Evaluating Slavoj Žižek’s Historical Claims on the Ottoman Empire and Kemalism

⏳⛰️🛡️ Süreç Heval ⏳⛰️🛡️

(link, Slavoj Žižek’in ‘Tüm Kürtler Türkiye Altında Birleşse Mükemmel Olmaz mı?’ Fikrinin Kapsamlı Analizi)

Introduction

Slavoj Žižek – a Slovenian philosopher known for provocative cultural critiques – has, in various public statements, invoked the history of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey to illustrate points about tolerance, multiculturalism, and nationalism. Žižek’s remarks on these topics have drawn both interest and ire. He has, for instance, praised the Ottoman Empire’s religious tolerance and pluralism, suggesting it could serve as a model for multicultural politics, and criticized the Turkish Republic’s founding ideology (Kemalism) for introducing nationalist intolerance – even linking it to atrocities like the Armenian Genocide. These bold claims raise the question: How do Žižek’s characterizations stack up against historical evidence and scholarly consensus?

This report examines Žižek’s key statements about the Ottoman political system and Kemalism, verifies their factual accuracy through primary and secondary sources, and situates them in current historiographical debates. In doing so, it separates verifiable historical assertions from philosophical opinion or rhetorical exaggeration. The goal is neither to vindicate nor refute Žižek, but to contextualize his claims with neutral, scholarly analysis.

To accomplish this, the report is structured in three main parts. First, we identify and quote Žižek’s relevant statements – from interviews, articles, and talks – regarding Ottoman religious tolerance, multiculturalism, and the shift to a secular Turkish nation-state. Each statement is presented with its source and context. Second, we verify each historical claim embedded in those statements, drawing on authoritative historical scholarship and primary records. For example, when Žižek says European travelers were amazed by Ottoman tolerance in Istanbul, we will check travelogues and historians’ findings; when he asserts that intolerance in Turkey began with Atatürk and the Young Turks, we will cross-check with historical accounts of late Ottoman and early Republican policies (including the treatment of minorities). We will note where historians agree, where there are differing interpretations, and where nuance is needed. Third, we provide a historiographical discussion comparing mainstream scholarship’s view of Ottoman governance and Kemalist reforms with Žižek’s framing. This will highlight how historians of the Ottoman Empire assess its record on religious tolerance and minority rights, and how scholars of modern Turkey evaluate Kemalism’s approach to secularism, nationalism, and minorities.

Throughout, citations are provided for all facts and quotations, using an in-text reference system (in brackets) that corresponds to full source details. For instance, ** would refer to lines 172–180 on a given source page, retrievable in the bibliography or appendix. The report maintains a neutral tone, aiming to trace cause and effect without ascribing blame. Was the Ottoman Empire truly a haven of convivencia (coexistence)? Did the Turkish Republic simply inherit Western nation-state ideals with their darker side? Or are these sweeping assessments in need of refinement? By following each Žižek claim down to the historical evidence, the report allows readers to see how the philosopher’s provocative soundbites align or clash with the complex tapestry of history as recorded by experts.

For readers new to Ottoman and Turkish history, brief background explanations are included. Terms like “millet system” (the Ottoman method of governing through religious communities) and “Tanzimat” (19th-century Ottoman reforms) are explained when they arise. Likewise, we clarify who the Young Turks were and what Kemalism entails as an ideology. A comparative synthesis at the end will tie together the findings: it will compare the multicultural Ottoman Empire that Žižek describes with the portrait provided by historians, and do the same for Kemalism and its outcomes. Two appendices conclude the report: one listing Žižek’s primary sources used (interviews, writings), and another summarizing key scholarly works consulted on Ottoman and Turkish Republican history.

By mapping Žižek’s rhetorical assertions onto the historical map, this report not only fact-checks the philosopher’s claims but also illuminates broader issues of how history is used (or misused) in contemporary intellectual discourse. The stakes are more than academic: questions of the Ottoman legacy and Kemalist reforms remain alive in Turkey’s own discussions about identity, governance, and minority rights. Understanding the factual basis of these issues is thus essential – and it is to that task that we now turn, beginning with Žižek’s depiction of the Ottoman Empire’s political and cultural order.

Žižek’s Statements on the Ottoman Empire

Žižek has on several occasions referenced the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922) in the context of tolerance and multiculturalism. Notably, during a 2011 visit to Istanbul, he gave interviews in which he praised the Ottoman model of governance for its relative religious tolerance. He also contrasted this with the later Turkish nation-state. To evaluate his historical claims, we first present the key statements in full, along with their sources and context, before breaking down their factual components.

Žižek’s Remarks on Ottoman Tolerance and Multiculturalism

One of Žižek’s most-cited comments on this topic comes from an interview with the Turkish newspaper Radikal in October 2011, titled “Dikkat, ufukta yeni bir apartheid tehlikesi var!” (“Careful, there is a new apartheid danger on the horizon!”). In this conversation, Žižek was asked about East-West cultural issues and turned to Ottoman history. He reportedly said:

“İslam her zaman hoşgörülü bir din oldu; 18. ve 19. yüzyılda İstanbul’a gelen Avrupalı gezginler, buradaki dini hoşgörüden şaşkına dönmüşlerdi. İslam’ın ve özellikle de Osmanlı’nın, özgün haliyle hoşgörüye sahip olmak anlamında, çok gerilere giden bir tarihi var. Eğer çok kültürlülük konusunda bir şey öğrenmek istiyorsak, sizin tarihinize bakmamız gerektiğini çok açık olarak söylüyorum… Türkiye nasıl böyle hoşgörüsüz bir toplum haline geldi? 20. yüzyılın başında Avrupa’ya baktınız. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ve Jön Türkler Batı’yı taklit edip modern bir ulus devlet olmayı istediklerinde, Türkiye hoşgörüsüzlükle tanıştı.”

Translated from Turkish, Žižek is saying: “Islam has always been a tolerant religion; in the 18th and 19th centuries, European travelers who came to Istanbul were astonished by the religious tolerance here. Islam and especially the Ottomans have a long history, in the original sense, of having tolerance. If we want to learn something about multiculturalism, it’s clear that we should look at your history… Now, how did Turkey become such an intolerant society? At the beginning of the 20th century you looked to Europe! When Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Young Turks imitated the West and wanted to become a modern nation-state, Turkey became acquainted with intolerance.” In the same response, he added, “I am also talking about what was done to the Armenians here…”, explicitly linking this claimed rise of intolerance to the atrocities inflicted on Ottoman Armenian subjects (which culminated in the 1915 genocide).

Žižek thus posits two historical phases: (1) an Ottoman phase characterized by remarkable religious tolerance and multicultural coexistence, rooted in Islamic tradition, and (2) a 20th-century nation-state phase (Young Turks and Atatürk) characterized by intolerance and violence, exemplified by the treatment of the Armenians. The cause of the shift, in his view, was the Ottoman elites “looking to Europe” and imitating Western ideas of the nation-state, abandoning their own tradition of pluralism.

Žižek continued this line of thought in later interviews. In January 2012, he spoke to Hürriyet, a major Turkish daily, in an interview headlined “Yeni-Osmanlıcılık ancak Ermenileri ve Kürtleri kucaklamakla olur” (“Neo-Ottomanism is only possible by embracing Armenians and Kurds”). Here, Žižek doubled down on praising Ottoman openness:

“Osmanlı’yı bitiren, çok fazla açık ve toleranslı bir rejim olmasıdır. Ben bu toleransı takdir ettiğimi söylemeye çalışıyorum.”

Which translates as: “What finished off the Ottomans was being a regime that was too open and tolerant. What I’m trying to say is that I appreciate this tolerance.” Žižek admits this comment “was found shallow by some intellectuals” and clarifies that he is not advocating empire for its own sake but the principle of inclusion. He says if “neo-Ottomanism” means embracing different communities (like Kurds and Armenians) as the old empire did, then “try to be like the Ottomans”. In his words:

“Eğer yeni-Osmanlıcılık eski imparatorlukta olduğu gibi farklı toplulukları kucaklamaksa (Kürtleri ve Ermenileri), o zaman Osmanlı gibi olmaya çalışın. Yani, etnik kimlik üzerine kurulmamış bir modeli övmeye çalışıyordum.”

Meaning: “If neo-Ottomanism means embracing different communities as in the old empire (Kurds and Armenians), then try to be like the Ottomans. In other words, I was trying to praise a model that is not based on ethnic identity.” Here Žižek explicitly frames the Ottoman system as a non-ethnic, pluralist model in contrast to the ethno-nationalist model of the modern nation-state.

In the same Hürriyet interview, Žižek applied this reasoning to current issues: he argued that Turkey could solve its Kurdish problem only by abandoning strict nation-state logic and granting cultural autonomy in an “Ottoman-like” framework. He even (provocatively) imagined a future where “all the Kurds from other countries unite under Turkey’s umbrella in an autonomous way” – a statement he himself called “terrible” and likely to endear him to neo-Ottoman romantics. This was less a concrete proposal than a thought experiment to stress the idea of a supra-national arrangement (like a modernized Ottoman Empire) as a solution.

Finally, Žižek reiterated his historical narrative during a Kurdish television interview in October 2015 (on Med Nuçe TV, reported by Diken, a Turkish news site). In that interview, aimed at a Kurdish audience, he emphasized that the massacres of Armenians and Kurds were a modern phenomenon, not a product of age-old “Turkish barbarism”:

“Kürtlerin ve Ermenilerin katledilmesi, geleneksel Türk barbarlığı değil. Son zamanlarda, Jön Türklerin ortaya çıkmasıyla oldu bunlar. Bunlar, Türkiye’nin modernleşmesiyle oldu. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, bugünkü devlete nazaran azınlıklara ve farklı gruplara karşı çok daha hoşgörülüydü. Sorunlar Jön Türklerle başladı… 19. yüzyılın milliyetçi Avrupa’sına göre İstanbul, daha hoşgörülü. Eğer [AKP’liler] Osmanlı saltanatına dönmek istiyorlarsa, bu kanun ve geleneklere geri dönsünler.”

In English: “The killing of Kurds and Armenians is not some traditional Turkish barbarism. It happened in recent times, with the emergence of the Young Turks. It happened with Turkey’s modernization. The Ottoman Empire was much more tolerant towards minorities and different groups compared to the current state. The problems began with the Young Turks… Compared to 19th-century nationalist Europe, Istanbul was more tolerant. If the [ruling AKP members] want to go back to the Ottoman sultanate, then let them return to those laws and traditions.”

This remarkable quote encapsulates Žižek’s historical claim: that communal violence (like genocides) was a break from Ottoman norms, introduced by the Young Turk revolutionaries and their nation-state project, and he even challenges current Islamist politicians (who tout “neo-Ottoman” pride) to emulate the real Ottoman tolerance in law and custom.

To summarize Žižek’s Ottoman-related statements:

The Ottoman Empire (rooted in Islamic principles) had a long-standing tradition of religious tolerance. European travelers in the 1700s–1800s were allegedly “astonished” by how different faiths coexisted in Istanbul.
This imperial system was multicultural and not based on ethnic nationalism – different communities (Muslims, Christians, Jews, etc.) lived under Ottoman rule with a degree of autonomy (Žižek implies this is the “original meaning” of tolerance).
As a result, if today’s world wants to learn true multicultural coexistence, one should look at the Ottoman historical example.
The end of this tolerant order came when Ottoman elites embraced the European idea of the homogeneous nation-state. Žižek pins this on the Young Turks and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, suggesting that their Western-inspired reforms introduced a new era of “hoşgörüsüzlük” (intolerance) in Turkey.
The Armenian Genocide (1915) and other atrocities against minorities are cited as evidence of this turn to intolerance – events which Žižek frames as novel in Turkish history, not continuity from Ottoman tradition.
Žižek holds the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, the Young Turks’ ruling party) and later Kemalists responsible for dismantling the “multiethnic, multi-religious fabric” of the empire and replacing it with an exclusivist Turkish nationalism.
He contrasts Ottomanism vs. Kemalism implicitly: the former he equates with plurality and openness; the latter with ethnic homogenization and repression.
Importantly, Žižek acknowledges that these statements are provocative and were criticized in Turkey as oversimplifications. He insists he was “misunderstood” not as literally advocating an imperial revival, but praising the idea of pluralism over ethnic nationalism.
He also notes that neo-Ottoman nostalgia can be dangerous if it’s mere irredentism – in the 2012 Hürriyet interview he alludes that Turkey as a regional power must avoid imperialist traps even as he says “if someone must be a model (for the Muslim world), let it be Turkey”. This nuance is sometimes lost in secondary reports.

Now that we have Žižek’s perspective in his own words, we can begin scrutinizing the historical claims inherent in it. There are several distinct factual or semi-factual assertions to test:

European travelers in the 18th/19th centuries marveled at Ottoman religious tolerance in Istanbul.
The Ottoman Empire/Islam has a deep-rooted tradition of tolerance and multicultural coexistence (especially compared to contemporaneous Europe).
This tolerant, pluralistic order ended in the early 20th century when Ottoman leaders adopted European-style nationalism to form a nation-state.
The Young Turks and Atatürk’s reforms introduced intolerance in the form of ethnic/religious homogenization – exemplified by policies like the Armenian Genocide and other acts against minorities.
The Ottoman Empire was “much more tolerant” towards minorities than the modern Turkish Republic is.
If modern Turkey (under Islamist-rooted leaders) truly wants to honor the Ottoman legacy (“neo-Ottomanism”), it should return to Ottoman laws/traditions of pluralism and protect Armenians, Kurds, etc., rather than continue nation-state exclusion.

These claims span both the Ottoman era (up to ~1908) and the Kemalist era (after ~1920). We will address them in sequence: first examining the Ottoman Empire’s actual record on governance, religious tolerance, and minority rights, and then analyzing the changes that occurred with the Young Turk Revolution (1908), World War I, and the founding of the Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1913–1930s), including the ideological tenets of Kemalism (secularism and nationalism) and their impact on minorities.

Historical Claims in Žižek’s Statements: Ottoman Tolerance

Claim 1: Ottoman Istanbul’s tolerance amazed European travelers (18th–19th c.). Is there evidence to support this? Yes, there is documentation from European travelers and diplomats who commented on the Ottoman Empire’s relative religious diversity and the freedoms (or at least lack of persecution) afforded to various communities. For example, the 17th-century English author Sir Paul Rycaut, writing in 1679 about the Ottoman lands, observed that Christians and Jews lived under Muslim rule and had their own churches and synagogues – a stark contrast to parts of Europe that, at the time, did not tolerate open worship by religious minorities. Žižek’s mention of travelers specifically “astonished” by tolerance likely echoes real accounts such as Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, an 18th-century English aristocrat who lived in Istanbul in 1717–18. In her famous letters, she noted with admiration aspects of Ottoman society, including the freedom of women in the harem and the practice of inoculation against smallpox – though on religion her remarks were more mixed, she did comment on the presence of many faiths. A mid-19th-century example: French writer Alphonse de Lamartine visited Istanbul and in his 1835 travelogue remarked on the cosmopolitan milieu – seeing Greek priests, Armenian merchants, Jewish traders, dervishes, and others all mingling in the city streets. Such scenes would indeed have been striking to Europeans from nations that had state-enforced churches or had expelled religious minorities (e.g., Catholic Spain had expelled Jews and Muslims in 1492/1502, and even France had driven out its Protestants with the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685).

Historians confirm that Istanbul (Constantinople) by the 18th century was a multi-religious metropolis: it had large populations of Orthodox Christians (Greeks, Armenians, etc.) and Jews living alongside the Muslim majority, each community with its own institutions. A 17th-century English commentator explicitly argued that “Ottoman toleration of many religions was preferable to the violent enforcing of one (religion), as occurred in Christian Europe”. This is cited by historian Marc David Baer, who notes that Europeans at the time recognized the Ottomans allowed a plurality of faiths while Europe was still convulsed by religious strife. Such testimonies support Žižek’s claim that Europeans were “astonished” by Ottoman tolerance – albeit with the caveat that these observers often had their own agendas and biases.

Claim 2: The Ottoman Empire/Islam had a long tradition of tolerance and multiculturalism. Here we must carefully parse what “tolerance” means historically. Žižek speaks of “tolerance in the original sense” – likely implying the pre-modern notion of tolerance as mere permission for minority religions to exist and worship, rather than modern liberal tolerance (which connotes equal rights and celebration of diversity). The Ottomans did have a system, often referred to as the millet system, which organized society by religious communities. Under classical Islamic law (sharia), non-Muslims (primarily Christians and Jews, termed “People of the Book”) in a Muslim-ruled state were considered dhimmis – protected minorities who were allowed to practice their religion, govern their own communal affairs, and had autonomy in matters like marriage, divorce, and inheritance, in exchange for paying special taxes (like the jizya head tax) and acknowledging Muslim political authority. The Ottomans largely followed this model: they appointed or recognized religious leaders (Patriarchs for Greek Orthodox, an Armenian Patriarch for Armenian Christians, a Chief Rabbi for Jews) and gave them jurisdiction over their flock’s education, religious courts, and some civil matters.

This arrangement can be viewed as a form of institutionalized tolerance. Notably, the Ottomans did not force mass conversion of these groups – a significant fact in an age when European powers often did (e.g., the forced Catholicization of Protestants or vice versa in certain epochs). Ottoman tolerance allowed, for instance, the Greek language Orthodox Church to continue functioning after Constantinople’s conquest in 1453, and Jews expelled from Spain in 1492 found refuge in Ottoman lands, especially in cities like Salonica (Thessaloniki) and Istanbul. Historians often cite these examples as evidence that the Ottoman Empire was (comparatively) tolerant. In the words of one modern scholar, “Ottoman tolerance is European tolerance” – highlighting that what we consider a cornerstone of modern Western values also had an early manifestation under Ottoman rule.

However, tolerance did not mean equality. Ottoman society was hierarchically organized with Muslims on top. Non-Muslims paid extra taxes and faced certain legal disabilities. For example, a dhimmi’s testimony was not historically accepted in Islamic courts against a Muslim. They also had to show deference (in early periods that could mean sumptuary laws like distinctive clothing or not riding horses, though many of these rules were not strictly enforced or were abolished by the 19th century). As Marc David Baer explains: “Tolerance is not the same as celebrating diversity, coexistence, equality, multiculturalism, or mutual acceptance. To tolerate means ‘to suffer, endure, or put up with something objectionable’… Tolerance is in fact the expression of a power relationship. The tolerating party… determines to what extent the other group may be allowed to express their difference.”. This captures the Ottoman situation well. The Ottoman state “tolerated” Christians and Jews – meaning it didn’t seek to eliminate them and allowed them communal autonomy – but they were firmly second-class subjects.

So Žižek’s implication that the Ottomans had true multiculturalism needs nuance. Historians like Halil İnalcık and Bernard Lewis have described the Ottoman system as one of “parallel societies”: each religious community governed itself under its religious law (to an extent) and interaction was regulated. This certainly avoided many religious conflicts; for centuries Muslims and Christians lived in the same towns and villages in the Balkans and Anatolia without the kind of sectarian bloodletting that Europe saw during the Thirty Years’ War, for example. But it was a very different model from modern pluralistic democracy. As one historian puts it: the Ottomans “maintained difference” as the basis of their empire. People were not citizens of a single nation, but subjects of the Sultan categorized by group. In practice, “the empire was built on the maintenance of difference” – the state did not try to assimilate all subjects into one identity. A 19th-century British diplomat, Aubrey Herbert, observed that the Ottoman administrative system “worked without too much oppression” and was “more patient than the Greek, Bulgarian or Serbian states” in its treatment of different ethnic groups. He noted, during the 1897 Greco-Turkish War, Greek shop clerks in Istanbul left to fight for Greece and returned without harm – “no one did anything to them,” whereas in neighboring nation-states, ethnic rivals were treated much more harshly. Herbert (who was pro-Ottoman to an extent) blamed European meddling for stirring Ottoman Christian minorities into rebellious nationalism, remarking that “if there was not love (between communities) there was not very bad relations either… every difference between faiths and races was emphasized by Europe”. This contemporary account aligns with Žižek’s broad point that for a long time, diverse peoples cohabited under Ottoman rule with less friction than one might expect, and that Western influence (nationalism) heightened divisions.

That said, modern scholarship also points out instances of Ottoman intolerance and violence. The empire was not uniformly peaceful among religions. There were periodic forced conversions (particularly of young Christian boys through the devşirme system to serve as janissaries – though those boys then rose to elite status, a complex phenomenon in itself). There were pogroms and massacres at times: e.g., in 1821, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople was hanged by the Ottoman authorities in retribution for Greek uprisings, and throughout the Greek War of Independence (1821–30) there were atrocities against Greek civilians in Ottoman lands and vice versa. In the 19th century, sectarian violence sometimes flared – the 1860 Damascus riots saw Muslims attack Christian neighborhoods (though the Ottomans, pressed by European powers, punished the perpetrators). In the 1870s, the Ottoman suppression of a Bulgarian nationalist revolt led to the infamous “Bulgarian Horrors” (1876) where thousands of Bulgarian Christians were massacred by Ottoman irregulars – an event that caused international outrage and was decried in Europe (including by British statesman William Gladstone) as evidence of Ottoman brutality. Žižek’s narrative tends to skip over these late 19th-century episodes, which were indeed “intolerance” perpetrated by the Ottoman state or loyalists before the Young Turks took power. However, a key context is that by the mid-to-late 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was itself already influenced by nationalist currents and reacting to separatist revolts among its subject peoples. Many historians would say the age of Ottoman tolerance eroded precisely as modern nationalism (and great-power intervention) grew. This will be relevant when evaluating Žižek’s attribution of blame solely to Young Turks/Atatürk – one could argue the slide had begun earlier under Sultan Abdülhamid II (who, for instance, is associated with the 1894–96 Hamidian massacres of Armenians, in which hundreds of thousands were killed).

Nonetheless, up to the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire did pride itself on being a haven for multiple religions. In 1856, as part of the Tanzimat reforms, the Ottoman government issued an edict (Hatt-ı Hümayun) officially guaranteeing equality of all subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim, under the law. This was partly driven by Western pressure and the need to modernize to hold the empire together. Tellingly, the concept of “Ottomanism” (Osmanlılık) emerged – an idea of creating a common Ottoman citizenship for all, to supersede ethnic/religious identities. Žižek’s praise for “Ottoman tolerance” might be seen as anachronistically affirming the ideals of these reformers. But the Ottomanist experiment ultimately faltered as nationalism proved stronger – various groups preferred their own nation-states over Ottoman unity.

In sum, historians would partially validate Žižek’s rosy picture of Ottoman pluralism, with caveats. The empire was comparatively tolerant in pre-modern times (especially vs. European religious wars or expulsions). It had a system allowing multi-religious cohabitation that, indeed, contemporary Europeans noticed and sometimes admired. However, it was a hierarchical tolerance that did not entail modern equality. Furthermore, by the late 19th century, as the empire weakened, communal relations deteriorated – tolerance gave way to mutual distrust and periodic violence, due to many factors (nationalist ideologies, foreign intervention, economic competition among communities, etc.).

Now let’s turn to Claims 3, 4, and 5, which concern the transition to the nation-state and Kemalism, as they are interlinked:

Verification: The Young Turks, Kemalism, and the End of the Ottoman Plural Order

Claim 3: Ottoman tolerance ended when the Young Turks/Atatürk imitated the West to form a modern nation-state (early 20th c.). Žižek pinpoints the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and subsequent reforms as the turning point. Historically, what happened?

In 1908, a group of reformist officers and officials calling themselves the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) – popularly known as the Young Turks – restored the Ottoman constitution and effectively took power from Sultan Abdülhamid II. These Young Turks were influenced by European ideas (many had studied in Europe or at modern schools). Their avowed goal was to save the multiethnic empire by unifying it around the concept of Ottoman citizenship and modern administration. Initially, in 1908, there was euphoria among all groups – Turks, Armenians, Arabs, Jews, Greeks – who all briefly celebrated the constitutional revolution, hoping for liberty and equality. However, within a few years, the CUP’s policy shifted in a more nationalist direction. Facing the empire’s continued territorial losses (notably the loss of nearly all Balkan provinces in 1912–13), the Young Turk leadership became increasingly convinced that the future lay in building a modern nation-state of Turks (and loyal Muslim minorities), rather than preserving a cosmopolitan empire.

Historians such as Feroz Ahmad and Erik Jan Zürcher note that from 1913 onward (after a coup consolidated the CUP’s rule under a triumvirate of Talât Pasha, Enver Pasha, and Cemal Pasha), the Ottoman government pursued “Turkification” policies. This included promoting the Turkish language and culture in administration and education, and viewing certain minorities, especially Armenians and Greeks, as potential fifth columns that undermined state unity. The CUP’s guiding ideology evolved into what one might call Turkish ethnic nationalism, albeit often cloaked in the language of civic Ottoman patriotism. Žižek’s stark phrasing that intolerance began when “they wanted to be a modern nation-state” corresponds to what many scholars argue: the concept of nation-state based on ethnic identity was indeed foreign to the Ottoman system and necessitated excluding or assimilating those who didn’t fit the core identity.

This leads to Claim 4: The Young Turk and Kemalist regimes introduced policies of intolerance (genocide, deportation, assimilation) towards minorities. Tragically, the historical evidence supports this claim in large measure:

Armenian Genocide (1915–1917): During World War I, the CUP-led Ottoman government undertook the wholesale deportation of the Armenian population of Anatolia to the Syrian desert, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 1–1.5 million Armenians. This was a deliberate, centrally-organized campaign – as unequivocally documented by historians and even by Ottoman court-martial proceedings in 1919. The Young Turks (specifically Talât Pasha, the Interior Minister) viewed the Armenians as an internal threat (fearing they’d align with Russia or seek independence). The genocide is widely seen as the culmination of an exclusionary nationalist ideology: the CUP leadership wanted to consolidate a Turkish-Muslim nation in Anatolia by eliminating the large Christian minority. A scholarly encyclopedia entry on the Young Turks notes: “The CUP espoused a form of Turkish nationalism which was xenophobic and exclusionary in its thinking. Its policies threatened to undo the tattered fabric of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society.”. It goes on, “By the time World War I broke out… the CUP constituted a chauvinistic band which had subordinated the Ottoman state to its Turkist ideology.”. This directly supports Žižek’s point that the late Ottoman leadership moved away from pluralism to an ethnic-chauvinist vision, and in doing so, “threatened to undo” the old plural society.
The Armenian Genocide itself is the ultimate example of intolerance that Žižek cites (“what was done to the Armenians”). Historians like Taner Akçam detail that the CUP leaders saw the war as a chance to “secure the existence of a Turkish nation-state” through demographic engineering. Indeed, Uğur Ümit Üngör’s research on Young Turk “social engineering” concludes that “a generation of traumatized Young Turk politicians launched and perpetuated this violent project of societal transformation in order to secure a Turkish nation-state,” and that “ethnically heterogeneous regions were subjected to more encompassing and violent forms of social engineering”. He also observes a “strong continuity of population politics… between the CUP era (1913–1918) and the Kemalist era (1919–1950)” – meaning the nationalist policies started by the Young Turks continued under Atatürk’s Republic, though the methods shifted from genocide to forced assimilation after outright mass violence in the war years.
Other minorities: During World War I, aside from Armenians, the Ottoman CUP regime also targeted Assyrian (Syriac) Christians in massacres (sometimes called the Sayfo or Assyrian genocide) and expelled or persecuted Greek Orthodox communities in western Anatolia and eastern Thrace (many Greeks were forced out in 1914 and again during the war). Thus, the traditional millet mosaic was being violently unraveled. Žižek is substantially correct that this wasn’t “traditional” – it was a modern rupture. As he put it, “not traditional Turkish barbarism” but “happened with the rise of the Young Turks… with Turkey’s modernization”. The word “modernization” here is almost darkly ironic: the Young Turks saw themselves as modernizers – but their modern ideology (ethnic nationalism) led to unprecedented atrocities. This is a point many genocide scholars note: the Armenian Genocide was one of the first major genocides of the 20th century, perpetrated by a regime trying to modernize and nationalize an empire, influenced by social Darwinist and nationalist thought.
Atatürk and the early Republic (Kemalism): After World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman imperial government, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) led a nationalist resistance (1919–1922) that established the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Atatürk’s ideology, Kemalism, was built on secularism and nationalism as its pillars. The new republic definitively abolished the multinational, religiously-diverse empire in favor of a unitary Turkish nation-state. Did Atatürk continue intolerance towards minorities? In some ways, yes. The Republic was founded essentially as a Muslim Turkish nation-state:
Under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey recognized only three minorities (all non-Muslim: Greeks, Armenians, Jews) and even those were restricted to religious rights, not autonomy. All other groups (Kurds, Alevis, Assyrians, etc.) were not recognized as minorities at all.
The population had already been altered by war: by 1923, very few Armenians remained in Turkey (those who survived the genocide mostly fled or were in exile). The Greek Orthodox population in Anatolia and Thrace (except Istanbul) was forcibly exchanged with the Muslim population of Greece – about 1.2 million Greeks were expelled from Turkey and ~400,000 Muslims from Greece to Turkey, under the compulsory population exchange agreement brokered at Lausanne. This exchange, while agreed by both governments, was essentially ethnic cleansing by policy. Atatürk’s government acquiesced to it as a solution to the “minority problem.”
Kurds, a large ethnic group in eastern Turkey, initially fought alongside Turks in the War of Independence, expecting perhaps autonomy or recognition. Instead, Atatürk’s state denied the existence of Kurds as a distinct people, labeling them “Mountain Turks” in official discourse. Kurdish rebellions (the Sheikh Said revolt in 1925, the Ararat revolt 1930, and the Dersim rebellion 1937–38) were brutally suppressed. Particularly, the Dersim operation (1937-38) led to tens of thousands of Alevi Kurds killed or deported – considered by some scholars as an ethnocide. This shows Kemalist Turkey’s intolerance of ethnic dissent: it engaged in military violence to enforce unity.
The policy of “Turkification” was pursued in language and culture. In 1928, the Latin alphabet replaced the Arabic script for Turkish – a radical reform that was part of creating a new national identity disconnected from the Ottoman-Islamic past. Non-Turkish languages were discouraged or banned in public. A slogan, “Vatandaş, Türkçe konuş!” (“Citizen, speak Turkish!”) was propagated especially in the 1930s, pressuring minorities like Jews and Armenians to use Turkish in public. In 1934, a law required everyone to take Turkish surnames.
Non-Muslim citizens faced ongoing discrimination. For instance, in 1942 (slightly after Atatürk’s era, but under his successor İnönü’s rule which was Kemalist in orientation), a Wealth Tax was imposed that fell disproportionately (and punitively) on non-Muslim entrepreneurs, ruining many and forcing some to labor camps when they couldn’t pay. Even earlier, in 1927, Turkish citizenship law made it hard for refugees (like Armenian survivors abroad) to return, and confiscations of properties left behind by Armenians and Greeks continued under republican laws.
That said, the Republic did not carry out mass killings of remaining Armenians or Greeks on the scale of the CUP – partly because few remained and partly because the ethos had shifted to assimilation and expulsion rather than outright murder. But the 1942 Wealth Tax and later the 1955 Istanbul Pogrom (a mob attack on the Greek community) indicate that minorities continued to suffer under the ostensibly secular, modern Turkish state – contradicting any notion that Kemalism was fully benign toward diversity.

Žižek’s assertion that the Ottoman Empire was “much more tolerant” to minorities than the current Turkish state is a broad comparison that depends on timeframe. If current state means, say, the 2010s under Erdoğan’s Islamist-leaning government, one could argue Turkey still struggles with minority rights (e.g., Alevis still not recognized, Kurds had cultural rights expanded then contracted). But comparing late Ottoman to entire Republican era: In the late Ottoman period (1870-1915), minorities faced extreme violence (e.g., Hamidian massacres, Adana massacre of 1909, Armenian Genocide), whereas in most of the Republican period (1923-1990s), non-Muslim minorities were small and somewhat protected on paper but faced subtler forms of pressure and occasional violence (and Kurds faced denial of identity and intermittent rebellion and repression).

However, it’s true that the early Republic completed the homogeneity project that the CUP started. By 1924, Turkey was about 98% Muslim (after the population exchange and genocide), whereas the Ottoman Empire in 1914 was only ~80% Muslim. Turkey in 1924 was also overwhelmingly Turkish- or Turkic-speaking (except the Kurds, who were ~10-15% but officially counted as Turks). So from a pluralistic mosaic, within a generation, Anatolia became a much more uniform nation-state – largely through coercion and violence. Historians like Üngör explicitly talk of a “continuity of demographic engineering from the Young Turks to the Kemalists”, with the methods shifting from extermination to assimilation after 1918. In that sense, Žižek’s linking of Young Turks and Kemalists as part of one Westernizing nationalist project is supported by academic analysis.

Where nuance is needed is in differentiating Atatürk from the CUP in terms of degree: Atatürk did distance himself from the CUP’s most extreme legacy. For instance, the postwar Ottoman government (before Atatürk broke away) held war-crimes trials in 1919–20 that condemned the top CUP leaders (in absentia) for the Armenian massacres. Atatürk, while not enthusiastic about these trials, later allowed some former CUP figures into his ranks but also eliminated others. In 1926, a plot by former Unionists to assassinate Atatürk was uncovered, and he used it to execute a number of them (including prominent CUP ideologues like Dr. Nazım). This was Atatürk decisively ending any independent CUP remnants. He aimed to legitimize the Turkish Republic as a new start, not simply continuity of the CUP. Indeed, he and his followers vigorously denied that the new Turkey was responsible for Ottoman actions like the Armenian Genocide – hence Turkey’s long-standing official denial of that genocide (presenting it as an “Ottoman” or “CUP” crime separate from the Republic). Žižek’s commentary that “Kemal was much better, not as bad as people say” might reflect an awareness that Atatürk is often demonized by Islamists or some Kurdish commentators, and Žižek may be cautioning that Atatürk was not a straightforward villain. In truth, Atatürk did not perpetrate something on the scale of 1915, and he did build a functioning, somewhat inclusive state (inclusive at least of all Muslims as Turks). Some historians argue “Kemalist nationalism is civic and territorial, not racial” – implying that if minorities assimilated linguistically and culturally, they could be accepted. For example, Turkish Jews and Armenian citizens who spoke Turkish and adopted Turkishness could and did rise in society to some extent (though still facing prejudice). This is a contrast to the CUP’s wartime paranoia that led them to physically destroy communities.

Claim 5: If today’s Turkish leaders truly want to honor Ottoman legacy, they should embrace pluralism (including Kurds and Armenians). This is Žižek applying history to present politics. Turkey’s ruling party in the 2010s (the AKP under President Erdoğan) often invoked “neo-Ottoman” themes – projecting influence in former Ottoman lands, emphasizing Ottoman glories, etc. Žižek basically calls them out: if you admire the Ottomans, you should “return to those laws and traditions” of millet-like pluralism, rather than nationalist exclusion. This is more of a polemical challenge than a historical claim, but it underscores how Žižek interprets the Ottoman legacy as one of plurality that could be instructive for modern Turkey dealing with its Kurdish issue and minority rights.

Having dissected Žižek’s historical claims, we can now see that many of his core factual claims align with mainstream historical understandings, albeit stated in a very stark form:

Yes, the Ottoman Empire was often noted for relative religious tolerance compared to pre-modern Europe. Numerous sources confirm European travelers’ astonishment at seeing, for instance, synagogues and churches operating openly in Ottoman cities while in much of Europe at the time such scenes were impossible.
Yes, the Young Turk era introduced an ethnonationalist paradigm that led to ethnic cleansing and genocide – a rupture from earlier Ottoman policies.
Yes, Atatürk’s nation-building continued policies of Turkification, completing the transition to a unitary nation-state with one language and identity at the expense of minority cultures.
And indeed, historians debate continuity vs. change between the CUP and Kemalist regimes, but many agree on ideological through-lines (secularism, nationalism, and a belief in social engineering).

Where Žižek’s commentary might be considered too sweeping or in need of balance, historians would point out:

The Ottoman Empire was not an ideal pluralist paradise – tolerance coexisted with inequality, and later years saw significant intolerance from the Ottoman side as well (e.g., Abdülhamid II used pan-Islamic ideology and massacred Armenians in the 1890s; Ottoman officials tolerated or encouraged violence against Christians in several instances). Žižek glosses over these to make a cleaner East/West dichotomy. In reality, by the time the Young Turks came, the empire’s plural ethos had already been undermined to a degree.
Atatürk’s Turkey, while oppressive to non-Turkish identities, also implemented many progressive reforms internally (women’s emancipation, mass education, separation of religion from state to a large extent) which some minorities appreciated. For example, many Jews in Turkey supported Atatürk because the secular state was preferable to potentially theocratic alternatives. Žižek’s focus is understandably on ethnic/religious tolerance, but Kemalism’s legacy is multidimensional – it was intolerant in some ways, but arguably improved other aspects (contrasting with Ottoman rule where non-Muslims were tolerated but nobody had democratic rights and women had very limited rights).
The causal blame on “imitation of the West” is a bit oversimplified. While it’s true Western nationalism influenced the Young Turks, one could also say local nationalism among Greeks, Armenians, etc., “pulled” the Turks into their own nationalism as a reaction. It’s a cycle: Balkan nations broke away (inspired by European nationalism), then Turkish nationalism hardened. So it’s not solely “the West’s fault” – Ottoman Muslims/Turks developed their own agency in choosing a nationalist path. Žižek frames it as the Turks trying to become like Europeans and thus doing similar evils (colonialism, racism, etc.). There’s truth in that (CUP leaders indeed admired European national states and even colonial techniques – some referenced how Europe dealt with its “internal enemies” or colonies as precedent). But it’s also an internal Ottoman story of a multiethnic empire failing to transform into a multiethnic democracy and instead splintering into ethnic pieces.
Historiographically, Nuray Mert and other Turkish critics accused Žižek of practicing a new kind of Orientalism – turning the East into a positive stereotype (the always-tolerant East) against a negative West. Mert writes that Western intellectuals like Žižek make “sweeping, equally shallow generalizations – just positive rather than negative – about Eastern societies and their history, without deep knowledge”. For instance, saying “Islam has always been tolerant” is a gross generalization (there were certainly times and places in Islamic history of extreme intolerance, just as in Christian history). Žižek likely knows this but is rhetorically countering the equally simplistic “Islam is intolerant” narrative. The danger, as Mert points out, is that it can come off as patronizing or be misused by conservatives in Turkey to whitewash real historical crimes (which indeed happened: Islamist-leaning outlets eagerly quoted Žižek’s words to validate their view that “all problems came from secularism/nationalism, and Ottoman Islamic rule was harmonious”).

In the next section, we will delve deeper into how current historical scholarship evaluates these issues, to see where it corroborates or contests Žižek’s framing.

Historiographical Context and Comparison

Žižek’s claims invite us to compare them with the views of professional historians and the broader historiography on the Ottoman Empire’s governance and Kemalism’s reforms. We find that elements of Žižek’s narrative align with a recent trend in scholarship that reassesses empires (like the Ottoman) as relatively flexible in managing diversity, while casting a critical eye on the nation-state model for unleashing new forms of exclusion and violence. Yet, historians also caution against romanticizing the imperial past or oversimplifying the causes of intolerance.

Let’s outline the major historiographical perspectives:

Ottoman Religious Tolerance and Governance: Traditional Western narratives (especially in the 19th and early 20th centuries) tended to portray the Ottoman Empire negatively – as despotic, intolerant, “backward” – often to justify European interventions as “civilizing” missions. However, from the mid-20th century onward, and particularly since the 1980s, a more nuanced and sometimes positive reassessment emerged. Scholars like Bernard Lewis acknowledged that “for centuries, Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Armenians, Jews lived together in the Ottoman lands with less friction than their counterparts in Europe”. More recently, historians such as Karen Barkey and Marc Baer have explicitly argued that the Ottoman Empire provides an early example of effective management of pluralism. Barkey in Empire of Difference (2008) emphasizes the Ottomans’ pragmatism: they incorporated diverse groups by granting them autonomy and co-opting local elites, thus keeping the empire stable for so long. Baer (2021) goes further to integrate the Ottomans into the story of the development of secular governance, noting that as early as the 15th century, sultans like Mehmed II were issuing kanun laws that existed alongside sharia – a dual legal system implying a kind of proto-secularism. He points out that the Ottomans allowed freedom of worship well before Europe’s Enlightenment: “While full toleration did not exist in medieval Christian Europe, it did in medieval Islamic (Ottoman) lands. Ottoman tolerance is European tolerance.”. Baer and others argue that Europe’s own concept of tolerance emerged later and that Ottoman practice may have been an unacknowledged precursor. This resonates strongly with Žižek’s statements. Žižek essentially compresses this scholarly argument into a provocative soundbite: “If you want to learn multiculturalism, look at Ottoman history.”. While no serious historian would endorse an unqualified “Islam was always tolerant” claim (as Žižek phrased it), many would agree that the Ottoman Empire in its prime allowed a degree of religious pluralism unusual for its time. They would add the caveats we discussed: tolerance was hierarchical and conditional. But they might also point out that early modern Europe’s approach to diversity was arguably more oppressive (e.g., the expulsion of Jews and Muslims from Spain, the Inquisition, the wars between Catholics and Protestants) whereas the Ottoman polity avoided such large-scale internecine religious wars among its subjects for most of its history. There’s also a current within Turkish historiography, especially among conservative or Islamist writers, that glorifies “Ottoman tolerance” in a somewhat ahistorical way – basically as propaganda to contrast the “good old Ottoman days” with the troubles of the nation-state era. This view tends to blame all problems (like the Armenian tragedy or Kurdish conflict) on the abandonment of Islamic-Ottoman principles and the adoption of toxic Western nationalism. Žižek’s remarks have been welcomed by this camp (as noted, outlets like Yeni Şafak and Yeni Akit – conservative newspapers – approvingly cited him). Historians would caution that such a black-and-white inversion (Ottoman = good, secular West = bad) is as flawed as the old Orientalist trope (Ottoman = bad, West = good). In reality, the Ottoman system had its strengths (longevity, relative intercultural peace) and weaknesses (authoritarian rule, no concept of equal citizenship, occasional arbitrariness or oppression).
Kemalism, Secularism, and Nationalism: For decades, the dominant narrative in both Turkish official discourse and much Western scholarship was that Atatürk’s Kemalist revolution was an enlightened, positive transformation. It was credited with dragging a feudal theocratic empire into the modern age – establishing secular education, enhancing women’s rights (Atatürk gave women voting rights and discouraged the veil), creating a sense of national unity, and aligning Turkey with Europe. Early biographers of Atatürk (like Lord Kinross, 1960s) and historians such as Bernard Lewis tended to gloss over or justify the less liberal aspects, like one-party rule or suppression of Kurdish identity, arguing that Turkey needed strong medicine to survive in a Social-Darwinist world of nation-states. In this view, Kemalism was not seen as “intolerant” but as nation-building. Non-Turkish or non-Muslim minorities were either overlooked or seen as “small remnants” whose situation was admittedly not ideal but not a central focus. From the late 20th century onward, however, a more critical historiography emerged. Especially with the rise of discussions on human rights and minority rights, scholars began scrutinizing the cost of Kemalist policies. The Kurdish perspective became more represented: for Kurdish historians and writers, the early Republic means Dersim 1938 (often termed a massacre or even genocide of Alevi Kurds) and decades of forced assimilation and denial. Likewise, Armenian diaspora scholars pointed out that Atatürk’s Turkey, by not reckoning with the genocide and by benefiting from the property and homogeneity gained, was built in part on the genocide’s legacy (for instance, many buildings and businesses in republican Turkey were formerly owned by Armenians or Greeks). Rıfat Bali and others have documented the Republican era’s policies toward Jews and Christians, showing persistent antisemitism and Turkification drives. The historiographical debate often centers on continuity vs. rupture: Did the Turkish Republic represent a sharp break from the Ottoman past or a continuation of late Ottoman trends? Şükrü Hanioğlu argues that Atatürk’s ideological underpinnings (positivism, social engineering, Turkish nationalism) were forged in the Young Turk era, making the Republic a successor in spirit to the CUP (minus its overtly violent methods). Erik Zürcher even calls 1908–1950 the “Young Turk era” in Turkey, encompassing both CUP and early Republican rule as one continuum of elite-led transformation. On the other hand, many Kemalist-leaning historians emphasize Atatürk’s differences: he disbanded the CUP, he executed some wartime perpetrators (though mostly for show), and he genuinely wanted to orient Turkey to a new identity (even shunning the Ottoman dynasty and caliphate). They frame Kemalism as anti-imperialist (fought off colonial powers), secular, and inclusive in a civic sense. Notably, they claim “Kemalist nationalism is not racist: anyone can be a Turk if they embrace Turkish culture and loyalty.” Official propaganda had long echoed this: “How happy is the one who calls himself a Turk,” implying a voluntary identity. Žižek’s critique of Kemalism aligns with the newer critical historiography that underscores its illiberal and homogenizing side. When he says “Turkey became intolerant when it formed a modern nation-state, with Atatürk and the Young Turks copying the West”, he is pointing to exactly the issues that critical scholars highlight: the exclusionary nationalism and authoritarian secularism Kemalism entailed. For example, as cited earlier, the Minority Rights Group notes that Turkey “accepts only three non-Muslim groups as minorities” (per Lausanne) and doesn’t recognize others, severely limiting minority cultural rights. This stems from the Kemalist notion that acknowledging sub-identities would fragment the nation. Historians like Soner Çağaptay have written about how the early Republic endeavored to create “one nation” out of a diverse populace, through education and migration policies (settling Turks in Kurdish areas, etc.). Feroz Ahmad writes that “Kemalism rested on two pillars: secularism and nationalism – both a sharp break from the Ottoman past”. That break meant, for instance, Islam was removed from public life (which alienated religious Kurds and others) and nationalism meant no more millets, only Turks. Differences in interpretation persist: Some view Kemalist reforms as ultimately beneficial (laying groundwork for a more egalitarian society in the long run, and argue that its excesses were mild compared to contemporary regimes like fascist or communist states). Others, especially from minority viewpoints, see Kemalism as simply a continuation of the CUP’s project of ethno-national dominance under a different guise. The truth has elements of both. As historian Uğur Ümit Üngör demonstrates, there was “strong continuity” in population policies: the Armenian Genocide and the 1934 Resettlement Law (which aimed to disperse Kurds and other non-Turkish groups) are part of one spectrum of social engineering to secure a homogenous nation-state. The methods differed – genocide vs. assimilation – but the goal of a Turkish nation remained.
Differing Scholarly Perspectives: It’s important to note that not all historians agree on emphasizing Ottoman tolerance or Kemalist intolerance. There are debates:
On the Ottoman side, some historians (especially Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian national historians) focus on Ottoman repression: centuries of Ottoman rule weren’t exactly benign for them – they highlight instances of forced devşirme conscription, cultural suppression, economic exploitation (e.g., heavy taxation of Christian peasants), and periodic massacres (e.g., 1820s Greek War atrocities, 1876 Bulgarian Uprising suppression, etc.). These scholars might accuse Western revisionists of whitewashing imperialism. On the other hand, scholars like Bruce Masters and Molly Greene have shown that many Christians and Jews thrived under Ottoman rule until the modern era, complicating a one-dimensional oppression narrative.
On the Republican side, there’s the official narrative (still prevalent in Turkey’s state education until recently) that Atatürk-era policies were necessary and largely positive – framing events like the Kurdish rebellions as treasonous revolts rightly crushed, and minimizing or justifying things like the Wealth Tax or the minor harassment of non-Muslims as war measures or individual excesses not core to ideology. In contrast, critical historians (many outside Turkey, and some dissidents inside) claim Atatürk’s revolution imposed a new form of hegemony, with Turkification akin to colonization of the Kurdish regions, and a silencing of heterodox identities.

The historiographical trend in the last 20 years has been towards acknowledging the darker chapters: for instance, Turkey’s academic and public discourse has cautiously started to discuss the Armenian Genocide (some Turkish historians like Taner Akçam have been pivotal in bringing Ottoman archive evidence to light, confirming genocidal intent), and the Kurdish issue is openly debated with recognition that denial was wrong. Thus, Žižek’s perspective finds more support now than it might have decades ago. What he asserts – that the transition to a nation-state involved atrocities and intolerance – is not controversial in current international scholarship. It’s almost a consensus that the age of nationalism was violent in the Ottoman case (as it was elsewhere too: e.g., the collapse of Austria-Hungary or British India also saw horrific ethnic violence).

Where historians might disagree with Žižek is on assigning blame solely to “imitation of the West.” While Western political models indeed provided the template (the nation-state, ethnic nationalism, even the word “millet” was reinterpreted from meaning religious community to nation in the 19th century under European influence), the late Ottomans made conscious choices. There was an alternative idea – Ottomanism (Osmanlıcılık) – which Young Turks initially toyed with: making all citizens equal Ottomans and perhaps decentralizing (as some late Ottoman liberals like Prince Sabahaddin suggested). That failed, arguably due to mutual distrust and the fact that many Christian minorities preferred full independence with backing from foreign powers, rather than a reformed Ottoman umbrella. So one could say Ottoman tolerance failed to transform into multiethnic democracy not only because of Turks but also because others weren’t interested by that point. This nuance is often discussed: Was the Ottoman Empire doomed to break apart because of rising nationalisms, or could a pluralist reform have saved it? Historians are divided, but the general reading is that by the early 20th century, chances of a pluralist empire-state (like a genuine federal Ottomans Commonwealth) were extremely slim. The CUP leaders, faced with multiple secessions and foreign encroachments, took the path of radical Turkic nationalism, with catastrophic results for minorities. Žižek’s statements reflect this tragedy: the empire’s collapse into nation-states led to immense human suffering, as it did in other multiethnic empires (compare the fate of minorities in the Austro-Hungarian breakup or the Partition of India).

In comparative synthesis, mainstream scholarship often contrasts the “Imperial model” vs. the “Nation-state model.” Empires like the Ottoman were “empires of difference” (to use Barkey’s term) – they maintained order by accommodating diversity (albeit in hierarchical fashion). Nation-states, by contrast, pursued homogeneity – one nation, one language, one religion (or secular identity). The late 19th and 20th centuries saw the messy transition globally from empires to nation-states, frequently accompanied by ethnic cleansing and population transfers (not just in Ottoman lands, but also in Greece, the Balkans, Central Europe during WWII, India/Pakistan, etc.). Historians like Burbank and Cooper argue that we should not see empires simply as outdated or only oppressive – they had methods of managing diversity that perhaps we can learn from. Žižek’s position is almost a popularized echo of that argument, urging modern Turkey (and perhaps metaphorically Europe too) to adopt a more pluralistic, non-assimilationist ethos – “Ottomanism” as a cure to rigid nationalism.

Significantly, Žižek’s challenge to Turkey’s current Islamist rulers – “if you want neo-Ottoman glory, practice Ottoman-style tolerance toward minorities” – actually aligns with some liberal Turkish commentators. For example, during AKP’s early years, some intellectuals said the AKP’s “neo-Ottomanism” should mean reviving the idea of millet-like autonomy for Kurds or Alevi rights; otherwise it’s just expansionist nostalgia. Pro-Kurdish figures also sometimes positively cite the Ottoman past, noting that Kurds had relative autonomy (some Kurdish leaders were tribal chiefs under Ottomans, whereas the Republic tried to eliminate their identity). Nuray Mert, in the piece we cited, while criticizing Žižek’s knowledge gaps, herself advocates honestly confronting how nationalism harmed minorities and suggests that simplistic anti-Western blame games aren’t enough – one must also question one’s own nationalist “Orientalism.”

In conclusion, Žižek is not far outside the lines of current historical understanding, but he compresses it into an accessible narrative of lost pluralism vs. gained intolerance. His error, if any, is one of emphasis and lack of nuance (e.g., overstating “Islam always tolerant” or implying a near-complete idyll pre-1900). But the broad strokes – that the Ottoman political system permitted multiethnic coexistence for centuries, and that the 20th-century shift to ethnic nationalism led to great violence – are strongly supported by historical research.

By verifying Žižek’s claims against the historical record and scholarly analyses, we find more agreement than disagreement. His perspective invites a reexamination of the legacy of both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic:

The Ottoman Empire can indeed be seen (especially in hindsight) as a multiethnic commonwealth that, while autocratic, averted the kind of total wars and genocides that marked the age of nations – until its final years when it, too, was engulfed by the flames of nationalism.
Kemalism, for all its accomplishments in state-building and modernization, undeniably involved suppressing or erasing minority identities to forge a unitary nation. Whether one views that as tragically unavoidable or unnecessarily chauvinistic will vary, but facts like the population exchange, anti-Kurdish policies, and minority flight are incontrovertible.

Žižek’s neutrality about Žižek aside, this evaluation underscores an important takeaway emphasized by historians: Celebrating one’s imperial past or nation-state history should not come at the expense of acknowledging the experiences of those who suffered under those systems. Žižek’s colorful pronouncements serve to jolt us into remembering that the way we organize political communities – empire or nation – has very real human consequences. The Ottoman Empire’s end and Turkey’s birth offer a case study in that truth.

Conclusion

The factual review of Slavoj Žižek’s statements on the Ottoman Empire and Kemalism reveals that, beneath the provocation, Žižek’s core historical assertions are largely corroborated by historical evidence and scholarly research, though they require careful qualification. Žižek portrays the Ottoman Empire as a realm of remarkable religious tolerance and pluralism, and Kemalist Turkey as a nation-state forged through intolerant, homogenizing policies. In broad outline, the historical record supports this narrative:

Ottoman “Tolerance”: For much of its six-century span, the Ottoman Empire governed a mosaic of peoples and faiths through the millet system, extending protection and a degree of autonomy to Christian and Jewish communities in exchange for loyalty and taxes. Contemporary European observers indeed marveled that in Ottoman Istanbul, mosques, churches, and synagogues stood side by side – a stark contrast to early modern Europe’s frequent persecution or expulsion of religious minorities. Renowned historian Marc Baer affirms that principles and practices of toleration “had already been established at the onset of Ottoman rule in Southeastern Europe in the 14th century… Ottoman tolerance was based on Islamic precedent… While full toleration did not exist in medieval Christian Europe, it did exist in… Ottoman domains. Ottoman tolerance is European tolerance.”. This validates Žižek’s claim that Ottoman history offers lessons in multicultural coexistence. However, historians also emphasize (as Žižek does not) that Ottoman tolerance was hierarchical. Non-Muslims were not equal citizens but subjects with a tolerated status – they paid special taxes and faced inequalities. Tolerance was a pragmatic imperial governance strategy, not a liberal ideology. Thus, Žižek’s praise of Ottoman pluralism is accurate in context – the empire was relatively tolerant “for its time” – but it was not a modern secular utopia. It was an order in which diversity persisted, yet under clear Muslim dominance.
End of Empire & Rise of Nationalism: Žižek pinpoints the early 20th century – the Young Turk revolution and Atatürk’s nation-building – as the moment when a once-tolerant society turned to ethnic and religious intolerance. The historical turning point he references is real and stark. As historian Erik Zürcher notes, “between 1913 and 1923, the demographic map of Anatolia was redrawn” – through war, genocide, expulsion, and population exchange, Anatolia went from a multiethnic, multi-religious region to a mostly homogeneous Turkish-Muslim nation-state. The Committee of Union and Progress (Young Turks), who took power in 1913, espoused an exclusionary Turkish nationalism that “threatened to undo the tattered fabric of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society.” Their worldview subordinated the old Ottoman pluralism to a vision of a unitary Turkish fatherland. In World War I, this vision turned genocidal: to “consolidate Turkish rule”, the CUP orchestrated the deportation and mass murder of Ottoman Armenians. As Žižek correctly asserts, these atrocities were justified by their perpetrators in modern, not traditional, terms – as drastic measures to create a modern nation-state in a Social-Darwinist world. Eminent genocide scholars confirm that the CUP leaders viewed the Armenian population as an obstacle to their nation-state and removed it with brutal efficiency. The result was the near-destruction of an ancient people from their homeland – an event Ottoman history had no precedent for in scale. Žižek’s linkage of this violence to the importation of European-style nationalism is echoed by historians: the Young Turks were inspired by nationalist ideologies and even colonial practices (Talât Pasha once allegedly compared relocating Armenians to how Americans treated Native Americans). Thus, it is historically sound to say, as Žižek does, that the Ottoman tradition of relative tolerance “came to an end” when Western-modeled nationalism took hold. It was during this transition that the infamous slogan “Turkey for the Turks” effectively materialized, through blood and suffering.
Kemalism and Minority Suppression: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Republic of Turkey, established in 1923, continued the nationalist project initiated by the Young Turks – albeit under a different banner and with different methods. Žižek is essentially correct that Atatürk’s ideological blueprint rested on Turkish nationalism and secularism and that this meant a conscious break with the Ottoman multiethnic legacy. The new republic defined itself as a state of and for ethnic Turks. While it granted equal citizenship to Muslims of various backgrounds, in practice it sought to assimilate them into a single identity. Non-Muslims were placed outside the core definition of the nation, as evidenced by Turkey recognizing only its tiny communities of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews as minorities (per the Treaty of Lausanne) and denying minority status (and related rights) to Muslim heterogenous groups like Kurds or Alevis. Žižek’s contention that Turkey “became acquainted with intolerance” by imitating Western nation-state norms finds support in historical events: the Kurdish language and identity were banned from public life; Kurdish revolts (1925, 1930, 1937) were crushed militarily; and in 1934, a Resettlement Law aimed to disperse non-Turkish populations to dilute their cultural presence. In 1941, even after Atatürk, Turkey conscripted tens of thousands of non-Muslim citizens into labor battalions, and in 1942 it levied the Wealth Tax that economically ruined many of those citizens. All these policies stemmed from the Kemalist ethos that true Turks must be unified and that those who differ (in language or religion) must either become Turk or face pressure to leave. Thus, Žižek’s implication that Kemalism carried an inherent intolerance toward pluralism is factually grounded. As one scholarly analysis observes, Kemalist nationalism defined belonging not by race per se, but by adherence to Turkish language and culture – which was in effect an exclusion of those unwilling or unable to assimilate. That “anti-imperialist, civic” veneer of Kemalist nationalism did not extend tolerance to expressions of Kurdish or other non-Turkish identity; on the contrary, it strove to eliminate them in the public sphere. Historians like Uğur Ümit Üngör explicitly link the mass violence of the CUP to the coerced assimilation under Atatürk as parts of a continuous campaign of “social engineering… to secure the existence of a Turkish nation-state.”. He notes a “strong continuity of population politics… between the CUP era (1913–18) and the Kemalist era (1919–50)”. In short, Atatürk’s Turkey completed, through population exchange and cultural repression, what the CUP had started with genocidal ethnic cleansing – the creation of a predominantly homogeneous nation. Žižek’s stark formulation that “Turkey became such an intolerant society” in this process may sound blunt, but it reflects the reality that early Republican policies left little room for diversity: those minorities who survived had to keep their heads down and their distinct identities private, or emigrate.
Historiographical Corroboration: Beyond specific events, Žižek’s broader thesis – that the Ottoman Empire’s multicultural ethos was replaced by a rigid nationalist ethos under Western influence – finds resonance in modern historiography. Scholars Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, for example, argue that empires like the Ottoman managed difference through flexible arrangements, whereas the 20th-century world of nation-states often handled difference by expulsion or assimilation. Nuray Mert, a Turkish historian, criticized some of Žižek’s overgeneralizations but agreed that “Western-centric bigotry” among Turkish secular elites led them to enact top-down Westernization that dismissed the Ottoman plural heritage. Meanwhile, revisionist histories within Turkey have begun acknowledging the dark side of the nation’s founding – e.g., the joint 2011 conference “Ottoman Armenians During the Decline of the Empire” held in Istanbul, which openly discussed 1915, or the increasing scholarship on the Dersim massacre. This reflects a shift towards the very self-reflection Žižek urges: a willingness to “accept the horrible things done to Armenians,” as Žižek put it, and by extension, to other minorities. While Žižek’s suggestion that Turkey apologize while also “blaming Europe” for setting the precedent is debatable (and was understandably controversial), his main point was that Turkey’s wounds are partly self-inflicted through copying the worst of European nationalism, and healing requires honest reckoning rather than denial or one-sided blame.

In verifying Žižek’s claims, we also identified nuances and qualifications that he omits. For instance, Ottoman tolerance had limits – it did not prevent all violence (e.g., the Hamidian massacres of 1894-96 show Ottoman authorities themselves engaging in mass violence against a minority before the Young Turks). Additionally, not all intolerance in the late Ottoman period came from Turks copying Europe; it also came from indigenous fears and prejudices, and from the empire’s own power dynamics. Žižek’s framing tends to exonerate “Islam” and put all blame on “Western contagion” – an oversimplification. Nevertheless, it is true that the scale and ideology of late Ottoman violence were unprecedented and bore the hallmark of modern nationalism, something the empire had avoided for centuries.

Likewise, regarding Kemalism, Žižek does not mention that Atatürk’s secular policies also broke the hold of the Islamic establishment and introduced progressive reforms (from women’s suffrage to outlawing polygamy) – facts which do not negate his points but provide context that the Kemalist project was not singularly about ethnic exclusion; it had multiple dimensions, including some emancipatory ones for certain segments of society. Historians would present a fuller picture of Kemalism’s mixed legacy, whereas Žižek (speaking in the context of minority rights and political identity) highlights its repressive aspect – which is fair for his purpose, if not comprehensive.

In the final analysis, Žižek’s contentions stand up to factual scrutiny:

He accurately quotes the astonishment of European travelers at Ottoman religious freedom, a sentiment echoed in historical sources.
He correctly identifies the early 20th century as the juncture when “the problems began” – meaning systematic persecution of minorities – with the rise of the Young Turks. The Armenian Genocide and subsequent population engineering substantiate this.
He rightly notes that “the Ottoman Empire was much more tolerant towards minorities than the modern state” – a comparison supported by the vast difference in minority presence and status between, say, 1910 and 1930. (In 1910, 20% or more of Anatolia’s population was non-Muslim; by 1930, it was under 2%. In 1910, multiple languages and faiths had official recognition in some form; by 1930, Turkish and Sunni Islam were hegemonic, with others suppressed or marginalized.)
He astutely observes the irony that current Turkish leaders who glorify the Ottoman past often do not practice its pluralist ethos. This, too, is evident: appeals to neo-Ottoman grandeur have sometimes gone hand-in-hand with nationalist and sectarian policies (for instance, until a recent softening, the AKP government showed little real accommodation for Kurdish cultural rights or Alevi religious rights, notwithstanding neo-imperial rhetoric of unity). Žižek’s exhortation – embrace Armenians and Kurds if you want to be neo-Ottoman – is historically apt, since the Ottoman rulers did integrate those communities for centuries (albeit under dominance). It’s a provocative way of saying that true strength lies in inclusion, not homogenization, a lesson one could draw from history.

In maintaining strict neutrality about Žižek himself, we conclude that his provocative summations generally align with historical facts, even if his phrasing is polemical and his emphasis one-sided. The value of Žižek’s intervention is in highlighting what mainstream nationalist narratives often gloss over: the Ottoman Empire, for all its autocracy, cultivated a kind of plural coexistence, and the Turkish Republic, for all its reforms, was built through exclusion and violence towards certain groups. These are not accusations but historical realities documented by courts, archives, and countless scholarly works. By tracing each claim to source-based evidence – whether in travel diaries, Ottoman decrees, population statistics, peace treaties, or trial records – we have been able to verify Žižek’s statements and place them in context.

In a broader historiographical sense, Žižek invites a re-examination of how we judge empires versus nation-states. His perspective aligns with a growing recognition that the 20th century’s promise of self-determination carried a heavy price in blood and displacement, especially in places like the collapsing Ottoman realm. Historians do not suggest turning back the clock to empires, but many now acknowledge that imperial diversity management sometimes prevented the kind of zero-sum ethnic conflicts that later erupted. The lesson Žižek seems to draw – and which history supports – is that a political system that allows multiple identities to coexist (even imperfectly) tends to be less violently rupturous than one that demands a singular identity. The Ottoman Empire’s demise and the birth of modern Turkey exemplify this: the imposition of one identity over others engendered immense suffering that still echoes today in memory and politics.

In conclusion, Žižek’s historical remarks, once meticulously verified, stand as a concise if simplified articulation of a complex historical trajectory. The Ottoman Empire’s governance was indeed (comparatively) tolerant and multiethnic, and the emergence of Turkish nationalism and the nation-state in its wake was accompanied by some of the 20th century’s worst episodes of intolerance – from genocide to cultural repression. Understanding this trajectory is not about assigning guilt to one civilization or another, but about recognizing, as Žižek urges, that “the crimes of the past” must be acknowledged and learned from. Only by tracing how an empire of difference gave way to a republic of enforced sameness can one appreciate the delicate balance between unity and diversity – a balance that remains as relevant to Turkey’s future (and indeed to global politics) as it was in Ottoman times.

Ultimately, the factual verification of Žižek’s statements affirms that his provocative analysis, stripped of its rhetorical excess, is grounded in the historical reality documented by a wealth of scholarly research. In other words, when Žižek contends that “we should look to your history” for lessons in multiculturalism, history itself – through the records and studies we have examined – largely backs him up.

Appendix 1: Primary Sources – Žižek’s Statements

Žižek’s 2011 Radikal Interview: Kaya Genç, “Dikkat, ufukta yeni bir apartheid tehlikesi var!”, Radikal (Turkish daily), 1 Oct 2011. – An interview where Žižek discusses tolerance and multiculturalism. Key quote: “Islam has always been tolerant; in the 18th and 19th centuries European travelers were astonished by the religious tolerance in Istanbul… If we want to learn about multiculturalism, it’s clear we must look at your history. Now I come to the second issue: How did Turkey become so intolerant? At the start of the 20th century you looked to Europe! When Atatürk and the Young Turks imitated the West and wanted a modern nation-state, Turkey became acquainted with intolerance. I am also talking about what was done to the Armenians…”. This establishes Žižek’s thesis about Ottoman tolerance vs. nationalist intolerance.
Žižek’s 2012 Hürriyet Interview: Cansu Çamlıbel, “Yeni-Osmanlıcılık ancak Ermenileri ve Kürtleri kucaklamakla olur”, Hürriyet, 27 Jan 2012. – A candid interview during Žižek’s visit to Turkey. Žižek said: “What finished off the Ottomans was being too open and tolerant a regime. I’m trying to say that I appreciate this tolerance.”. He acknowledged critics found this simplistic, and clarified: “If neo-Ottomanism means embracing different communities as in the old empire (Kurds, Armenians), then try to be like the Ottomans. I was praising a model not based on ethnic identity.”. He also advised Turkey to confront the Armenian issue: “Turkey should answer by accepting the horrible things done to Armenians. But do not position yourself as subservient to Europe when doing so… Many European countries did similar massacres becoming nation-states. You did it too, to imitate them… Yes it happened before Kemal. In fact Kemal was much better, not as bad as he’s criticized. In the end what happened? The Europeans stigmatized you, as if only Nazis and Turks were the bad guys.”. Here Žižek encourages an apology to Armenians framed in a way that also indicts European hypocrisy – a controversial stance, but revealing his view that Turkey’s crimes occurred in a context of learning from the West. Finally, on the Kurdish question: Žižek mused about an “Ottoman-like” solution – “Throughout history nobody wanted the Kurds… They were partitioned by colonial borders. I see an Ottoman-style solution as the only way out today. I’m desperately looking for a new model. I wonder if the Ottoman model of a multi-cultural structure could work today… Of course, just a legal framework isn’t enough; people must accept minimum cultural norms, and one culture will inevitably be somewhat advantaged defining the space of tolerance – it was like that in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman too. But today, by giving Kurds cultural autonomy, couldn’t Turkey, by moving away from the nation-state model, create a model for the world?”. He even fantasized (tongue-in-cheek) “wouldn’t it be perfect if all Kurds from other countries united under Turkey with autonomy? Obviously impossible without war… but in an ideal scenario, Kurds of Syria, Iraq, Iran are represented under Turkey’s roof with autonomy.”. This extreme idea – essentially a neo-Ottoman federalism – he followed by, “Now you’ll tell me this can’t happen. Okay then where is this headed?”. While not a literal proposal, this shows Žižek’s thinking that a post-nation-state imperial arrangement might solve Kurdish statelessness peacefully, an idea he admits is utopian.
Žižek’s 2015 Med Nuçe TV Interview (reported by Diken): “Dünyaca ünlü düşünür Slavoj Žižek: Erdoğan’ın yaptığı ‘canavarlık’”, Diken, 21 Oct 2015. – Žižek spoke to a Kurdish TV channel amid renewed Turkey-PKK conflict. He reiterated historical points: “The killing of Kurds and Armenians is not traditional Turkish barbarism. It happened recently, with the rise of the Young Turks. It happened with Turkey’s modernization. The Ottoman Empire was much more tolerant to minorities and different groups compared to the current state. The problems began with the Young Turks… I recently read a Frenchman’s early 19th-century travel memoir of Istanbul. He describes Istanbul as much more tolerant then. He says he saw rabbis and priests in the streets. Compared to 19th-century nationalist Europe, Istanbul was more tolerant. If [the AKP leaders] want to return to the Ottoman sultanate, then let them go back to those laws and traditions.”. This source furnishes Žižek’s direct comparison of Ottoman tolerance vs. modern intolerance and his challenge to contemporary neo-Ottomanists to live up to Ottoman pluralist traditions.
Žižek’s New Statesman article (2015): Slavoj Žižek, “Is something rotten in the state of Turkey? A reply to my critics.”, New Statesman, 31 Dec 2015. – This piece is mostly about current events (Turkey’s policy on ISIS and Kurds), but Žižek mentions the “fate of the Kurds is a tragedy of colonialism imposing artificial borders… divided among four countries – Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey – they are deprived of autonomy.”. He criticizes how the Turkish state reduced the Kurdish issue to “terrorism” and notes “continuous tensions between the Turkish state and intellectuals, journalists, etc – which exploded in Gezi Park in 2013 – are a sign Turkey is in the middle of an identity struggle. There is reason to believe if forces opposing Erdoğan won, the Kurdish struggle would enter a new stage.”. This shows Žižek’s view that Turkey’s inability to integrate Kurds is part of its flawed nation-state paradigm and that democratization would likely yield minority rights improvements.
Žižek’s LRB essay (2013) – Trouble in Paradise. In an LRB article, Žižek noted Turkey was once hailed as combining Islamism with liberal capitalism successfully, but listed ominous signs: “Turkey’s denial of the Armenian holocaust; arrests of journalists; unresolved status of Kurds; calls for a greater Turkey to resuscitate the Ottoman Empire’s tradition; occasional imposition of religious laws.”. This shows Žižek acknowledging issues like genocide denial and neo-Ottoman ambition as problematic facets of the Turkish state. It situates his historical comments within a critique of Turkey’s contemporary politics – he sees unresolved historical injustices (Armenians, Kurds) and creeping neo-Ottoman Islamist rhetoric as “stains” on the supposed success story.

(Note: All translations of Žižek’s Turkish interview quotes are by the report author. Emphasis has been added in some quotes for clarity. The sources above are listed in chronological order for reference.)

Appendix 2: Key Scholarly Works on Ottoman History and Kemalism

Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 – A foundational work detailing Ottoman institutions including the millet system. İnalcık explains how the empire managed a multi-religious population, noting the autonomy given to communities and the sultan’s role as protector of the “People of the Book”. This work provides context for Ottoman governance that underpins claims of relative tolerance (while also describing the legal inferiority of non-Muslims).
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (2nd ed., 1968) – Lewis charts the shift from empire to republic. He describes the 19th-century reform era (Tanzimat) where the Ottomans attempted to create equal citizenship (e.g., the 1856 edict, Ottoman Constitution of 1876) and the subsequent rise of nationalism. Lewis (writing before the term “genocide” was commonly applied) acknowledged the massacres of 1915 but couched them in wartime context. Still, his narrative confirms that Ottoman pluralism gave way to Turkish nationalism and that the early Republic built a homogeneous nation-state (praising its achievements but noting its authoritarianism). This work is cited to understand how Kemalism was traditionally viewed and what facts Lewis presents (e.g., population exchanges, secular reforms).
Taner Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (2012) – A seminal scholarly work using Ottoman archives to document the planning and execution of the Armenian Genocide. Akçam demonstrates the CUP leaders’ intent to eliminate Armenians as a defined policy for achieving a Turkified state. He situates this in the larger framework of demographic engineering that continued in the Republican era. Key findings (like Talât Pasha’s communications, mortality statistics, and confiscation of Armenian properties) corroborate Žižek’s claims about what was “done to the Armenians” and that it was a product of modern ideology, not some eternal inter-communal strife.
Uğur Ümit Üngör, “Geographies of Nationalism and Violence: Rethinking Young Turk ‘Social Engineering’”, European Journal of Turkish Studies No.7 (2008) – Üngör’s article (and his broader work The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-50) directly addresses continuity between CUP and Kemalist policies. He introduces the concept of “social engineering” to describe population policies including genocide, deportations, and assimilation. He argues that a generation of Young Turk elites carried their nation-state project through WWI into the Republican era, creating an ethnically “purified” Turkish homeland. This scholarly perspective strongly supports Žižek’s linkage of Young Turk and Kemalist intolerance, providing detailed evidence of how post-1915, policies like Kurdish resettlement or the 1934 Thrace anti-Jewish measures were part of the same nation-building impetus. Üngör’s quantitative data on demographic changes and his qualitative analysis of state documents bolster the factual basis for claims of deliberate homogenization.
Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (2008) – Barkey explores how the Ottoman Empire succeeded in ruling diverse peoples. She emphasizes flexible arrangements, negotiated sovereignty, and the Ottomans’ willingness to incorporate local elites of different religions. Barkey argues this “empire of difference” was a source of stability. This work gives historical weight to Žižek’s positive view of Ottoman pluralism, although Barkey also notes the system’s inherent hierarchy (she calls it toleration, not equality). Barkey’s insights explain why European travelers found the Ottoman lands tolerant: because the empire pragmatically allowed local customs and faiths. She also discusses the 19th-century challenges as nationalism spread, aligning with the view that Western ideas disrupted the old order.
Marc David Baer, “Ottoman Pathways to Tolerance” (Aspects of History, 2022) – In this essay, Baer contends that Ottomans practiced a form of toleration long before Western Europe, and that Ottoman statecraft subordinated religious authority to sultanic authority (a kind of secularism) as early as Mehmed II. He, however, clarifies tolerance meant a power relationship: the Ottoman state “tolerated” divergent groups from a position of strength. Baer’s work is used to verify Žižek’s depiction of pre-modern Ottoman tolerance and to highlight its limits. Baer’s recent biography The Ottomans: Khans, Caesars, Caliphs (2021) also frames the Ottoman Empire as part of European history and acknowledges both its inclusivity and its eventual resort to violence under pressure. He covers episodes like the 1821 Greek revolt, 1860 Lebanon/Damascus events, and the Hamidian massacres, which nuance the story of tolerance but also underscore how things changed as modern ideologies encroached.
Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (3rd ed., 2004) – Zürcher provides a balanced overview from late Ottoman to late 20th-century Turkey. He defines the period 1908–1950 as a continuous “Young Turk era”. He documents the Committee of Union and Progress policies (Turkification of administration, 1913 coup, entry into WWI) and then Atatürk’s reforms (abolition of caliphate, language change, etc.). Zürcher acknowledges the Armenian Genocide as a genocidal act by the CUP and notes how the early Republic eschewed multiethnic pluralism, opting for a unitary national identity (including suppressing Kurdish revolts). His work offers factual data such as population figures (e.g., 1914 census vs 1927 census), and legislative acts (e.g., 1934 Settlement Law) that corroborate the outcome Žižek describes: a demographic and ideological homogenization of Turkey. Zürcher’s analysis of Kemalist ideology shows it was influenced by Western positivism and nationalism – supporting Žižek’s contention that Turkey “imitated the West” in this path.
Minority Rights Group International, “Türkiye – Minority Rights” (updated country profile, 2018) – This NGO report provides factual information on Turkey’s minority policies. It notes that Turkey only recognizes Armenians, Greeks, and Jews as minorities (per Lausanne) and explicitly states that other groups (Kurds, Alevis, etc.) are not recognized, limiting their rights. It also provides context such as percentages of population, and mentions historical events like the 1923 population exchange and the suppression of Kurdish identity. This source is valuable to confirm factual claims about laws and official stance which show the Kemalist legacy of intolerance towards acknowledging diversity (for instance, the prohibition on teaching Kurdish for decades, or the fact that even today Turkey doesn’t collect ethnic data). It backs up Žižek’s claim that intolerance was enshrined in how the Republic defined itself (a unitary nation with no official minorities beyond those three, and even those curtailed to religious affairs).
Şükrü Hanioğlu, Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography (2011) – Hanioğlu delves into the intellectual currents that shaped Atatürk, showing how ideas of scientific materialism, social Darwinism, nationalism, and secular state-building came from late Ottoman Young Turk milieu and European thought. He highlights that Atatürk’s vision was rooted in making Turkey a modern nation-state on par with Europe – thus confirming that Western-inspired ideas guided Kemalism. Hanioğlu also touches on Atatürk’s approach to minorities: he notes Atatürk was pragmatic (e.g., he did allow limited freedoms to remaining Greeks/Armenians but also sanctioned repression when he deemed it necessary). Hanioğlu’s portrayal of Kemalism as an ideological continuation of Young Turk thought lends scholarly weight to Žižek’s linking of the two periods.
Nuray Mert, “Žižek’in ‘yeni oryantalizmi’”, Milliyet, 4 Oct 2011 – An op-ed by Turkish political scientist Nuray Mert reacting to Žižek’s 2011 remarks. Mert accuses Žižek of not being well-informed on Eastern specifics while making broad claims, dubbing it a “new Orientalism” where Western thinkers praise the East superficially. She nevertheless agrees that Western-centric biases in Turkish republican thought have led to ignorance of the Ottoman plural past and that a romanticized positive Orientalism can be as simplistic as classic negative Orientalism. Mert provides insight into Turkish debates on these issues, and her piece indirectly supports some of Žižek’s critiques (for instance, she acknowledges that leftist or liberal Western intellectuals sometimes gloss over details, and warns that conservatives use their words to boost their narrative – as indeed happened with Žižek’s quote circulated in Yeni Şafak). Mert’s references to works like Burbank & Cooper (on empires) show the academic context of these ideas.
Frederick Cooper & Jane Burbank, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (2010) – This comparative history argues that empires historically dealt with diversity through structures of difference (often more successfully than nation-states have), and that the nation-state model isn’t the only or necessarily best political form. They cite the Ottoman Empire as an example of an empire that managed diverse populations under a single sovereignty by allowing considerable internal autonomy. This scholarship helps frame Žižek’s positive appraisal of the Ottoman system in a global context. It isn’t about idealizing empires, but about understanding that empires like the Ottoman had mechanisms (millets, local autonomy, flexible identity) that avoided some of the totalizing conflicts seen in later nation-states. Cooper & Burbank’s perspective lends academic legitimacy to the idea that something was lost in the transition from empire to nation-state in terms of managing pluralism – precisely the point Žižek makes dramatically.

This compendium of scholarly works collectively underpins the factual claims evaluated in this report. They provide the evidence base – archival documents, eyewitness accounts, analyses of policy – that allows us to verify statements about Ottoman tolerance (e.g., Baer, Barkey, Lewis), about the Young Turks’ nationalist turn and atrocities (e.g., Akçam, Üngör), and about Kemalist nation-building and its impact on minorities (e.g., Zürcher, Hanioğlu, Minority Rights Group). Through these references, we ensured that every key factual statement attributed to Žižek could be traced to established historical knowledge:

Ottoman religious tolerance astonished Europeans.
The CUP regime was “xenophobic and exclusionary”, leading to genocide.
Kemalist Turkey was founded on secular Turkish nationalism that brooked little diversity.

All these are extensively documented in the academic literature, confirming that Žižek’s public discourse on the topic, though packaged in his idiosyncratic style, is firmly grounded in documented history and current historiographical understanding.

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Žižekian Analysis

The lion only leaps once!

Evaluating Slavoj Žižek’s Historical Claims on the Ottoman Empire and Kemalism

Introduction

Žižek’s Statements on the Ottoman Empire

Žižek’s Remarks on Ottoman Tolerance and Multiculturalism

Historical Claims in Žižek’s Statements: Ottoman Tolerance

Verification: The Young Turks, Kemalism, and the End of the Ottoman Plural Order

Historiographical Context and Comparison

Conclusion

Appendix 1: Primary Sources – Žižek’s Statements

Appendix 2: Key Scholarly Works on Ottoman History and Kemalism

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Evaluating Slavoj Žižek’s Historical Claims on the Ottoman Empire and Kemalism

Introduction

Žižek’s Statements on the Ottoman Empire

Žižek’s Remarks on Ottoman Tolerance and Multiculturalism

Historical Claims in Žižek’s Statements: Ottoman Tolerance

Verification: The Young Turks, Kemalism, and the End of the Ottoman Plural Order

Historiographical Context and Comparison

Conclusion

Appendix 1: Primary Sources – Žižek’s Statements

Appendix 2: Key Scholarly Works on Ottoman History and Kemalism

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