourse.

What does that mean? At the point where we are, that is, having begun to see this discourse take shape, we see that as discourse, and not in what is said, in its saying, it allows us to apprehend what is at stake in semblance.

It is striking to see that at the end of a tradition… as was made clear to us last time… cosmological, how could the universe have come into being?

Does that not seem a bit dated to you? But dated from the depths of the ages, it remains dated nonetheless. What is striking is that this leads Peirce to a purely logical, even logician’s, articulation.

It is a point where the fruit detaches from the tree of a certain articulation—illusory, I will call it—which from the depths of the ages had resulted in this cosmology joined with a psychology, a theology, and everything that follows from it.

Here we are, touching with our own hands… as it was stated to you last time… touching the fact that there is only discourse on origin in treating the origin of a discourse.

That there is no other origin that can be grasped than the origin of a discourse, and that this is what matters to us when it is a matter of the emergence of another discourse [discourse A], a discourse which, in relation to the master’s discourse [discourse M]… whose terms and arrangement I will quickly retrace here… entails the double inversion precisely of the oblique vectors. And this is of the utmost importance.

What Peirce dares to articulate for us is there at the junction of an ancient cosmology; it is the fullness of what is at stake in the semblance of body, it is discourse in its relation, he says, to ‘nothing’. That means that around which every discourse necessarily revolves.

By this path, what I have tried to promote this year with set theory… to those who hold the function of the analyst… is to suggest that it should be in this vein… the one exploited by those statements formalized from logic… it should be to this vein that they devote themselves to be formed.

To be formed for what?

For what must distinguish what I called earlier the stuffing, the interval, the buffering, the gap that exists between:

– the level of the body, of jouissance, and of semblance,

– and discourse,

…in order to realize that it is there that they pose the question of what is to be placed, and which is not good sentiments nor jurisprudence, which has to do with something else, which has a name, which is called interpretation.

What the other day was put on the board for you in the form of the so-called semiotic triangle, in the form of the representamen, the interpretant, and here the object:

to show that the relation is always ternary, that is, that the representamen-object pair which is always to be reinterpreted, this is what is at stake in analysis. The interpretant is the analysand. That does not mean that the analyst is not there to help him, to push him a little in the direction of the interpreted.

It must be said, this cannot be done at the level of a single analyst, for the simple reason
– that if what I say is true, namely that it is only in the vein of logic, of extracting the articulations of what is ‘said’, and not of the ‘saying’,
– that if, to say it all, the analyst in his function does not know, I mean in body, how to gather enough of what he hears from the interpretant, who is the one to whom, under the name of analysand, he gives the floor, well, this analytic discourse remains at what, in effect, was said by Freud without deviating by a line.

But from the moment it becomes part of common discourse, as is now the case, it enters into the framework of good sentiments. For interpretation to progress, to be possible, according to the schema of Peirce that was presented to you last time, it is insofar as this relation, interpretation and object… note, what is at stake? What is this object in Peirce? …it is from there that the new interpretation, there is no end to what it can bring, except that there is a limit, precisely:

…which is indeed what analytic discourse must reach, provided it does not stagnate in its current stagnation.

What must be substituted in Peirce’s schema for it to match my articulation of analytic discourse? It is as simple as can be: at the level of what is at stake in the analytic cure, there is no other representamen than the object (a). The object (a) for which the analyst becomes the representamen himself, precisely, in place of the semblance.

The object in question is nothing other than what I have interrogated here with my two formulas, it is nothing other than this, as forgotten: the fact of the saying. [cf. ‘L’étourdit’: ‘That which one says remains forgotten behind what is said in what is heard’]

This is what is the object of what, for each, is the question: where am I in the saying? Because if it is indeed clear that neurosis spreads out, it is very precisely in this that we find the wavering that Freud put forward concerning desire, and especially desire in the dream.

It is quite true that there are dreams of desire, but when Freud analyzes one of his dreams, we see very well what desire is at stake, it is the desire to set the equation of desire as ‘= zero’.

At a time not much later than 11 April 1956, in 1957 to be exact, I analyzed the dream ‘of Irma’s injection’. It was transcribed as you might imagine by an academic, in a thesis where it is currently wandering.

The way it was, I will not say ‘heard’, because the person was not there, she worked from notes, she worked from notes and thought she could add her own ideas.

But it is still clear that if there is one thing that the dream of this injection of Irma, sublime, divine, allows us to show, it is what is obvious, which should have been… since the time I announced this thing… which should have been exploited by anyone in analysis. I left that lying around, because after all, as you will see, the thing does not have that many consequences.

If, as I recently recalled, the essence of sleep is precisely the suspension of the relation of the body to jouissance, it is quite evident that desire, which for its part is suspended from surplus-jouissance, will not for all that be put in parentheses.

What the dream works on, what it knits with, and we see well how and with what: with the elements of waking as Freud says, that is, with what is still entirely on the surface of memory, not in its depths.

The only thing that connects the desire of the dream to the unconscious is the way one must work
– to solve the solution,
– to solve the problem of a formula with ‘= zero’,
– to find the root by which the way it works, it cancels itself out.

If it does not cancel itself out, as they say, there is awakening. As a result, of course, the subject continues to dream in his life.

If desire has interest in the dream, Freud emphasizes, it is insofar as there are cases where fantasy, one cannot resolve it, that is, to realize that desire… allow me to express myself—since I am at the end—thus… has no reason for being, it is that something has happened which is the encounter, the encounter from which neurosis proceeds, the Medusa’s head, the slit mentioned earlier, directly seen, it is insofar as it, it has no solution.

That is precisely why, in most people’s dreams, what is at stake is indeed the question of desire. The question of desire, insofar as it refers much further back, to structure, to the structure by virtue of which it is the (a) that is the cause of the Spaltung [splitting] of the subject.

Yes! So, what binds us to the one with whom we embark, after the first apprehension of the body is overcome? And is the analyst there to reproach him for not being sexual enough, for not enjoying well enough? And what else? What binds us to the one who, with us, embarks in the position called that of the patient?

Does it not seem to you, that if we link it to this place, the term ‘brother’… which is on every wall: ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’… I ask you, at the point of culture where we are, of whom are we brothers? Of whom are we brothers in any discourse other than in analytic discourse?

Is the boss the brother of the proletarian? Does it not seem to you that this word ‘brother’ is precisely the one to which analytic discourse gives its presence, if only by bringing back what is called all that family baggage?

Do you think it is simply to avoid class struggle? You are mistaken, it depends on many other things than the family racket. We are brothers of our patient in that, like him, we are the sons of discourse.

To represent this effect that I designate as the object (a), to accustom ourselves to this de-being of being the support, the waste, the abjection to which that which will, thanks to us, be born from saying, a saying that is interpreting, can latch on, of course, with the help of this, which is what I invite the analyst to support himself with so as to be worthy of transference, to support himself with this knowledge that, being in the place of truth [S2], can interrogate itself as such on what has always been at stake in the structure of knowledge, from know-how to scientific knowledge.

From there, of course, we interpret. But who can do it if not the one who himself engages in the saying and who, from the brother, certainly, that we are, will give us exaltation? I mean that what is born from an analysis, what is born at the level of the subject, the speaking subject, the analysand, is something that, ‘with’, ‘by means of’… ‘Man thinks,’ said Aristotle, ‘with his soul’… the analysand analyzes with this shit that, in the figure of his analyst, the object (a) proposes to him.

It is with this that something, this split thing [S], must be born, which is nothing other in the end… to take up again something that was brought to you the other day regarding Peirce… than the beam by which a balance can be established and which is called justice.

Our transfigured brother, that is what is born from the analytic conjuration and that is what binds us to the one improperly called our patient.

This ‘parasexual’ discourse—right?—it must be said, like that, that it can have these boomerang effects. I would not want to leave you only with sugarcoating. The notion of ‘brother’, so solidly cushioned by all sorts of jurisprudence over the ages, by returning to this level, to the level of a discourse, will have what I just called ‘these returns’ at the level of the support.

I have not spoken to you at all in all this about the ‘father’ because I considered that you have already been told enough, enough explained to you to show you that it is around the one who ‘unites’, the one who says no,
– that can be founded,
– that must be founded,
– that can only be founded,
…all that is universal.

And when we return to the root of the body, if we revalue the word ‘brother’, it will come back in full sail at the level of good sentiments.

Since it is necessary, after all, not only to paint the future for you in rosy hues, know that what is rising, which we have not yet seen to its final consequences, and which itself is rooted in the body, in the fraternity of the body, is racism, about which you have not finished hearing.

There it is!

[Applause]