🦋🤖 Robo-Spun by IBF 🦋🤖

(All parts in English)

I would really like, from time to time, to get an answer, even a protest.
I don’t have much hope since one of the people who once gave me that satisfaction—
it is true that I begged her to play that role only half an hour ago—asks me to give it up.

But if there were someone, by chance, who, in what I said last time…
the last time, from which I myself came out, let us just say, quite worried, not to say more,
and what, upon my rereading, turns out—well, for myself—to be entirely bearable,
let us say it is my way of saying that it was very good
…I would not be unhappy if, all the same, someone could give me the testimony of having heard something of it.
It would suffice that… that a hand be raised, so that to that hand, if I may say so, I give the floor.

I see that it is not the case, so I must therefore continue. It may be less good this time, eh?
I would like to start from a remark, from a few remarks,
– the first two of which will consist in recalling what it is with knowledge,
– and then in trying to make the junction with what, for you today, I would readily write as “hainamoration,” which must be written: h.a.i.n.a.m.o.r.a.t.i.o.n. [neologism blending haine (hate) and amour (love)]

It is the relief, as you know, that psychoanalysis has been able to introduce in order to situate, to situate there the zone of its experience.
It is, on its part, a testimony, if I may say so, of good will.
If hainamoration precisely, it had known how to call it by another term than that—bastard—one of “ambivalence,” perhaps, perhaps it would have succeeded better in awakening the context of the time into which it is inserted.
Perhaps it is also modesty on its part.

And indeed if I ended on something…
that something thanks to which it becomes possible to approach what had polarized me
throughout my enunciation last time
…I had stated in that last paragraph that there was someone named Empedocles, and I had remarked that it is not for nothing that Freud arms himself with it: that for Empedocles God had to be the most ignorant of all beings…
which joins us to the question of knowledge
…and this very precisely, I said, of not knowing hate.

I added that Christians later transformed this non-hate of God into a mark of love.
It is there that the analysis of the correlate it establishes between hate and love urges us, urges us to something like a reminder, to which I will return in a moment and which is exactly this: one does not know love without hate.

That is to say that, if there is knowledge of something, if this knowledge disappoints us…
which has been fomented over the centuries, and which makes it necessary for us to renovate the function of knowledge
…it is indeed perhaps because hate has not been put in its place.

It is true that, on that subject, it is not at all what seems most desirable to evoke.
And that is why I ended with this sentence: one could say that the more the man credits the woman with confusing him with God…
that is to say what she enjoys, remember my diagram last time, I’m not going to redo it
…the less he hates, and at the same time, I said…
having equivocated on h.a.i.t. and e.s.t. in French
…that is to say that in this matter, likewise, the less he loves.

I was not very happy to have ended on that, which is nevertheless a truth.
It is indeed what will make me today question once again what apparently gets confused between the true and the real,
– as I have introduced the notion of it,
– as it takes shape in analytic experience,
and what there is indeed not to confuse.

Of course the true asserts itself as aiming at the real.
But that is stated only as the fruit of a long elaboration,
and I will say more: of a reduction of the pretensions to truth.

Everywhere we see it present itself, assert itself as an ideal, as something of which speech
can be the support, we see that truth is not something that is reached so easily.
[“of which speech can be the support”: each of the 4 discourses positions truth as being unattainable: H : S2◊a, M : a◊S, A : S1◊ S2, U : S◊S1,
→each discourse will run up against its “not-all” → H : science without s(o)ul, U : subject without power, M : surplus-enjoyment without subject]

Shall I say that if analysis is based on a presumption, it is that a knowledge about truth can be constituted from it?

In the schema, the little grapheme that I gave you of analytic discourse, the a is written at the top left,
which is supported by this S2: knowledge insofar as it is in the place of truth.
That is where it is addressed by the S asked to say this “whatever” that must lead to the production of the S1,
of the signifier by which—what?—precisely its relation to truth can be resolved.

Truth, let us say to cut into the quick, is of origin ἀλήθεια [alétèia], on which Heidegger speculated so much,
אמת [emet], the Hebrew term, which like every use of this term truth has a juridical origin:
even nowadays the witness is asked to say “the truth, nothing but the truth,” and what is more “the whole”…
if he can, how alas could he?
…“the whole truth” about what he knows.

But what is sought, and precisely more than in any other place in juridical testimony, is what?
It is to be able to judge what is the case with jouissance, and I will say further: it is that jouissance confesses itself,
and precisely in this, that it can be unconfessable, that the truth sought is precisely that one more than any other,
with regard to the law that regulates this jouissance.

It is also in this respect that, in Kant’s terms, the problem is evoked, evoked as to what the free man must do
with regard to the tyrant, the tyrant who offers him all jouissances in exchange for this: that he denounces the enemy
whom the tyrant fears may be, as far as jouissance is concerned, the one who contests it from him. [Kant: Critique of Practical Reason]

How is it not seen that the question, moreover, that… that is evoked from this imperative,
in the name of nothing that is of the order of the pathic, must not direct the testimony of what is evoked from it after all,
and if what the free man is asked to denounce is the enemy, the rival: if it were true, must he do it?

Is it not seen, from this problem alone as evoked, that if there is something that surely inspires in us
all the reserve that is indeed the one we all have, that we all have, it is that “the whole truth”
– is what cannot be said,
– is what can be said only on the condition of… of not pushing it to the end, of only half-saying it.

There is something else that binds us regarding what is the case with truth: jouissance is a limit.
It is something that belongs to the very structure evoked, at the time when I constructed them for you,
by my “quadrupeds”: it is that jouissance is only addressed, evoked, tracked, elaborated starting from a semblance.

Love itself, I emphasized last time, is addressed from the semblance. It is addressed from the semblance and likewise…
if it is indeed true that the Other is reached only by clinging—as I said last time—to the (a) cause of desire
…it is likewise to the semblance of being that it is addressed.
This “being” is not nothing: it is supposed to that something, to that object that is the a.
[love is addressed from the semblance (identification to the love object) to the semblance of being (a “clinging” to the Other (place of language) → approach to S(A)).
A being is supposed to “that which speaks” (S1← S2), that which speaks and which “as such” produces an a (S: subject, subjectum: sub-posed, ὑποχείμενον: upokeimenon)]

But here must we not find again this trace: that as such it answers to some imaginary?
Assuredly this “i-maginary” I explicitly designated by the i, by the little i, placed here isolated from the term “imaginary,”
and that it is in this, in that it is only clothing…
the clothing of the self-image that comes to envelop the object cause of desire [Cf. above the parakeet of Picasso]
that most often is supported…
it is the very articulation of analysis
…that most often is supported the “object-relation.”
[love is addressed from the semblance to the Other, but love reaches the Other only if to that Other an a is (a)ttached as fiction of a little other, of an imaginary a’ in the mirror,
which would come to clothe the Other and support, “sustain” the subject as S in this field of ex-sistence, thus allowing the reciprocity (imaginary too) of love]

This affinity of the (a) to this envelope, that is the joint—one must say it: one of those major joints to have been advanced
by psychoanalysis, and which for us is the point, the point of suspicion that it essentially introduces.

That is where what may come to us to say of the real is distinguished, for the real [the impossible]…
if you take it as I have believed, over the course of time, times that are those of my experience
…the real cannot be inscribed except by an impasse of formalization.
[trace of the real: logical impasse thus… Cf. the 4 impossibles of the 4 discourses: inconsistency(H), incompleteness(M), unprovable(U), undecidable(A)]

And it is in this that, it is in this that I believed I could draw the model of it from mathematical formalization, insofar as it is the most advanced elaboration we have been given to produce, the most advanced elaboration of signifiance.

Of a signifiance that, in sum…
I am speaking of mathematical formalization
…one can say is made contrary to meaning. I almost said against-meaning.

The “it means nothing” concerning mathematics is what—of our time—
the philosophers of mathematics say, even if they are mathematicians themselves: I have sufficiently emphasized Russell’s “Principia.”
[A.N. Whitehead, B. Russell: “Principia mathematica”]

And yet can one not say that this network so far advanced of mathematical logic precisely…
inasmuch as with regard to what found its point in a philosophy
forced to come out of its own trenches, the summit is Hegel
…can one not say that with regard to this fullness of dialectized contrasts in the idea of a historical progression…
of which it must be said that nothing attests the substance to us
…can one not say that with regard to that, what is stated of this formalization, so well made to be supported only by writing, is something that serves us…
would serve us, if it were needed, in the analytic process
…only by what is designated there, only by what is designated there as that “it” that holds bodies invisibly?
[“that ‘it’ that holds bodies”: the imaginary garment (and scintillating) that “envelops bodies,” the trace on the “a-wall,” the writing of a jouissance that sustains them in the field of the Other]

And if I were allowed to give an image of it, I would readily take it from what in nature seems closest, from what makes it so that writing requires in a way this reduction to dimensions—2 dimensions—of the surface,
and which in a certain way is supported, I would say, in the nature of that something
at which Spinoza already marveled, namely the work of text that comes out of the spider’s belly.

The spider web, a function truly miraculous to see in a way already supported, at that opaque point
of this strange being, the appearings of the surface itself, the one that for us allows the drawing of the trace of these writings,
and which are, in the end, the only point where we find graspable these limits, these points of impasse, of “no-exit”
which—the real—make it heard as being accessed from the symbolic at its most extreme point.
[where the impasse of formalization can be inscribed only by letters]

It is in this that I do not believe it vain that after a work of elaboration, the date of which I have no need to recall here,
nor now, I came to the writing:
– of this a, [M : a◊S (function of speech)]
– of this S of the signifier of the A insofar as barred: S(A) [H : S2◊a → S(A) (function of language)],
– and of the big Φ [A : S1◊S2 (function of writing)].

[each discourse comes to run up against the “not-all” of a truth that will inscribe in “letters” what can be grasped from it “beyond speech”:
– H : S2◊a → S(A),
– M : a◊S → a,
– A : S1◊ S2 → Φ]

Their very writing constitutes the support that goes beyond speech [beyond the half-said of truth]
which nevertheless does not come out of the effects of language themselves, and where something is designated on which to center the symbolic,
something that matters provided, of course, one knows how to use it.

But use it for what? To retain a congruent truth.
Not that truth that claims to be whole:
– that one precisely, that one with which we have to deal as a half-saying,
– that one which proves itself to be on guard against going as far as confession, the confession that would be the worst,
– that one which is on guard from the cause of desire [a].

It presumes this desire, inscribed from a bodily contingency.
I remind you of the way I support this term “contingency.” One can say that the phallus [Φ]…
as in analytic experience it is approached as the key point,
the extreme point, of what is stated as cause of desire
…one can say that analytic experience does not cease writing it [production of asemantic S1].

Now if I call [Φ] contingency, it is insofar as that is where analytic experience meets its term [S1◊ S2],
that all it can produce is this S1, this signifier, this signifier of which last time, I think you still remember the murmur I managed to produce from this audience by qualifying it as signifier of jouissance,
even the most idiotic—and I was told so—in both senses of the term:
– that of the idiot on the one hand, which indeed has here its function of reference,
– and that also which is the most singular.

It is in this “does not cease being written” that the point of what I called “contingency” resides.
Contingency, if as I say it is opposed to the impossible,
is insofar as the necessary is the “does not cease not being written” [slip]…

I beg your pardon: it is the necessary that here introduces for us this “does not cease,”
but the “does not cease” of the necessary is the “does not cease being written.”
Now it is indeed there that the apparent necessity to which analysis leads us by the reference to the phallus resides.
[in the necessary (does not cease being written) “resides” the point (Φ) of contingency (ceases not being written)]

The “does not cease not being written” that I said by slip just now is the impossible,
the impossible as I define it from the fact that it cannot in any case be written.
That is how I designate what it is with the sexual relation: it does not cease not being written,
but the correction that by that fact it allows us to bring to the apparent necessity of the phallic function is this:
it is that it is really insofar as mode of the contingent,
that is to say that the “does not cease being written” must be written “ceases—precisely—not being written.”

It is as contingency, contingency in which everything is summed up of what, for us, subjects the sexual relation
to being for the speaking being only the regime of “the encounter” [→ of chance] *.
it is in this sense, it is in this sense that one can say that through psychoanalysis the phallus…
the phallus reserved in ancient times for the “mysteries”
…has ceased not being written, nothing more. *[Cf. Aristotle: τύχη (tuché) → εὐτυχία (eutuchia: happy encounter) or δυστυχία (dustuchia: unhappy encounter)]

It has not entered into the “does not cease,” into the field on which depend necessity on the one hand, and higher up impossibility.
The true thus, here, bears witness that by being on guard, as it is, against the imaginary, it has a lot to do with a-natomy.

It is in the end these 3 terms, those that I inscribe as a, S(A), and the big Φ,
it is under a depreciative angle that I bring them in.

What the conjunction of these three terms demonstrates to us is precisely what is inscribed of this triangle,
of this triangle constituted of the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real, and where from their junction is designated—what?

– On the right the little reality [Φ] by which is supported this principle that Freud promoted as being the one that is elaborated from a progress, which would at bottom be that of the pleasure principle, the little reality, that is to say this:
that everything we are permitted to approach as reality remains rooted in fantasy [a◊S, stumbling-block of the Master’s discourse].

– On the other hand S(A), what is it other than the impossibility of saying all the true of which I was speaking a moment ago?

– And finally, 3rd term, this, this by which the symbolic, in directing itself toward the real, demonstrates to us the true nature of this object (a) that a moment ago I qualified as semblance of being, not by chance: it is indeed because it seems to give us the support of being.

It is also indeed from what is confirmed by everything that has been elaborated as such, and whatever it may be of being,
of being and even of essence, that we can…
in reading it from analytic experience, in reading Aristotle for example,
…see that what is at issue is the object (a).
That Aristotelian contemplation, for example, is the fact of that gaze as I defined it in “The Four Concepts…” as representing one, one of the 4 supports that make the cause of desire. [oral, anal, vocal, scopical]

So it is from one of the “graphicizations”… [neologism: graphicization]
not to speak of a graph, since a graph
is a term that has a very precise sense in mathematical logic
…in this “graphicization” that these correspondences are shown, are shown that make the real an open between the semblance that results from the symbolic and reality as it is supported in the concreteness of human life:
– in what leads men,
– in what makes them always charge along the same paths,
– in what makes them still produce other men,
– in what makes it so that, forever, “the still to be born” will give nothing but “the horned one.” [Laughter] [pun: encore à naître (still to be born) / encorné (horned)]

On the other side this a, this a which, being on the right path after all, would make us take it for being,
in the name of this, that it is apparently indeed something, which in the end is resolved only by its failure,
by precisely not being able to be inscribed in any way, completely, at the approach to the real.

The true then, the true then, of course, is that, except that it is only ever reached by crooked paths,
and that all we are ordinarily led to appeal to as the true is simply to recall this:
that one must not be mistaken, that one must not believe that one is already even in the semblance, that before the semblance…
from which indeed everything is supported in order to bounce back into fantasy
…before that, one must make a severe distinction between the imaginary and the real, that one must not believe that this semblance
is in any way supported by us ourselves even. We are not even “semblance.”

We are, on occasion, what can occupy its place and make reign there—what?—what certainly…
to keep to this immediate of today
…allows us to say that after all the analyst, in all the orders of discourse, which are in any case those that are currently supported…
and this word “currently” is not nothing if we give to “act” its full Aristotelian sense
…of all the discourses that are currently supported, it is indeed the analyst who, by putting the object (a) in the place of the semblance,
is in the most suitable position to do what it is right to do,
namely to question, to question as of knowledge, what is the case with truth. What is knowledge?

It is strange that apart from Descartes…
whose being at the threshold of modern science is not for nothing, not the only one but still
…before Descartes, the question of knowledge was never posed. [scientific discourse: H]

That, in a way, it took that something which is analysis and which came to announce to us
– that there is knowledge that does not know itself
– and that it is, properly speaking, a knowledge that is supported by the signifier as such,
– that a dream does not introduce any unfathomable experience, any mysticism, that it is read in what is said of it. [H discourse]

And that one can even go further: taking its equivocations in the most anagrammatic sense of the word, that it is at this point of language that a Saussure asked himself whether even in Saturnian verse,
where he found the strangest punctuations of writing, it was or was not intentional. [scientific discourse: H]

That is where Saussure, in a way, awaits Freud.
That is where the question of knowledge is renewed.

If you will pardon here something I will borrow from an entirely different register,
that of the “virtues” inaugurated by the Christian religion [Faith, Hope, Charity]…
but you will see that it is not misplaced since
we will indeed have to come to speak of the said religion
…there is there a kind… a kind of late effect, of rejection, of offshoot, of “charity.”

What could possibly…
if not I know not what kinship, affinity with what, in the kind of that animal which is speaking
…partakes of the “gift,” as one says?
I see it nowhere else than in this “gift” of Freud: having told us that the unconscious had at least that little degree of priming, thanks to which misery [of speaking beings] could say to itself that there was something there that truly…
and not as had been said up to then
…transcended:
– nothing other than this language that this species inhabits,
– nothing other than this language, and that of this language it found itself, in sum, in what concerns its everyday life, having support of more reason than could appear, namely that this vain pursuit of an unattainable wisdom and always doomed to failure: there was already some of it there [un-known knowledge].

But then, do I need all this detour to pose the question, the question of knowledge in the form: “What is it that knows”?
Does one realize that it is the Other, the Other with a capital A as from the start I posed it as nothing other,
nothing other than the place where the signifier is posited, and without which nothing indicates to us that there is nowhere a said-mansion of truth—“said-mansion” in two words: the residence of the said— the said of which knowledge posits the Other as place. [wordplay: dit-mansion (said-mansion) echoing dimension; “residence of the said”]

The status of knowledge implies as such that there is already knowledge, and in the Other,
that it is to be taken—in 2 words—which is why it is made of learning, in a single one [word]. [wordplay: à prendre (to be taken) / apprendre (to learn)]
The subject results from the fact that this knowledge must be learned, and even priced (p.r.i.c.e.),
that is to say that it is its cost that evaluates it not as exchange but as use.
[this knowledge is not bought (no exchange value), its (use) value comes from what it costs to acquire it]

Knowledge is worth exactly as much as it costs a lot—“fine cost” in two words and c.o.s.t. with a grave accent—
a fine cost from the fact that one must put one’s skin into it, from the fact that it is difficult,
difficult, difficult in what?—well, less in acquiring it than in enjoying it.
There, in enjoyment, its conquest as knowledge, its conquest is renewed in the “each time” that this knowledge is exercised.
The power it gives remaining always turned toward its jouissance.

It is strange that this has never been brought out, that the sense of “knowledge” is entirely there, that the difficulty of its exercise itself, that is what heightens that of its acquisition. It is from the fact that at each exercise this acquisition repeats, that there is no question of which of these repetitions, which is to be posited as 1st, in its learned-ness.

Of course there are things that run and that quite look like they work like little machines,
and they are called computers, but who is going to say…
that a computer thinks: I am willing to
…but that it knows, who is going to say it?

The foundation of a knowledge is what I have just said:
it is that the jouissance of its exercise is the same as that of its acquisition.
It is thus, since—as you see—there one meets in a sure way, surer than in Marx himself,
what concerns a use value, since in Marx as well it is there only to make an ideal point
in relation to exchange value where everything is summed up.

And precisely let us talk about this “learned” that does not rest on exchange [mercantile],
the knowledge of a Marx himself, since I have just evoked it.
Well, from the knowledge of a Marx himself in politics—which is not nothing—
– well then, one does not do “Commarxe,” if you allow me, [pun: comme Marx (like Marx) / “Commarxe”]
– no more than one can, from that of Freud, make “fraud.” [pun: Freud / fraud; “to act as if,” is to use a knowledge without having acquired it: parrot-talk → fraud]

One only has to look to see that everywhere one does not find them again, these knowledges, without having made them enter one’s skin
through hard experiences, well then it falls flat: it is neither imported nor exported. [→ what transmission? → experience VS teaching]
There is no information that holds, except to the measure of a “trained for use.”

Thus it is deduced, from the fact that knowledge is in the Other, that it owes nothing to being, except that the latter may have carried the letter of it. Hence it results that being can kill where the letter reproduces, but reproduces never the same, never the same being of knowledge.

I think you feel there—eh?—as regards knowledge the function I give to the letter.
It is the one about which I beg you not to slip too quickly toward so-called “messages,”
it is the one that makes it analogous to a germen, this germen that we must so strictly…
if we are in the line of physics… of molecular physiology
…that we must so strictly separate from the bodies alongside which it carries life and death all together.
Marx and Lenin, Freud and Lacan, [Laughter] are not coupled in being, it is by the letter they found, [Marx read by Lenin, Freud read by Lacan] found in the Other, that as being of knowledge they proceed, two by two, in a supposed Other.
The new of their knowledge is that what is not supposed—what?—is that the Other knows nothing about it!

Not of course “the being that made letter there,” for it is indeed of the Other that it made letter at its expense, at the price of its being,
at the price of its being—my God—for each: not “nothing at all,” but also not “very much.”
To tell the truth, these beings, these beings from which one makes by the letter, I will make you a little confidence about them: I don’t think…
despite everything that one may have told for example about Lenin
…that hate or love, that hainamoration really choked any of them.

Don’t tell me stories about Mrs. Freud, eh?
On that I have Jung’s testimony; he told the truth, it was even his fault: he told only that. [Laughter]
Those who manage to make these sorts of “rejections of being,” moreover, are rather those who partake of “mis-price,”
which I will have you write this time—since today I am amusing myself with a-price and the rest— m.i.s.-p.r.i.c.e., [pun: mépris (contempt) / prix (price)]
that makes Uniprix. [Laughter]…we are all the same in the time of “supermarkets,”
so one must know what one is capable of producing, even in the matter of being. Yeah…

The annoying thing is this, that the Other, the place, itself—as I told you—knows nothing.
One can no longer hate God if he himself knows nothing, nothing of what happens especially.
When one could hate him, one could believe that he loved us, since he did not return it to us.
It was not apparent, despite that in certain cases… people put their whole weight into it.

Anyway, as I come to the end of these discourses that I have the courage to pursue before you,
I would like, since it is an idea that comes to me and after all it is also an idea I have thought about a very little bit— isn’t it?—that Christ in sum, whose misfortune is explained to us by an idea of saving men, I find rather that it was a matter of saving God, by finally giving back a little presence, a little actuality,
to this hatred of God, on which of course we are—for cause—rather limp.

It is from there that I say that the imputation of the unconscious, isn’t it, is an incredible act of charity:
they know, the subjects know, but anyway, all the same, they do not know everything.
At the level of this “not-all,” there is only the Other left not to know.
It is the Other that makes the not-all, precisely insofar as it is the part of the “not knowing at all” in this not-all.

So—momentarily, of course—it can be convenient to make it responsible,
to make it responsible for this to which analysis comes, to which analysis comes in the most avowed way,
except that nobody notices it, it is that in sum if desire, libido, is masculine, well then the dear woman,
it is precisely that from where she is “whole,” that is to say from where man sees her, and only there, that she can have an unconscious.
And what use is that to her? Well it is of use to her—as everyone knows—to make the speaking being speak, here reduced to the man, that is to say…
I don’t know if you have noticed it well in analytic theory
…to exist only as mother.

She has effects of the unconscious, but her unconscious, at the limit where she is not responsible after all for the unconscious of everyone, isn’t it, that is to say at the point where the Other she has to deal with—the big Other—where the Other makes it so that she knows nothing, because he, the Other—it is too clear—knows all the less since it is very difficult to sustain his existence, isn’t it,
well then one cannot say that all this gives her the best part. Yeah…

Last time I played—as I allow myself—on the somewhat far-fetched equivocation
of “he hates” and “he is.” I do not enjoy it, except in posing the question that it, [the equivocation] be worthy of the pair of scissors.
That is precisely what is at issue in castration. [Lacan’s laughter]
That being provokes hate—as such!—is let us say not excluded.

Because if the whole business of Aristotle was to conceive being as that by which the “less being” beings
participate in the highest of beings, it is tremendous… it is tremendous that Saint Thomas succeeded in reintroducing that
into a Christian tradition which of course, for having spread among the “Gentiles,”
was in the end forced to have formed itself there entirely, so that he only had to pull on the strings for it to work again.

But anyway does one realize that in the Jewish tradition the cut does not pass from the most perfect to the less perfect,
that the less perfect is simply what it is, namely radically imperfect,
and that one strictly only has to obey, to finger and to eye—if I dare express myself thus—him who bears a name: Yahweh,
with moreover a few other names in the entourage, which are not excluded as such,
but this one made the choice of his people and there is no going against it.
Is it not laid bare there that it is much better than “to being-hate,” to “betray him” on occasion? [pun: être-haïr (being-hate) echoing trahir (to betray)]
And that is what, obviously, the Jews did not refrain from; they could not get out of it otherwise.
We are, on this subject of hate, so smothered that nobody notices that a hate, a solid hate,
is addressed to being, to the very being of someone who is not necessarily God.

One remains…
and that is indeed why I said that the (a) is a semblance of being
…one remains with the notion…
and that is where analysis as always, well, is a little bit lame
…one remains with jealous hate, the one that springs from “jealouissance,” from the one that “image-gushes” from the gaze, [pun: jalousie (jealousy) + jouissance; and neologism echoing s’imaginer + jaillisse (to gush)]
in Saint Augustine who observes it, the little fellow, he is there as third,… he observes the little fellow
and he sees that “pallidus,” he pales from observing, hanging on the teat, his conlactaneum suum.

Yes, fortunately it is the first substitutive jouissance, isn’t it, in Freudian enunciation,
desire evoked of a metonymy, which is inscribed from a demand supposed addressed to the Other,
from this core of what I called “Ding,” in my article… in my seminar on psychoanalysis…
on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, the Freudian Thing in other words.
The “neighbor” himself, whom Freud refuses to love beyond certain limits, isn’t it.
The child looked at—he—has the a! Is having the a, being it?

That is the question on which I leave you today, and if you want to read, between now and the next time I see you, that is to say if my memory is good on April 10, what I wrote on the Bedeutung des phallus, on The Signification of the Phallus
in French, if you want to read it, you will see what the last question I am leaving you with leads to.